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LEONIDAS OF TARENTUM

NOTES AND QUERIES

THE surviving century of epigrams by this tedious writer was edited with a commentary by J. Geffcken in 1896,¹ and they were included in A. Veniero's *Poeti de l'Antol. Pal.* (1905) and A. Olivieri's *Epigrammatisti Gr. d. Magna Grecia* (1950?), but the inquirer who is not content with Geffcken's explanations or with his frequent silences will rarely find satisfaction in Veniero, and Olivieri's comments are almost exclusively translated from Geffcken. I have not a great deal to offer by way of supplement, but as a preliminary it may be worth while to consider the five epigrams which have been held to throw light on the poet's date, and first *A.P.* 6. 334, on which the authorities rely with varying degrees of confidence for placing his birth in or before 315 B.C.²

A.P. 6. 334 commemorates the offering of cakes and a cup of wine to Hermes, Pan, and rustic powers by an Aeacid named Neoptolemus. This, said Geffcken, accepting an identification so far as I know first made by Knaack,³ must be the Neoptolemus who ruled Epirus jointly with Pyrrhus and was murdered by him in or before 295 B.C.⁴ Since the lines are in the manner of Anyte, Geffcken said the epigram must be epideictic, for Leonidas could not have imitated Anyte as early as 295. Later (*R.E.* xii. 2023), persuaded by B. Hansen,⁵ he said it was not epideictic. When an epigram might on the face of it be either inscriptional or epideictic I am not among those who can tell you beyond a peradventure which it is,⁶ nor, if an Epirote prince made a trifling offering at a rustic shrine, do I know in which way it is the more likely to have been commemorated; but perhaps for the present purpose it does not matter, for whichever it is, if the lines relate to Pyrrhus' co-regent, they are more likely to have been written before than after his murder.⁷ The chance that they do in fact refer to him is, however, remote. Neoptolemus is a common name, and likely, for obvious reasons, to have been particularly favoured in the Aeacid family. At least three other Aeacids who bore it in historic times are known,⁸ probably other Neoptolemi whose origin is unknown were Aeacids, and no doubt there were other Aeacid Neoptolemi who have left no trace behind them. If Leonidas, a Tarentine, was writing in Epirus before 295 B.C.⁹ he can hardly have been

¹ *Jahrb. Cl. Phil.*, Supplementh. xxiii. 1-164, and separately published. Geffcken included seventeen epigrams by L. in his *Gr. Epigramme* (1916).

² Geffcken p. 132, and in *R.E.* xii. 2023, Knaack in *Susemihl Gesch. gr. Lit. d. Alexandrinerzeit* ii. 535, Christ-Schmidt-Stählin *Gr. Lit.* ii. 157, Wilamowitz *Hell. Dicht.* i. 139.

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⁶ Somebody, perhaps Cephalas, seems long ago to have felt this doubt, for the epigram appears not only among the *Ἀναθηματικά* of Bk. 6 but also (after 328) among

the *Ἐπιδεικτικά* of Bk. 9.

⁷ I see nothing to recommend Reitzenstein's view (*Ep. u. Skol.* p. 191) that L.'s Neoptolemus is an imaginary rustic so named in compliment to the prince, but this argument would still hold good if it were true.

⁸ (i) The maternal grandfather of Alexander the Great (*R.E.* xvi. 2463). (ii) The ἀρχιναυσιστής of Alexander killed by Eumenes (*ibid.* 2464). (iii) The father of the child whose epitaph begins *Ἀλεξάνδρος γένος εἰμί, Νεοπόλεμος δὲ πατὴρ μου* (Peck *Gr. Vers-Inschrift.* i. 1063 (1st cent. B.C.?; Macedonian)).

⁹ Schmidt-Stählin would push L.'s dates still further back because two flute-girls who, in *A.P.* 5. 206, dedicate their instruments to

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born later than 315, but there is no valid reason for supposing that he was so writing.

The four remaining epigrams, though not necessarily involving a birth-date as early as 315 B.C., are used in support of the common statement that Leonidas was a contemporary of Pyrrhus.¹ The two next to be considered must be taken together.

A.P. 6. 129 is a dedication to Athena *Κορυθαία* of eight panoplies taken from Lucanian infantry by an unknown Hagnon, who is called *ὁ βιαιομάχος*. A.P. 6. 131 is also a dedication to Athena of Lucanian spoils but differs in that no dedicator is named, that Athena has no cult-title, and that cavalry are mentioned. The relation between the two quatrains is not plain. They might refer to different engagements, but Leonidas has elsewhere two epigrams on the same theme,² and these might be either two dedications arising from the same battle, or 131 might be, as Geffcken thought, an epideictic variant of 129. Geffcken originally dated them before 295 B.C. because he supposed Leonidas at that date to be writing for Neoptolemus in Epirus. Later³ he put them before 281 B.C. because in that year the Lucanians and Tarentines were allied against Rome. Whether that alliance ended their inveterate hostility history does not make plain, and, if this line of argument is to be pursued, the end of the next decade, when both finally submitted to Rome, might be a safer *terminus ante quem*. It is however a precarious line since there is no certainty that the dedications were Tarentine. Leonidas was indeed a Tarentine by birth, but we have no idea when or why he left his native town, and its vicissitudes in the fifty years before it submitted to Rome may have driven him to early exile, whether voluntary or enforced. Lucanians had other enemies in Italy besides Tarentum (Thurii for example), nor can we be sure that the vanquished in these epigrams were not, as in A.P. 6. 130, to which I shall come shortly, mercenaries, fighting perhaps in a foreign country.⁴ Athena may no doubt have been called *Κορυθαία* in more places than one, but her only known cult under that title was on the west coast of Messenia near Pylos, and the Peloponnese saw plenty of fighting in the third century.

A.P. 9. 25 is six lines to be inscribed in a copy of the *Phaenomena* of Aratus which the author had read at best perfunctorily.⁵ The author is not quite certainly Leonidas since Planudes ascribes the lines to Antipater, but this is

the Muses are called *Ἀντιγυνεῖσιν παῖδες*. The famous flautist of that name probably died about 370 B.C., but if the phrase is not merely a way of saying that the girls were flautists (so Geffcken), and they were really related to him, they could as well have been great-nieces or great-great-granddaughters. It is also possible that the epigram is epideictic and the girls imaginary. Knaack's guess that the Syracusan Orthon who comes to a bad end in A.P. 7. 660 was Agathocles' envoy to Cyrene in 308 B.C. (Diod. 20. 40) has no particular likelihood, and in any case the epigram is by Theocritus, not by L.

¹ Pyrrhus was apparently born in 319 B.C. (Klotzsch *Epeir. Gesch.* p. 95); he was killed at Argos in 272.

² A.P. 6. 293, 298; 7. 478, 480; *Plan.*

306 f.; and perhaps A.P. 7. 448 f. (see p. 116 below); Cf. 6. 204 f.

³ *R.E.* xii. 2023.

⁴ I do not know that Lucanian mercenaries are anywhere specifically mentioned, but *βάρβαροι* from Italy had fought for Carthage against Dionysius in the fourth century (Diod. 14. 95), and, among other Italians, Agathocles had Samnites, Hannibal Bruttians, in their armies (Diod. 20. 11, 64, Polyb. 11. 19. 3, Liv. 30. 33. 6). There is no reason to suppose that Lucanians would have been harder to recruit.

⁵ Aratus is praised for his account of *ἀστέρων . . . ἀπλανέας τ' ἀμφὺ καὶ ἀλήμονας*, though he himself (454) expressly excludes the planets on the ground that he is incompetent to deal with them.

probably a slip due to the fact that in *A. Plan.* epigrams by Antipater precede and follow, and Leonidas' authorship is generally accepted. The *Phaenomena* is usually dated shortly after 277 B.C., but by Wilamowitz (on second thoughts)¹ in the next decade. The date however gives merely a *terminus post quem*, for the epigram might have been written at any time thereafter, and since its author says Ἀπρίτω . . . ὅς ποτε . . . ἀστέρας ἐφφάσατο it is reasonable to suppose that the publication was not recent.

The last of the epigrams calling for consideration here is *A.P.* 6. 130, and it is the only one of the five to offer a precise date. It is a dedication by Pyrrhus in the temple of Athena Ἰτωνίς (in Phthiotid Achaea) of spoils taken in 273 B.C. from Antigonus' Gaulish rearguard. Leonidas' authorship of the lines, though usually accepted, was denied by Geffcken,² who said that Leonidas could not have written for Pyrrhus since he did so for Neoptolemus, whom Pyrrhus had murdered, and for Aratus, who was a protégé of Antigonus. The first supposition has been criticized above, and one may praise an author's book (possibly many years later) without approving his politics; and if there is any weight in such arguments a weightier would be that he had written for the vanquishers of the Lucanians, who had welcomed Pyrrhus on his arrival in Italy.³ But I do not think there is any weight. We know next to nothing of Leonidas' life except that he was an impoverished wanderer⁴ and there is not much evidence that he was ever anything else;⁵ and such a person, I conceive, would be likely to cry a plague on all their houses and write for anyone who would feed or pay him.

Nevertheless for quite different reasons I think this epigram should be regarded as anonymous and excluded from Leonidas' works. It stands in *A.P.* between the two Lucanian epigrams, which are there headed Λεωνίδου (-δα), and it is written continuously with *A.P.* 6. 129 as though part of that epigram.

¹ *Hell. Dicht.* ii. 276; in *Gött. Nachr.* 1894 p. 198 he had said merely 'after 276 B.C.'

² P. 12.

³ *Plut. Pyrrh.* 13.

⁴ *A.P.* 6. 300, 302, 7. 715, 736. 7. 715 is L.'s epitaph, and it is here unimportant whether L. wrote it himself or not; but Geffcken's argument that he could not have known that he would be buried far from home is absurd. It has been, or seemed, obvious to countless people long before their death that they would never see their homeland again.

In the absence of more conclusive evidence for L.'s life too little importance has perhaps been attached to *A.P.* 9. 719, a couplet on Myron's *Cow* at Athens, and to *A. Plan.* 182, an epichastic epigram on the *Anadyomene* of Apelles at Cos. Others, it is true, wrote on the painting (*A. Plan.* 178 ff.), and the composition of couplets on the *Cow* was to become a positive *tic* (*A.P.* 9. 713 ff., 793 ff.); and no doubt many epigrams on these themes are by authors who had not seen the works in question. The fashions however must have originated from somebody who had seen them, and unless some of the

anonymous epigrams on the *Cow* are earlier, L. seems to have been the first to write on either. L.'s versification of a sentiment ascribed in *Diog. L.* 4. 49 to Bion the Borysthenite (*Stob.* 4. 52. 28) might be the product of a visit to Athens, and so might *A.P.* 7. 472 if Geffcken was right in tracing its ideas back to Crantor. There is nothing to confirm a visit to Cos, but if *A.P.* 6. 110, which records an exploit on the Meander, is by L. and not by Mnasalces, it suggests wanderings east of the Aegean. The Spartan references in *A.P.* 7. 19, 9. 320 cannot be considered significant, but the complete absence in so large a body of epigrams of any reference to Egypt is sufficiently noticeable to suggest that, unlike many third-century poets, L. had no contact with Alexandria.

⁵ In *A.P.* 7. 736 L. commends a settled life, however humble, in preference to that of a wanderer, and in 6. 302, as an old man, he tells mice that they will find no pickings in his καλύβη (an idea suggested perhaps by a joke of Diogenes recorded in *Diog. L.* 6. 40). It is possible therefore that L. may ultimately have found a resting-place.

The lemmatist has marked it as separate by providing it with a lemma but he has not named its author. Planudes, who has the three epigrams in the same order, heads them respectively *Λεωνίδου—τοῦ αὐτοῦ—τοῦ αὐτοῦ*, and the only authority for Leonidas' authorship of 130 is thus Planudes, who was presumably guessing. It was, in the circumstances, a natural enough guess, but 130 is an intruder in this context. One would expect the two Lucanian epigrams 129 and 131 to stand next to each other whether in Leonidas' collected poems or in Meleager's *Garland*, and since 131 is followed by Nossis on spoils taken from the Bruttians, 129, 131, 132 make a compact group which 130, on a very different people, disturbs. That of course does not prove 130 not to be by Leonidas, but if it reached the *Anthology* not from Leonidas' collected epigrams but from the stone, either directly or through a prose author who recorded it,¹ it is intelligible that it should have been inserted in its present place, for it begins *τοῖς θυρεοῖς* and 129 *ὀκτῶ τοι θυρεοῖς*, and the resemblance between the openings would account for the poems being placed in juxtaposition.

Similar, and possibly illuminating, phenomena occur in connexion with L. in *A.P.* 7. Two epigrams (448 f.) on Pratalidas are run together, and again the lemmatist distinguishes them with a lemma but no author's name. The second is properly placed and does not disturb a sequence, but it is not plain whether, as Geffcken thought, it is a second version of 448 and covered by the ascription of that epigram, or rather an imitation by some later writer. *A.P.* 7. 479 is on the tomb of Heraclitus, damaged by the encroachments of a road. It stands between two epigrams by Leonidas on the tombs of unnamed persons similarly broken open by a road, and here 479 is intrusive, for, like 6. 129 and 131, one would expect 7. 478 and 480 to stand together.² Unlike 6. 130 however, 7. 479 has not adhered to either of its neighbours and its author's name is preserved. It is not by Leonidas but by Theodoridas.³

Examination of these five epigrams has shown, I hope, that the first four cannot be dated, and that the fifth, which can, is not at all likely to be by Leonidas. If the fog which enshrouds Hellenistic literary chronology were less dense, if one knew how such fragile and seemingly ephemeral works as epigrams (particularly those by writers who are not known to have been in contact with centres of literary life) came to be as widely circulated as they evidently were, if, when two epigrams by different authors seem to be related, it were as easy as Geffcken and others profess to find it to distinguish which is original and which copy⁴—then one might form a clearer idea of Leonidas' dates. The

¹ It is quoted, naturally with no author's name, in Diod. 22. 22, Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26, Paus. 1. 13. 2.

² The placing of the two intruders is odd, for if in these contexts at all *A.P.* 6. 130 should be before 129 or after 132, and 7. 479 before 478 or after 480. It may be seen from p. 114 n. 2 above that if the intruders were removed *A.P.* would unite all the pairs among L.'s epigrams except 6. 293, 298, which are both in the same unsuitable context. I forbear however to speculate on these mysteries.

³ In my *Greek Anthology: sources and attributions* (p. 36) I illustrate further the risk of erroneous attribution which arises when epigrams are run together.

⁴ Geffcken (p. 146 and *R.E.* xii. 2023) lists the authors with whom he traces connexions in L. To take an example from epigrams already mentioned, L., in the second Lucanian epigram (*A.P.* 6. 131), says that the dedicated spoils regret their former owners. Nossis, in the following epigram, says that the shields do not regret the cowardly Bruttians, who threw them away, but praise the valour of their Locrian captors, and so, according to Geffcken, 'overtrumps' L. It may be reasonable to suspect some connexion between the two epigrams, but I do not myself see how priority is to be established except by chronology.

problem is not in itself of great importance, but for the history of Hellenistic epigram it is of some interest. The heyday of the genre is the earlier part and middle of the third century, when not only Asclepiades and Callimachus but several other writers less extensively preserved had things to say and said them with ease and elegance. It is not however of Asclepiades or Callimachus that Leonidas reminds us but (to take again poets preserved in comparable bulk) of Dioscorides, probably at the end of the third century, and still more of Antipater of Sidon in the second—a resemblance due of course in part to the fact that Antipater is Leonidas' sedulous imitator. Leonidas, wrote Wilamowitz,¹ 'does not deserve the honorable name of poet, and is not even an artist in language', and others have expressed similar opinions less pithily.² Naturally that does not prove that Leonidas cannot have been contemporary with Callimachus or even Asclepiades, for a ripe fruit may already have a rotten patch, but it is a warning that such a dating should not be accepted without good reason, and I have tried to show that the reasons are not good. I cannot replace them with better, and have no firm suggestion to make about Leonidas' date, but the considerations just mentioned, and Leonidas' deplorable popularity with later and worse epigrammatists, encourage the suspicion that he is usually dated substantially—possibly as much as half a century—too early.

With this unfortunately inconclusive discussion I turn to lines on the elucidation of which I have something to say. Again unfortunately, I cannot solve any of the major problems presented by Leonidas,³ and my notes for the most part deal with minor points. Except that in two cases I have put together kindred passages, I take the epigrams in the order in which they occur in *A.P.* and *Plan*.

A.P. 6. 204. 3: πέλκυν ρυκάναν τ' εὐαγέα.

Εὐαγής and *-αγής* (proposed by L. Dindorf) would suit the axe but not the plane;⁴ *εὐάκης* (Ruhnken), *-θαγής* (Meineke), *-άρης* (Stadtmueller), would suit both; so would *εὐπαγής* (Geffcken), though plane better than axe. If Leonidas used any of these he may of course have meant the adj. to qualify both nouns, but if he wanted one attaching strictly to the plane, *εὐαχέα*, mentioned but discarded by Meineke, would be better than any of them, for, apart from hammering, the ringing note of the plane is the most conspicuous sound in a carpenter's shop.

A.P. 6. 226. 1-3: τοῦτ' ὀλίγον) Κλείτωνος ἐπαύλιον ἢ τ' ὀλιγαῖλαξ
σπείρεσθαι, λιτός θ' ὁ σχεδὸν ἀμπελεών,
τοῦτό τε ῥωπεῖον ὀλιγόξυλον . . .

1 τοῦτ' ὀλίγον Jacobs; τοῦτο P 3 ῥωπεῖον Lobbeck; ρω παιων P; ῥωπεῖον Suid. s.v. ῥώπες

This is the humble home in which Cleiton nevertheless lived eighty years. *Ὀλίγον* in 1 is highly probable; *ῥωπεῖον* in 3 less certain, since the word does

¹ *Hell. Dicht.* 1. 143. Elsewhere he spoke of L.'s 'hohler Wortschaum' (*Timotheus* p. 55) and 'bombastische Gedankenleere' (*Textg. gr. Bukol.* p. 114).

² Reitzenstein's encomium (*Ep. u. Skol.* p. 145) seems to me quite undeserved.

³ I commend to the attention of scholars more ingenious than I particularly *A.P.* 5. 188, 7. 472, 648, 9. 320.

⁴ On ancient planes see Blümner *Techn.* ii. 227.

not occur, but evidently right in sense. I do not record the minor errors of P corrected from citations in Suidas.

The position of the def. art. in 2 shows that the adjectives are predicates—*this farm of C.'s is small*, not *this little farm is C.'s* (so Waltz) or *this is C.'s little farm*¹ (so Paton). 'Ολιγαῦλαξ, though glossed ἡ μικρὰ χώρα in Suidas, supports an inf., and must, like μικρ-, πολυαῦλαξ, ὁμῶλαξ, be an adj. though at present it lacks a substantive. Some feeble attempts to supply one are recorded by Stadtmueller, but it is easily found by writing ἡδ' for ἡ τ'—*this farm of C.'s is small and short of furrows for sowing, his vineyard* . . . That the first and most important noun will then have two predicates to the others' one seems rather an improvement than otherwise.

A.P. 6. 286. 1-4: τῆς πέξης τὰ μὲν ἄκρα τὰ δεξιὰ μέχρι παλαιστῆς
καὶ σπιθαμῆς οὐλῆς Βίττιον εἰργάσατο,
θάτερα δ' Ἀντιάνειρα προσήρμοσε, τὸν δὲ μεταξὺ
Μαϊάνδρον καὶ τὰς παρθενικὰς Βιτίη.

This simple piece is grossly misunderstood by Geffcken, and apparently by others. Three girls dedicate to Artemis an embroidered border for a garment (πέξα). The right-hand foot (παλαιστή καὶ σπιθαμή), says Leonidas, was made by Bittion, the left-hand by Antianeira, the meander and the girls in the middle by Bitie. Of course we are meant to see that Bittion's and Antianeira's subject was the same as Bitie's, and that Bitie's length was the same as theirs. The work, when put together, made a yard of embroidery depicting girls above (rather than below) a decorative border—a suitable length for the top edge of a χιτῶν if it was to be worn by a priestess or if the statue for which it was intended was life-size.

This is the earliest use of Μαϊάνδρος for a pattern (L. and S. please note), though we cannot be sure that it denotes the pattern now known by that name. Paton however, misled by the next epigram, said that Leonidas meant 'the actual river' Meander. In A.P. 6. 287 Antipater (it is not plain which of them) borrows Leonidas' theme and the girls' names, but now Bitie does dancing girls and λοῖζὰ Μαϊάνδρου ρεῖθρα παλμπλανέος while Antianeira does what is on the left, Bittion what is on the right, of the river. It is perhaps more likely that Antipater has deliberately changed the subject of the embroidery than that he misunderstood Leonidas, but even so a purely formal pattern, if known by the name of the river, might have been described as he describes it.

A.P. 6. 289. 3-6: ἃ μὲν τὸν μιτοεργὸν αἰδιδήγνον ἄτρακτον,
ἃ δὲ τὸν ὀρφνίταν εἰροκόμον τάλαρον,
ἃ δ' ἄμα τὰν πέπλων εὐάτριον ἐργάτων ἰστῶν
κερκίδα, τὰν λεχέων Πανελόπας φύλακα.

These are three sisters dedicating to Athena on retirement their spinning and weaving equipment, and vv. 4 and 5 have both given trouble. In 4 τάλαρος is the basket shaped like a truncated cone, used for various purposes and often, as here, as a receptacle for wool.² 'Ορφνίτας, which does not occur elsewhere, was connected by Jacobs with ὀρφανός and translated *vacuus*.

¹ Paton translated *cottage*, but the word is not confined to buildings, as may be seen

from Plut. *Mor.* 508 D, Ditt. *Syll.*² 344. 98.

² See my notes on Theocr. 5. 86, 18. 32.

Others derive it from ὄρφη and see a reference to the prolongation of the girls' working hours into the night, a favourite theme in such contexts and used by Leonidas in *A.P.* 7. 726.¹ Here the derivation of the word is no doubt right but the interpretation unsatisfactory. Ὀρφνίτας with the reference postulated would be suitable enough to ἀτρακτος and κερκίς, but to τάλαρος, which is a receptacle, not an implement, it is unsuitable. Ὀρφνίταν and εἰροκόμον have naturally enough been regarded as epithets of τάλαρον, and the second word is an adj. in *Il.* 3. 387, Nonn. *D.* 6. 146; in *A.P.* 6. 160 however, an epigram by Antipater of Sidon which owes something to this, it is used substantivally, and so it is here. Ὀρφνίταν is an attribute, not of τάλαρον, but of εἰροκόμον, and that phrase is in apposition to τάλαρον as ἐργάτιν to κερκίδα in 5. The words mean the basket which looks after her wool at night.² The second girl, unlike Praxinoa's slovenly slave in Theocr. 15. 27, tidied up when work was over for the day.

In v. 5 ἰστοί, plur., might perhaps be used of a single loom, for in the preceding epigram Leonidas calls a shuttle τὰν ἰσῶν μολπάτιδα, and Antipater (l.c.) calls it ἰσῶν Πάλλαδος ἀκνύονα, though in both places the plurals might denote looms in general. A shuttle however is no manufacturer of loom(s), and the phrase ἰσῶν κερκίδα, isolated by punctuation in all texts except those of Stadtmueller and Waltz, is meaningless and was prudently omitted by Paton in his translation. Waltz, punctuating rightly at the end of the line, but clinging to the meaning *looms*, printed Desrousseaux's πετάλων for πέπλων and translated 'habile compagne des longs métiers', as though *long*, even if πέταλος were an adj. with that meaning, would be a suitable epithet for a loom. Stadtmueller seems to have seen what ought to have been obvious to all, that ἰσῶν here means not *looms* but *pieces of stuff*, that it is an objective gen. dependent on ἐργάτιν, and that πέπλων conceals a laudatory epithet. Fortunately it is sufficiently like the adj. most commonly used both in prose and verse to denote fine stuffs for correction to be easy. Λεπτῶν εὐάτριον ἐργάτιν ἰσῶν means *accomplished artificer of fine stuffs*. Λεπτῶν was suggested by Stadtmueller, who however unaccountably preferred πικνῶν.

A.P. 6. 298. 3: ὅπαν ἀσπλέγγιστον ἀχάλκωτόν τε κυνοῦχον.

These are among the spoils taken from a Cynic named Sochares. Encouraged perhaps by the fact that in a second epigram on the same subject (*A.P.* 6. 293) they include ὅλην ῥυπόεσσα, Jacobs said that the first phrase meant *amphulla nunquam a sordibus purgata*. What Geffcken thought it meant he did not say, but all other editors and translators, and also L. and S., follow Jacobs. No doubt that is what it ought to mean, but who would clean an oil-flask with a σπλεγγίς? Leonidas has carefully placed a similarly misused adj. in the next phrase to make it plain that he means *scraperless flask and copperless purse*, using the adjectives in the manner of Sophocles' ἀκάρπτωτος χάρις and ἀπυνδάκωτος κύλιξ.³ Scraper and flask are constant companions,⁴ but Sochares lacks one of the pair. So does Diogenes in another epigram by Leonidas (7. 67), for his baggage, declared to Charon, includes ὅλην and πήρη but no σπλεγγίς.

¹ I hope the editors, who print in v. 5 of this epigram εἶχρις ἐπ' ἡοῦς, could defend the gen., for I cannot. Hecker proposed ἡοῦν, a form used (beside ἡῶ) by L. in *A.P.* 7. 472 and by Hedylus *ap.* Ath. 11. 473A.

² In Antipater, l.c., the basket is called σάμονος ἀσκητοῦ καὶ τολύπας φύλακα. Cf. Cat. 64. 318.

³ *Aj.* 176, fr. 611.

⁴ See Meineke, *F.C.G.* ii. 1042.

Κυνόχως is used of bags of various kinds though it is not plain how the word came by that meaning.¹ One might expect Sochares, as in the other epigram, to carry the *πήρα* of Diogenes and other ascetic philosophers. Perhaps Leonidas, who is here indulging in verbal facetiae, thought the word suitable for a Cynic, or even recalled that on the analogy of *έστιούχως*, *πολιούχως* it might mean *Cynic-protector*.

A.P. 6. 305. 2:

δεισόζου Δωριέος κεφαλά.

When Meineke defended the adj. the noun *δείσα* was known only from Suidas. and *Et. Magn.*; in papyri however it is not at all rare. It means *weeds, filth, rubbish*, and the like, and the adj. will mean *stinking*. The common use of *κεφαλή* for *person* is illustrated by Blaydes on Ar. *Ach.* 285 ὦ μὰρὰ κεφαλῇ. Leonidas' seems the only instance where it carries the gen. of a proper name, but Sophocles and Euripides frequently so use *κάρα*.² Except however in O.C. 1657 τὸ Θησέως κάρα, which is made somewhat anomalous by the def. art. also, *κάρα* and *κεφαλή* in both uses carry an epithet, and it is plain that we should here read *δείσοζος*. Hecker said *hoc unum video nomini κεφαλὰ adiectivum addendum esse*,³ and no doubt he would have made this correction long ago if he had not taken against the adj. *δείσοζος* on the ground that it ought to be *δείσοδμος* or *-ώδης*. He overlooked both *βαρύοζος* (Diosc. 5. 106. 2) and Leonidas' adjectival frivolity. *Εὐρυχαδῆς* (for *-χανδῆς*) in the next couplet lacks even so much support.

A.P. 6. 309. 1f.:

Εὐφημόν τοι σφαῖραν ἐγκρόταλόν τε Φιλοκλῆς
Ἑρμείη ταύτην πυξινὴν πλατάγην κ.τ.λ.

This is a boy dedicating his toys on putting away childish things, and in a second couplet knucklebones and *ρόμβος* (bull-roarer or perhaps top)⁴ join ball and clapper.⁵ Brunck said that *εὐφημον* meant *silens*, because the ball was soft and made no noise; Waltz, following Passow, that it meant 'renommé—c'est à dire auquel il devait sa réputation d'adroit joueur', but few are likely to agree with either. Meineke's tentative suggestion that the word conceals the name of a second dedicator is unlikely in itself and discountenanced by the fact that the other votives are all decorated with attributes. Evidently an adj. is wanted, and there are at present on offer *εὐνητον*, *-πηκτον*, *-σημον*, *-σχημον*, *-φιμον*. Better sense than any of these will be produced by *εὐφυλλον*, which, in view of the common confusion between *Λλ* and *Μ*, is also nearer than the majority to the text.

Φύλλα, though the lexica conceal the fact, is the Greek word for the narrow, pointed oval (and leaf-like) segments which, when stitched together, will form the covering of a ball. So far as I know the noun occurs in that sense only in A.P. 14. 62 (anon., on a ball) *λίην ἐντριχὸς εἰμι, τὰ φύλλα δέ μου κατακρύπτει* |

¹ T. Reinach (*Rev. Phil.* liii. 99) thought it meant *dog-muzzle*, and hence a bag of that shape, but this does not seem very probable.

² Soph. *Ant.* 1 ὦ κοινὸν ἀντάδελφον
Ἰσμήνης κάρα, O.T. 40, 950, 1207, 1235, O.C. 321, 1657, Eur. *Cycl.* 438, *Hec.* 676, *Tr.* 661, *Or.* 476.

³ *Comm. Crit.* 1. 9.

⁴ See J.H.S. liv. 8.

⁵ These are pleasantly illustrated by Arist. *Pol.* 1340^b 26 τὴν Ἀρχύτου πλατάγην . . . ἣν διδῶσαι τοῖς παιδίοις ὅπως χρώμενοι ταύτη μὴδὲν καταγνώσκει τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν οὐ γὰρ δύναται τὸ νέον ἡσυχάζειν, Plut. *Mor.* 714^E δοτέον ὥσπερ παισὶν ἀτρεμεῖν μὴ δυναμένοις . . . πλατάγην καὶ σφαῖραν.

τὰς τρίχας εἰ τρύπη φαίνεται οὐδαμόθεν—a riddle, the difficulty of which turns however not on the misuse but on the ambiguity of the words. The rarity of the term is only natural. Makers of sports-equipment call such sections 'panels', cartographers who so divide the globe call them 'gores', but one would look far in literature before finding either word in that sense. Leonidas has enriched or encumbered the lexica with many εὐ- adjectives of his own invention, and has also, as here, put old ones to new uses, as, for example, εὐάτριος (6. 289 above), -οῖνος, -στοχος. The word εὐφυλλος might refer either to the stitching¹ or to the decoration, for children's balls are ποικίλαι, *pictae*, *prasinae*,² but it is perhaps not uncharitable to wonder how much thought Leonidas devoted to the meaning of the adjectival flowers with which he strewn our dusty paths.

A.P. 7. 283. 4. Meineke here altered the name Φυλλεύς to Φυλεύς, as in 9. 744. 1 he altered Σώτων to Σώτων, and all subsequent editors have followed him in both places. Φυλλεύς, however, occurs in Ditt. *Syll.*³ 238 A ii. 12, Σώτων in *ibid.* 669. 2, and both changes are unnecessary. In A. *Plan.* 190. 1 L. Dindorf⁴ and Wilamowitz⁵ both proposed Μόρυχος for Μόριχος, but the places just mentioned impose caution and Μόριχος is possibly an alternative form of the name.

A.P. 7. 408. 1-4: ἀτρέμα τὸν τύμβον παραμείβετε μὴ τὸν ἐν ὕπνῳ
πικρὸν ἐγείρητε σφήκ' ἀναπαύομενον,
ἄρτι γὰρ Ἰππώνακτος ὁ καὶ τοκεῶνε βαῦξας
ἄρτι κεκοίμηται θυμὸς ἐν ἡσυχίῃ.

3 τοκεῶνε Headlam;⁵ τοκέων εἰα P; τ. εἰ P1

The repetition of ἄρτι, said Geffcken airily, is 'alexandrinisch', and he cited four examples where the word appears in anaphora in balanced phrases⁶ but naturally none of such a lopsided sentence as this. Presumably one line has infected the other, and the simplest remedy would be to write ὦδε or τῇδε in the hexameter, for a demonstrative adverb would improve the sense.

A similar accident has, I fancy, occurred in A.P. 10. 1. 5 ff.

ἐκλύσαιο γύαια,
ναντίλε, καὶ πλώις πᾶσαν ἐφείς ὁδόνην.
ταῦθ' ὁ Πρίηπος ἐγὼν ἐπιτέλλομαι ὁ λιμενίτας,
ὠνθροφ', ὡς πλώις πᾶσαν ἐπ' ἐμπορίην.

In the last line the opt. in a final clause in primary time can be defended, but it would surprise even if πλώις did not occur as a wish at the same point in the previous pentameter. It is likely to be derived from there, and should be corrected. It would be possible to alter the termination alone, but better to go further and change the verb, writing ἀνάγῃ rather than πλώῃς.

The following πᾶσαν, if somewhat inelegant after the same word so placed in v. 6, would hardly arouse suspicion on its own account, but in conjunction

¹ A.P. 12. 44 (Glaucus) ῥαπτῇ σφαῖρα, Sen. *Q.N.* 4. 11.

² Dio Chrys. 8. 16, Ov. *Met.* 10. 262, Petron. 27.

³ *Thes.* v. 1205.

⁴ *Hell. Dicht.* ii. 110.

⁵ C.R. xv. 401 and on Hds vi. 13.

⁶ E.g. (to cite the shortest) A.P. 7. 167 ἄρτι τέκουσα | ἄρτι δὲ καὶ νύμφη. Equally and similarly irrelevant is his citation of Eur. Or. 1479 in defence of A.P. 7. 472. 11.

with *πλώεις* it incurs it. Possibly therefore *στέλλης αἰδῆς* or *αἴρης ἱστία* would be more like what Leonidas wrote.¹

A.P. 7. 503. 1: ὦ θινὸς ἐπεσσηλωμένον ἄχθος.

This address to the tomb of a drowned man ought not to require a gloss, but since L. and S. render the verb *to be set up as a column upon*, the translators mistranslate, and Geffcken says merely (as he does much too often) that the participle is 'leonideisch', it may be worth recording that the words mean *mound of sand crowned by a stēlē*. *Στηλοῦν* may mean *erect as a stēlē* (for which sand is an unpromising material), but it also means *mark out with stēlai*, as Ditt. O.G.I. 225. 30 (3rd cent. B.C.) *περιορίσαι καὶ στηλῶσαι τὴν χῶραν*.

A.P. 9. 326. 1: πέτρης ἐκ δισσοῦς ψυχρὸν καταπάλμενον ὕδωρ | χαίροις.

G. Dindorf² wrote *κατεπ-* here, and has been followed by all subsequent editors, who have not asked themselves the relevance of *-επ-* in this context. Where *κατεπάλμενος* occurs elsewhere (*Il.* 11. 94; *Ap. Rh.* 2. 583; *Opp. Cyn.* 3. 120) an objective for the jump is in plain view, as here it is not.³ Since therefore *καταφάλλομαι* is as suitable a formation as the other, and since Hesychius has *καταπάλμενος· καταπηδήσας* it will be prudent to let well alone; also to leave open the question whether these words belong to *ἄλλομαι* or to *πάλλομαι*.⁴

A. Plan. 230 1-3: μὴ σύ γ' ἐπ' οἰονόμοιο περίπλεον ἱλνός ὦδε
τοῦτο χαραδραίης θερμόν, ὀδίτα, πήης,
ἀλλὰ μολὼν μαλὰ τυτθὸν ὑπὲρ δαμαλήβωτον ἄκραν . . .

'*Ἐπ' οἰονόμοιο* (neut.) *in solitude*', say L. and S., following *virī doctissimi* whom Lobeck⁵ does not, and I cannot, name, and followed by Paton. This may be Greek (though I very much doubt it) but sense it is not. Thirsty travellers do not wait for company before drinking. Lobeck himself (followed by Meineke) altered *ἐπὶ* to *ἀπὸ* and said that *χαραδραίης* stood for *χ. πηγῆς* vel *λιβάδος*. The other modern editors (Duebner, Geffcken, Veniero, Olivieri) print *γε ποιονόμοιο* conjectured by Emperius.⁶ Geffcken translated 'trinke nicht das warme Wasser voll vom Wiedenschlamm des Baches', and did not say whether *χαραδραίης* was, as with Lobeck, doing duty as a substantive or whether it was a second epithet of *ἱλνός*. Lest anyone should complain that *ποιονόμος* was an odd epithet for mud he said it meant 'alles was zur Weide gehört', and he prefaced these comments with the words 'Man kann nicht schreiben μὴ σύ γ' ἀπ' οἰονόμοιο denn vom Schlamme der Schafweide kann nicht die Rede sein wo die *δαμαλήβωτος* ἄκρα folgt'.

Ἀπ' οἰονόμοιο was Lobeck's correction, and he said nothing about 'Schafweide', apparently taking the adj. to mean *lonely* or the like. I should have thought however that *δαμαλήβωτος*, so far from putting *οἰονόμοιο* out of court, made it highly probable that that word was what Leonidas wrote, and certain

¹ A strange and unsatisfactory explanation of the similarity between these two pentameters was advanced by Wilamowitz (*Hell. Dicht.* ii. 109).

² *Thes.* iv. 1339, s.v. *κατεφάλλομαι*.

³ So also with *κατέπαλτο* (*Il.* 19. 351, Nonn. *D.* 48. 614, Tryph. 478).

⁴ On which see Spitzner *Iliad*, excurs. 16.

⁵ *Paral.* 313.

⁶ Duebner said *praebuerunt RS et F*. I cannot discover any explanation of these sigla but guess them to denote apographa of Planudes.

that if he did so he meant *sheep-rearing* and not *solitary*. Surely the meaning is *do not drink the warm water, which is full of mud from the torrent, in the sheep-pasture, but pass on to where the heifers graze*. If a substantive is wanted with ἐπ' οἰονόμοιο ἄκρας could be supplied, but in view of the substantival use of ἄροτος and σπόριμος this seems unnecessary.

p. Ox. 662 (= Page G.L.P. p. 458):

ἀκρωρίτῃ Πανὶ καὶ ενπα[. . . .] Νύμφαις

Possibly ἐμπαγαῖσι as a Leonidean alternative for ἔνυδροι, πηγαῖαι, κρηνίδες, κρηνίδες, κρηναῖαι, κρουνίδες—a scandalous formation no doubt, but there are many such in Leonidas. In Antipater's imitation, which follows in the papyrus, the Nymphs are called Σιλήνων ἀλόχοις ἀντηρίσαι, but such variations occur elsewhere in imitated epigrams (cf. A.P. 6. 286 above) and this might be a distinction without a difference.

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POSTSCRIPT (p. 119): A.P. 6. 298 was, I now see, correctly explained by Wilamowitz (*Hell. Dicht.* i. 142 n. 2). Somewhat similar are ἀμύκητος καλύβη, *cowless* (A.P. 9. 150, 255; Antipater and Philip), and ἀνύμφετος λάγυνος (at least by implication) *unwatered* (ibid. 229; Marcus Argent.).

MARGINALIA SELECTA

II. LUCIAN¹

VOL. i, Reitz 88, *Iudicium Vocalium* 5. The so-called ἡμίφωνα are given as λ μ ν ρ σ ζ ξ and ψ by Dionysius Hal. *Comp.* 14.

91. Ibid. 7: μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ('as long as') ὀλίγοις (λόνοις) ἐπεχείρει (sc. τὸ Ταῦ) <τέτταρα καὶ> τετταράκοντα λέγον (MSS. also λέγων or -ειν) ἀποστερεῖν (MSS. also -οῦν) με τῶν συγγεγεννημένων μοι, συνθήθειαν ὦμην συντετραμμένων γραμμάτων, ἔτι τε (MSS. δὲ) 'τήμερον' καὶ τὰ ὁμοῖα ἐπισπώμενον ('drawing in') ἴδια ταυτὶ λέγειν (sc. ὦμην), καὶ οἷστον ἦν μοι τὸ ἀκουσμα καὶ οὐ πάνυ ἑδακνόμεν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς. ὁπότε δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἀρξάμενον ἐτόλμησε 'καττίτερον' εἰπεῖν κτλ.: <τέτταρα καὶ> Halm; for λόγοι 'words' cf. ἐνὶ λόγῳ, and for ἔτι τε Plat. *Phaedr.* 279 a, where some MSS. give εἴτε.

93. 8: ἐκ μέσων ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν τῶν κόλπων ἀρπάσαν: ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, which Attic prose uses to qualify a universal statement (involving πάντες or οὐδείς), is here used, like *ut ita dicam*, for 'so to speak'; so too at *Halc.* 2.

96-97. 11: καὶ ὁ μὲν τι καλὸν ἰδὼν "καλόν" εἰπεῖν αὐτὸ βούλεται, τὸ δὲ (Ταῦ) παρεισπεσὼν "ταλόν" εἰπεῖν αὐτοῦς ἀναγκάζει ἐν ἅπασι προεδρίαν ἔχειν ἀξιοῦν: in this context ταλόν must have some meaning: perhaps Τάλον, so spelt by Pausanias at 7. 4. 8, though he gives Τάλων (from Τάλως) at 8. 53. 5; for the mythical Cretans of this name, one of whom, nephew of Daedalus, was buried on the way up to the Acropolis at Athens (cf. Luc. *Pisc.* 43), see Roscher s. *Talos*. It may be relevant that Pausanias at 1. 21. 6 and 26. 5 calls this one Κάλως.

213 *Dialogi Deorum* 5. 1: καὶ τοῦτο γάρ, ὦ Ἥρα, ζηλοτυπεῖς ἤδη ἀφελὲς οὗτω καὶ ἄλυπον: MSS. ἀλυπότατον.

325 *Dialogi Marini* 15. 2: ἡ μὲν Εὐρώπη κατεληλύθει ἐπὶ τὴν ἡῶνα παίζουσα τὰς ἡλικιώτιδας παραλαβούσα: MSS. παίζουσα.

371 *Dialogi Mortuorum* 10. 9: Μένιππος οὐτοσὶ λαβὼν πέλεκυν τῶν ναυπηγικῶν ἀποκόψει αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν πύγωνα) ἐπισκοπ(άν)ῳ τῇ ἀποβάθρᾳ (of Charon's boat) χρησάμενος.

442-3. 27. 7: ὁ μὲν γὰρ Βλεφίας αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ κατηγορεῖ φθάσας (before I could) πολλὴν τὴν ἀνοιαν, ὅς ('seeing that he', MSS. ὡς) τὰ χρήματα ἐφύλαττε τοῖς οὐδὲν προσήκουσι κληρονόμοις κτλ.: for this use of the relative cf. Xen. *Mem.* 2. 7. 13 θανμαστὸν ποιεῖς, ὅς ἡμῖν μὲν ταῖς ἐριά σοι καὶ ἀρνας καὶ τυρὸν παρεχούσαις κτλ.; and so Sommerbrodt without comment.

495 *Charon* 4: ἀκούεις δὲ γε ἴσως καὶ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ ἐμοῦ πέρι [τοῦ Ἥρα-κλέους] ὡς διαδέξαιτό ποτε αὐτὸς ἐκείνον [τὸν Ἀτλαντα]: delete glosses, and correct MSS. αὐτὸν ἐκείνον with Hemsterhuys.

504. 11: οὐ γὰρ οἶσθα ὅσοι πόλεμοι διὰ τοῦτο ('gold') καὶ ἐπιβουλαὶ καὶ ληστῆρια καὶ ἐπιόρκια καὶ φόνοι καὶ δεσμὰ καὶ πλοῦς μακρὸς [sic] καὶ ἐμπορίαι καὶ δουλείαι; read πλοῦς (nom. pl.) μακροί, cf. Kühn.-Bl. i. 516 Anm. 5.

¹ My notes, originally made in Jacobitz i (1893), ii, and iii (1887), have been checked, where possible, for Reitz, Dindorf, Fritzsche, Sommerbrodt, and Harmon.

513. 17: εἰ δὲ εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐνενοῦν ὅτι θνητοὶ τε εἰσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ <τὸν> ὀλίγον τοῦτον χρόνον ἐπιδημήσαντες τῷ βίῳ ἀπίαςιν ὥσπερ ἐξ ὀνείρατος πάντα <τὰ> ὑπὲρ γῆς ἀφέντες, ἔζων τε ἂν σωφρονέστερον καὶ ἤττον ἡνῴωντο ἀποθανόντες.

590 *Piscator* 20: μισαλάζων εἰμι καὶ μισογῆς καὶ μισοφειδῆς καὶ μισόστροφος καὶ μισο-πάν τὸ τοιοντῶδες εἶδος τῶν μιᾶρῶν ἀνθρώπων: MSS. μισῶ πᾶν, and below λέγω δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ φίλου τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχουσαν: φιλαλήθης τε γὰρ καὶ φιλόκαλος κτλ., where Halm corrects φίλου to φίλο, cf. *Indoct.* 20 with Sommerbrodt's τῶν ὑπὸ τῷ ψεῦδο τεταγμένων (MSS. τὸ ψεῦδος), and *Ar. Vespr.* 77 and *Eg.* 131 ff. πώλης; somewhere in Comedy I have found τίς-οφῶν 'Mr. What-ophon' (cf. Xenophon).

610. 42: πιθανώτεροι γὰρ οἱ γόητες οὗτοι πολλάκις τῶν <ὡς> ἀληθῶς φιλοσοφούντων.

670 *Merc. Cond.* 15: εἰ πολλάκις 'if ever', cf. L. S. J. s.v. III (delete ὅπως after ἐπισκοπεῖν, with Dindorf).

737 *Laps.* 16: τάχα δ' ἂν τινα ἐκπλήξειε τῆς κατ' ὄρθον λογισμόν (sc. ὁδοῦ) καὶ στρατιωτῶν πλῆθος ὧν οἱ μὲν κτλ.: for τῆς MSS. have also τῶν and τὸν corrected to τοῦ.

809 *Herm.* 67: καίτοι ποσὰ (not πόσα) ἄλλα παρείδον ἐκὼν σοι ἐξετάσεως μακρᾶς καὶ αὐτὰ δεόμενα—B τὰ ποῖα.

813. 71: ὅπερ ἀδύνατον καὶ αὐτὸς λέγεις εἶναι. νῦν δὲ ὁμοῖόν μοι δοκεῖς ποιεῖν ὥσπερ εἰ τις δακρυοὶ καὶ αἰτιῶτο τὴν τύχην ὅτι μὴ δύναιτο ἀνελθεῖν εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν, ἢ ὅτι μὴ βύθιος ὑποδὺς εἰς τὴν θάλατταν ἀπὸ Σικελίας ἐς Κύπρον ἀναδύσεται, ἢ ὅτι μὴ ἀρθεῖς πτηνὸς αἰθημερὸν ἀπὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος εἰς Ἰνδοὺς τελεῖ: written in 165, all possible in 1958.

831-2 *Herod.* 1: τῆς γνώμης τὸ περιπτόν: 'the wide range of his (Herodotus') thought', cf. *Zeux.* 5 τὰ περιττὰ ἐπεδείξατο τῆς τέχνης.

Vol. ii, *Reitz* 12, *Hist. Conscrib.* 9: οἱ δὲ (MSS. also ὅσοι δὲ) οἴονται καλῶς διαμεῖναι ἐς δύο τὴν ἱστορίαν, εἰς τὸ τερπνὸν καὶ <τὸ> χρήσιμον . . . ὁρᾷς ὅσον τάληθους ἡμαρτήκασι;

51-52. 38: . . . ῥῆστον ἦν ἐνὶ καλᾷ λεπτῷ τὸν Θουκυδίδην ἀνατρέψαι μὲν τὸ ἐν ταῖς Ἐπιπολαῖς παρατείχισμα, καταδύσαι δὲ τὴν Ἑρμοκράτους τριήρη . . . καὶ τέλος Συρακουσίου μὲν ἐς τὰς λιθοτομίας ἐμβαλεῖν, τοὺς δὲ Ἀθηναίους περιπλεῖν [*sic*] Σικελίαν καὶ Ἰταλίαν μετὰ τῶν πρώτων τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἐλπίδων: we want the aorist infinitive of 'make to sail round'; περιεῖναι from an otherwise unknown περιήμι (cf. περιῶν for περιῶν) would certainly be corrupted; else read περιπέμψαι κτλ.

90 *Vera Hist.* i. 24: τῇ μέντοι γε γαστρὶ ὅσα πῆρε χρῶνται τιθέντες (the Selenites) ἐν αὐτῇ ὅσων δέονται· ἀνοικτὴ γὰρ αὐτοῖς αὕτη καὶ πάλιν κλειστὴ ἔστιν (perhaps παλιγκλειστὴ). ἔντερον δὲ οὐδὲν οὐδὲ ἦπαρ <οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδέν> ἐν αὐτῇ φαίνεται ἢ τοῦτο μόνον, ὅτι δασεῖα πᾶσα ἐντοσθεν καὶ λασίς ἔστιν, ὥστε καὶ τὰ νεογνά, ἐπειδὴν ῥίγος ἦ, ἐς ταύτην ὑποδύεται: the first οὐδέν has some MS. support, cf. Sommerbrodt, p. 208; for Nilén's ῥίγος ἦ MSS. have ῥιγῶσι(ν) or ῥιγῶση; was this trait suggested by travellers' tales of the marsupials of New Guinea, or Australia?

91. 26: καὶ μὴν καὶ ἄλλο θαῦμα ἐν τοῖς βασιλείοις ('of the King of the Moon') ἐθεασάμην· κάτωπτρον μέγιστον κεῖται ὑπὲρ φρέατος οὐ πάνυ βαθέος· ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐς τὸ φρεᾶρ καταβῇ τις, ἀκούει πάντων τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ γῇ λεγομένων, ἐὰν δὲ

ἐς τὸ κάτοπτρον ἀποβλήθη, πάσας μὲν πόλεις, πάντα δὲ ἔθνη ὁρᾷ ὥσπερ ἐφεστῶς ἐκάστοις: wireless and television in the second century; the method was perhaps suggested by seeing, as you can, the stars by day from the bottom of a well.

158 *Tyrannicida* 21: ἀπέθανον ἄν, ἀλλ' ἢ ὡς [sic] τύραννος μόνον, ἀλλ' ἔτι νομίζων ἔξεν ἐκδικον ('avenger'): read ἀλλ' ἢ deleting ὡς as gloss on ἦ.

207 *Phalaris* 2. 12: καὶ μὴν ἐξ ἐκείνου μὲν τοῦ παλαιοῦ ἔθους, τοῦ ἀνέδην καὶ πᾶσιν ἐξεῖναι [sic], ὁρᾷτε ὅσων ἀγαθῶν ἐμπέπλησται τὸ ἱερὸν κτλ.: read εἰσιέναι.

295. *Saltatio* 46 fin.: . . . ἡ κατὰ Παλαμήδους ἐπιβουλὴ καὶ ἡ Ναυπλίου ὄργη καὶ ἡ <θατέρου> Αἰάντος μανία καὶ ἡ θατέρου ἐν ταῖς πέτραις ἀπώλεια.

299. 58: . . . καὶ τὰ νεώτερα δὲ ὅσα μετὰ τὴν Μακεδόνων ἀρχὴν ἐτολήθη ὑπὸ τε Ἀντιόχου (MSS. Ἀντιπάτρου or Ἀντιγόνου) καὶ παρὰ Σελεύκου ἐπὶ τῷ Στρατονίκῃς ἔρωτι.

310. 78: ὀρχήσῃ δὲ καὶ τὰ ὠτων καὶ <τὰ> ὀφθαλμῶν πάρεστιν: so Sommerbrodt without comment.

319 *Lexiphanes* 1: τὸν μὲν εἰρώνα πέδοι κατάβαλε: MSS. πεδοί. corr. Kaibel.

326. 4 καὶ γὰρ τῷ (MSS. τὰ) κόρα μοι ἐπιτεθόλωσθον καὶ σκαρδαμυκτῷ κτλ.: Sommerbrodt τῷ without comment, MSS. also σκαρδαμύττω.

408 *Amores* 11: καὶ δόξαν ἡμῖν Κνίδω προσορμίσαι κατὰ θέαν τοῦ Ἀφροδίτης ἱεροῦ [sic]—ὑμνεῖται δὲ τούτου τὸ τῆς Πραξιτέλους εὐχερείας ὄντως ἐπαφρόδιτον—ἡρέμα τῇ γῇ προσηνέχθημεν κτλ.: ἱεροῦ is a gloss on a lost ἔδους in the sense of 'statue', cf. *Iou. Trag.* 692, *Syr. D.* 460; *Schol.* ad loc. ἔκφρασις τοῦ ἐν Κνίδω τεμένους καὶ τοῦ ἀγάλματος Ἀφροδίτης.

418. 18: οἱ δ' ἐπὶ συννοίας μεγάλῃν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς σκέψιν ἄνω καὶ κάτω κυκλοῦντες ὡς <περ> περὶ τῆς προπομπίας ἀγωνιούμενοι Πλαταιαῖσιν.

448. 45: ἡδῖους ὕπνους καθεύδει τοῖς μεθ' ἡμέραν καμάτοις ἐπηρεμῶν <ἄν> ἐπιφθόνως: MSS. ἐπίφθονον or ἐπὶ χρόνον.

449. 46: εὐξαιτο μὲν οὖν <ἄν> ἐρῶν τις κτλ. and below ὀπλισαίμην <ἄν> καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν.

469 *Imagines* 11 fin.: οὐ τοίνυν ἀπόχρη τὸ κάλλος, εἰ μὴ κεκόσμηται τοῖς δικαίοις κοσμήμασι, λέγω δὲ (MSS. δὴ) οὐκ ἐσθῆτι ἀλουργεῖ καὶ ὄρμοις, ἀλλ' οἷς προεῖπον ἐκείνοις, ἀρετῇ καὶ σωφροσύνῃ κτλ.

476. 17: . . . Ἀσπασίαν, ἥ καὶ ὁ Ὀλυμπίων θαυμασιώτατος καὶ αὐτὸς συνῆν: MSS. Ὀλύμπιος, some omit the second καὶ or read γε for it.

489 *Pro Imag.* 10: καὶ ἑαυτὴν [sic] οὖν τὸ μὲν πλάσμα σου ἐπαινεῖν καὶ τὴν ἐπίνοιαν τῶν εἰκόνων, μὴ γνωρίζειν δὲ τὴν ὁμοιότητα: read καθ' ἑαυτήν.

522 *Toxaris* 14: τὴν ἄβραν: Reitz rightly keeps the smooth breathing in the sense of lady's-maid.

597 *Asinus* 28: . . . ὥστε φέρειν οὐκ ἡδυνάμην ζηλοτυπίαν <ταύτην τὴν> ἐπιπικὴν.

705 *Gallus* 2: εἰ σοὶ ἡ τῆς Ἀργοῦς τρόπις ἐλάλησεν, ὥσπερ ποτέ, ἥ ἡ φηγὸς <ἡ> ἐν Δωδώνῃ αὐτόφωνος ἐμαντεύετο: Reitz omits the second ἡ, and prefers, what some MSS. give, ἐμαντεύσατο, cf. *Am.* 31 ἡ ἐν Δωδώνῃ φηγός.

707. 3: ἀφθέντα δὲ [ὡς ἀφείθη] τὸν Ἄρην ἀγανακτῆσαι: delete gloss with Reitz.

(III Jacobitz) 796 *Bis Accus.* 4: καὶ αὐτός, ὦ Ζεῦ, <πολλῶν> πολλὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἀκούσας δυσχεραυνόντων λέγειν πρὸς σέ οὐκ ἐτόλμων.

864 *Parasitus* 40: μάχην σταδαίαν: MSS. σταδιαίαν.

895 *Anacharsis* 16: τὸν γὰρ πῖλόν μοι <μὴ> ἀφελεῖν οἴκοθεν ἔδοξεν, ὡς μὴ μόνος ἐν ὑμῖν ξενίζοιμι τῷ σχήματι: *Anacharsis loquitur*; οἴκοθεν not 'from Scythia', but, as he speaks of Solon as his host, 'from your house'; cf. 892-3. 14, 922. 40 f.

921. 39 fin.: . . . καθάπερ κλέπτας ἢ λωποδύτας ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον ἐργασασμένους: so edd., but our 'and what not' and the position of τι suggest the interrogative form τί.

III Reitz 3, *Rhetorum Praeceptor* 3: οὐ γάρ σε τραχεῖάν τινα οὐδὲ ὄρθιον <ὄδον> καὶ ἰδρώτος μεστήν ἡμεῖς γε ἄξομεν: the ellipse of ὄδον is unlikely with τινα.

29-30 *Philopseudes* 1 fin.: περὶ ἐκείνων . . . οἱ αὐτὸ ἄνευ τῆς χρείας τὸ ψεῦδος περὶ πολλοῦ τῆς ἀληθείας τίθενται ἡδόμενοι τῷ πράγματι: Sch. ἀντὶ τοῦ περὶ πλείονος; either read περὶ πλείους (perhaps with Gesner), or πρὸ πολλοῦ (with some MSS.) in the sense of 'long before'.

30. 2: . . . εἰ τοιοῦτοὶ ἄνδρες ἄριστοι τὰ πάντα ὁμῶς χαίρουσιν <αὐτοί> τε ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας ἐξαπατῶντες: MSS. αὐτοὺς τε καὶ κτλ.: the Attic idiom requires αὐτοί when the reflexive object is contrasted with another.

100 *Adversus Indoctum* 2: ἀναγινώσκεις ἕνα (of your books) πᾶν ἐπιτρέχων φθάνοντος τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ τὸ στόμα: the ancients whispered as they read: cf. 123. 28 below προσάψῃ δὲ μηδέποτε μηδὲ ἀναγνῶς μηδὲ υπαγάγῃς τῇ γλῶττι παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν λόγους καὶ ποιήματα μηδὲν δεινὸν σε εἰργασμένα, and see Augustine, *Conf.* 6. 3.

127 *Calumpnia* 2: ὁ δὲ Ἀπελλῆς οὐχ ἑωράκει ποτὲ τὴν Τύρον οὐδὲ τὸν Θεοδόταν ὅστις ἦν ἐγίνωσκεν, <εἰ μ>ὴ καθ' ὅσον ἤκουε Πτολεμαίου τινα ὑπαρχον εἶναι τὰ κατὰ τὴν Φοινίκην ἐπιτετραμμένον.

164 *Pseudologista* 3: . . . ἃ γέρων ἄνθρωπος ἐς <σ>εαυτὸν παρανομεῖς: Dindorf σεαυτὸν without comment.

174. 16: . . . ὁ μὲν Κόθορρον τινα εἶπεν εἰκάσας αὐτοῦ τὸν βίον ἀμφίβολον ὄντα τοῖς τοιούτοις ὑποδήμασιν, ὁ δὲ Ὑλπαῖν (or λυπάδην) ὅτι τὰς ἐκκλησίας θορυβώδης ὦν ῥήτωρ ἐπετάραττεν: perhaps Λυττατὴν 'Maddener', though we should expect Λυττητὴν; I have also thought of Λύτταν, mother of the Erinyes in Eur. *Bacch.* and probably mentioned *Cal.* 131. 5.

195 *Domus* 8: . . . ἐς ὅσον καὶ οὐρανὸς ἐν νυκτὶ . . . περιλαμπόμενος: MSS. οὐρανός.

Ibid.: ὁπότεν γὰρ τὸ φῶς προσπεσὸν ἐφάψεται καὶ ἀναμιχθῇ τῷ χρυσῷ, κοινὸν τι ἀπαστράπτουσι (sc. ὁ χρυσὸς καὶ τὸ φῶς) καὶ διπλασίαν τοῦ ἐρυθήματος ἐκφαίνουσι τὴν αἰθρίαν (= αἴγλην): chiasmic order.

198-9. 15 fin.: . . . ὥστε ἄχθοντο ἂν εἰκότως παρορωμένη <ἡ γυνή> διὰ τὸν κόσμον κτλ.

202 fin. 21: τῆς γὰρ τέχνης τὸ ἀκριβές, καὶ τῆς ἱστορίας μετὰ τοῦ ἀρχαίου τὸ ὠφέλιμον, ἐπαγωγὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ πεπαιδευμένων <τῶν> θεατῶν δεόμενον.

212 *Longaevi* 7: . . . ὦν ἕνα καὶ <ἡ> εὐσεβεστάτη μεγάλου θειοτάτου αυτοκράτορος τύχη εἰς τὴν τελειωτάτην ἀγαθοῦσα τάξιν κτλ.: some MSS. ἡ καί.

255 *Navig.* 10: Ἀδείμαντος γάρ, οὐκ ἄλλος τίς ἐστι.—B πάνυ ἤδη σαφῶς ὁρῶ, καὶ θοιμάτιον αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὸ βάδισμα ἐκείνο, καὶ ἐν χρωῇ ἡ κουρά: MSS. ἐκείνου.

267. 29: . . . ὥσπερ ὅταν εἰδῇ (MSS. ἴδῃ) τις αὐτὸς δι' αὐτοῦ κτησάμενος τὴν δυναστείαν: the Greeks could say 'I see you', but not 'I see what you mean'.

271. 35: ἐγὼ δὲ νήφειν ᾤμην καὶ οὐ (or σὺ) παραποφανεῖσθαι (or παρὰ τὸ φανεῖσθαι) τὴν γνώμην: read νήφων καὶ ὑπαρ ἀποφανεῖσθαι: Bekker kept νήφειν, and read ὑπαρ, but changing future to present.

276. 44: εἰ δέ τι ἐν Ἰνδοῖς ἢ Ὑπερβορείοις θέαμα παράδοξον ἢ κτήμα τίμιον ἢ ὄσα ἐμφαγεῖν ἢ πιεῖν ἤδεα, οὐ μεταστευλάμενος ἄλλ' αὐτὸς ἐπιπετόμενος <ᾧ> ἀπέλانون ἀπάντων ἐς κόρον . . . καὶ τὸ πάντων ἡδιωτον, αὐθημερόν ἀγγεῖλαι ἐς Βαβυλῶνα τίς ἐνίκησεν Ὀλύμπια καὶ ἀριστήσαντα, εἰ τύχοι, ἐν Συρίᾳ δειπνήσαι ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ.

282 *Dialogi Meretricii* 2. 1: καὶ σὺ δ' οὖν πρότερον ἰδοῦ αὐτὴν καὶ τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἰδέ [sic], μὴ σε ἀνιάτω, εἰ πάνυ γλαυκοὺς ἔχει αὐτοὺς κτλ.: for ἰδέ—intolerable after ἰδοῦ—read ἰδίᾳ 'close up' in the usual position of adverbs when emphatic; ἰδίᾳ comes at the end in 632, though there it merely reinforces ἕκαστος.

284. 3. 1: ἐαυτὸν as subject? MSS. also αὐτὸν; read αὐτὸς.

295. 6. 3 fin.: Jacobitz prints ζώοις, Reitz ζώης (which we should expect) without comment.

304. 9. 5 fin.: for MSS. Τίβιος read Τίβειος, cf. Men. *Heros* 21 et al.

306. 10. 2 fin.: ἀνάγνωθι λαβοῦσα, ὦ Χελιδόνιον! οἶσθα γὰρ δῆπου γράμματα. Note that Drosis can't read.

308. 10. 4: θάρρει, πάντα ἔσται καλῶς: cf. 314. 12. 5 οὕτως ὄν.

309. 11. 3: ἐπίσκειται γὰρ ἀκριβῶς ὑποβλέψας ποτὲ τοὺς κροτάφους αὐτῆς, ἐνθα μόνον τὰς αὐτῆς τρίχας ἔχει: Jacobitz prints τὰς αὐτῆς and so below.

310. 11. 3 fin.: ἄλλ' ἄπειμι· καὶ γὰρ ἤδη τρίτον τοῦτο ἦσεν ἀλεκτρυνών: MSS. without article (as ἀλέκτωρ in N.T. Matth. xxiii. 34, Marc. xiv. 30, Luc. xxiii. 34, Joh. xiii. 38); but cf. Ar. *Ec.* 390 f.

314. 12. 5: ἰδοῦ τὸ μειράκιον [ὁ μοιχὸς] ὃν ἐξηλοτυπεῖς: for the masculine relative cf. Plat. *Lach.* 180 e, and delete gloss.

353 *Peregrinus* 32: . . . ὥστε καὶ εἰς χεῖρας αὐτῶν ἦλθον: for ἀλλήλων, MSS. αὐτῶν.

362. 42: τοῦτο <τὸ> τέλος τοῦ κακοδαίμονος Πρωτέως ἐγένετο, ἀνδρὸς . . . πρὸς ἀλήθειαν μὲν οὐδεπώποτε ἀποβλέψαντος, ἐπὶ δόξῃ δὲ καὶ τῷ παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπαίνῳ ἅπαντα εἰπόντος αἰεὶ καὶ πράξαντος, ὥς καὶ εἰς πῦρ ἀλασθαι, οὐ γε (MSS. ὅτε) μὴδ' ἀπολαύειν τῶν ἐπαίνων ἐμελλεν ἀναίσθητος αὐτῶν γενόμενος: for ἀλασθαι Reitz prints ἀλέσθαι, Jacobitz ἀλλεσθαι; with οὐ γε cf. ὅπου γε Xen. *Cyr.* 2. 3. 11; perhaps better οὐ γε νῆ Δί' <οὐκ> ἀπολαύειν κτλ.

383 *Fugitivi* 32 fin.: ἔστι τι, ὦγαθέ, Τρικάρανος βιβλίον.—B οὐδὲν ἄτοπον, ἐπεὶ καὶ Τριφάλης ὁ τῶν κωμικῶν εἰς [sic]: read τινος; one MS. omits ὁ; the first is a satire of Anaximenes of Lampsacus, the second a comedy of Aristophanes (542 K.).

410 *Epistolae Saturnales* 29 fin.: εἰ δὲ ὑπερεωρᾶτε αὐτῶν . . . αὐτοὶ ἐφ' ὑμᾶς ἴοντες ἐδέοντο <ᾧ> συνδειπνεῖν.

412. 32 fin.: τὸ γοῦν ᾗδιον καὶ συμποτικώτατον ἢ ἱσοτιμία ἐστὶ: MSS. συμποτικώτερον, which Dindorf keeps but translates *maxime convivale*.

414. 35: . . . ἐπεὶ ἐρήσομαι ὑμᾶς εἰ μύοντες οἱ πένητες βαδίζοιεν . . . οὐκ ἂν ὑμᾶς ἠγίασεν οὐκ ἔχοντας οἷς ἐπιδείξεσθε τὰς ἀλουργεῖς ἐσθλότητας κτλ.: MSS. ἐπιδείξασθε οἱ -ετε.

449 *Conviniūm* 46: τέλος δὲ ὁ Ἀλκιδάμας ἀνατρέφας τὸ λυχνίον σκότον μέγαν ἐποίησε . . . ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἐπράχθη καὶ δεινὰ ἐν τῷ σκότῳ: MSS. σκότος μέγα but not σκότει, and Lucian elsewhere always uses the masculine form.

489 *Syria Dea* 57: ἀλλ' ἐπεὰν παραστήσῃ <τις> τῷ βωμῷ τὸ ἱρήμιον κτλ.

492 *Demosthenis Encomiūm* 2: εἰ οὖν ἡμῖν ἐπαρκέσαι τὸ εὐχεσθαι συμβουλοίμην ἂν σοι: MSS. ἐπαρκέσοι.

498. 10: τὸ δὲ σόν, ἔφη, κατὰ χειρὸς ἐπιδρομόν τε καὶ λεῖον ἐφ' ὠρισμένοις τε καὶ γνωρίμοις <τοῖς> ὀνοματίοις, οἷον κτλ.: MSS. ὀνομάτων.

502. 15: Πυθέα δὲ ὁ κρότος τῶν Δημοσθενικῶν ἀπόζειν ἐφαίνετο τοῦ νυκτερινοῦ λύχνου: I suggest for κρότος 'swing' or 'rhythm' in the less exact sense, lilt, the way the words 'run', Aristotle's οὐκ ἀκριβὴς ῥυθμός, *Rhet.* 3. 8; not 'the stress-accentuation' in those days of the language; see on 514 below.

505-6. 20: ἰκανή γ' ἂν σοι οὐδ' ἡ Περικλέους (ῥητορεία). ἐκείνου μὲν γε τὰς ἀστραπὰς καὶ βροντὰς καὶ πειθοῦς τι κέντρον δόξῃ παραλαβόντες, ἀλλ' αὐτὴν γε οὐχ ὁρώμεν, δῆλον ὡς ὑπὲρ τὴν φαντασίαν οὐδὲν ἔμμενον ἔχουσιν οὐδ' οἷον ἐξαρκέσαι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ χρόνου βάσανον καὶ κρίσιν· τὰ δὲ τοῦ Δημοσθένους κτλ.: I have sometimes thought that the tradition that Pericles was the first orator to write his speech beforehand implies that a copy of his Funeral Oration was available to Thucydides; but this looks as if, in Lucian's day at any rate, no speech of his was believed to be extant.

506-7. 21 fin.: οὐδ' ὁ Δημοσθένης αἰτιάσεται καθ' ἐν τῶν αὐτοῦ καλῶν ἐπικινούμενος: MSS. αὐτοῦ (in wrong position).

507-8. 22 fin.: χρὴ μέντοι καθάπερ ὁδοῦ θαρραλεωτάτην εἶναι τὴν συνηθεστάτην: read ὁδῶν.

514. 32: οἱ δ' Ἀττικοὶ ῥήτορες παιδία παραβάλλειν τῷ τούτου κρότῳ καὶ τόνῳ καὶ λέξεων εὐρυθμίᾳ κτλ.: MSS. παιδιὰ: the last quality is 'balance (of clauses)', the second 'rise-and-fall'—known to the reader by the accentuation—, and the first 'rhythm' in the less exact sense: cf. 502 above.

515. 33: νῦν δ' ἐκείνων μὲν (the other Greek orators) ἕκαστος ἀπογέγραπται χρυσίον ξύλα πόρους θρέμματα γῆν οὐ <μὲν> Βοιωτίας οὐ δ' ἐνθ' <οὐ> τιμῇ <ν> παρ' ἐμοῦ λαβόντες· ἡμεῖς δὲ κτλ.: MSS. γῆν οὐ Βοιωτίας οὐδ' κτλ.: 'in Boeotia and where-not as a gift'.

542 *Cynicus* 5: ὅτι νῆ Δία τῆς φύσεως ἦν σὺ (the Cynic) τιμᾶς καὶ τῶν θεῶν <τῇν> γῆν ἐν μέσῳ κατατεθεικότων κτλ.

594-5 [*Philopatris*] 9: διαμελεῖσθαι τμηθείσας: 'cut up piecemeal'; perhaps the tenth century is too late for L. S. J.

597. 12: ἐγὼ γάρ σε διδάξω τί τὸ πᾶν καὶ τίς ὁ προὖν πάντων καὶ τί τὸ σύστημα τοῦ παντός: MSS. ὁ πρόφην πάντων, cf. *Apoc. Ioh.* i. 8, iv. 8.

599. 13 fin.: ἀνταποδώσει δὲ πᾶσιν ἢ ἡμέρᾳ αὐτὸς ἐνετειλάτο: MSS. ἢ ἡμέραν (perhaps Byz.).

602-3. 17: ἀλλά μοι τόδε εἰπέ, εἰ καὶ τὰ τῶν Σκυθῶν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἐγχαράττουσι. — Β πάντα, εἰ τύχοι γε χρηστός <τις> καὶ ἐν ἔθνεσι: some MSS. τύχη, which Jacobitz prints.

631 [Charidemus] 21 fin.: βελτίον μὲν ἦν τοῦτοις <σε> ἀπαλλάττειν με τῶν δυσχερῶν ἀγαπῶντα.

632. 23: βασκαίνομεν μᾶλλον ἐξ ὧν γ' ἂν οὐ καλῶς αὐτοῖς τὰ πράγματα πραττόμενα σχοίη (MSS. τ' ἂν)· καλοῦς δ' οὐ μόνον οὐ φθανοῦμεν τῆς ὥρας κτλ.: the accusative καλοῦς is just possible, because of the passive use, e.g. Plut. 2. 772 b.

634. 27: θαυμάζομεν τε <καὶ> φιλοπόνους τε καὶ φιλοκάλους ὀνομάζομεν.

637-8 [Nero] 2: τὰ δὲ Σέρξου . . . ἴσως ἐνενόησε, μέγιστα τῶν μεγαλουργιῶν ὄντα, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτοις <ὥς> τῷ (MSS. τὸ corr. Gesn.) δι' ὀλίγου ἀλλήλοις ἐπιμίξαι πάντας ἔσοιτο <δυνατόν> τὴν Ἑλλάδα λαμπρῶς ἐστιᾶσθαι τοῖς ἔξωθεν (neut.): <ὥς> Kayser; MSS. εἴσαιτο τὴν, which Gesner referred to Hesych. εἴσαιτο· δόξειεν, but? for δυνατόν 'possible' cf. Asin. 21.

665 [Ocyrus] 5 f.: γελῶ δὲ τοὺς πληγέντας ὑπ' ἑμοῦ <καιρίας> | καὶ μὴ λέγοντας <τ>ἀτρεκῇ τῆς συμφορᾶς: lost before καί.

667. 44 f.: νεωτέρῳ γὰρ αἰσχος ἐν παισὶν <γ> αἰεὶ | ὑπέρτης ἀδύνατα (MSS. -τος) γογγύζων γέρων.

667. 56: τρέχων ἔτεινα καὶ συνενεμίχθην πόνῳ: (ἔτεινα Kayser for MSS. ἔστευλα) MSS. συνεμμίχθην.

668. 66 f.: νῦν δ' εἰσορᾷς ἅπαντας ἐξ <ἐγκαρσίου>, | ὁ πόνος δ' ἔλιξας ἐμμελῶς διαστρέφει.

669. 78 ff.: ὁρᾷς με, Σωτήρ καὶ πάλιν Σωτήριχε, | σάλπιγγος αὐτῆς ὄνομ' ἔχων σωτηρικόν, | δεινὸς πόνος με τοῦ ποδὸς δάκνει κακῶς κτλ.: for σωτηρικόν MSS. have σωτήριχε from above.

670. 115 ff.: οὗτος προσῆλθε χεῖρα θεῖς ἐμοὶ πικρὰν | θρηνῶν πυρέσσων ἐπ' ἐμοὶ Βάζων <ἄρτια>. | ἂ πρὶν δέ σοι κατεῖπε πάντ' ἐφύευστο | τὰ δεινὰ κρύπτων τῆς νόσου μυστήρια: cf. Il. 14. 92; ἄρτια became ἄρτι before ἂ and was deleted.

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[Readers of the *Classical Quarterly* will have heard with sorrow of the death of Mr. Edmonds. He had not been able to correct the proofs of this article.]

SOCRATES' 'DREAM' IN THE *THEAETETUS*

At the beginning of the third part of the *Theaetetus* (201d–202c), Socrates entertains an interesting theory of knowledge in the form of a 'dream'. In Cornford's translation, it reads as follows:

I seem to have heard some people say that what might be called the first elements (*στοιχεῖα*) of which we and all other things consist are such that no account (*λόγον*) can be given of them. Each of them just by itself can only be named; we cannot attribute to it anything further or say that it exists or does not exist; for we should at once be attaching to it existence or non-existence, whereas we ought to add nothing if we are to express just it alone. We ought not even to add 'just' or 'it' ('that') or 'each' or 'alone' or 'this', or any other of a host of such terms. These terms, running loose about the place, are attached to everything, and they are distinct from the things to which they are applied. If it were possible for an element to be expressed in any formula (*λόγον*) exclusively belonging to it, no other term ought to enter into that expression; but in fact there is no formula in which any element can be expressed: it can only be named, for a name is all there is that belongs to it. But when we come to things composed of these elements, then, just as these things are complex, so the names are combined to make a description (*λόγον*), a description being precisely a combination of names. Accordingly, elements are inexplicable (*ἄλογα*) and unknowable (*ἄγνωστα*), but they can be perceived; while complexes (*συνλαβές*) are knowable (*γνωστός*) and explicable (*ρήτᾱς*; 'statable'), and you can have a true notion of them. So when a man gets hold of the true notion of something without an account (*ἄνευ λόγου*), his mind does think truly of it, but he does not know it; for if one cannot give or receive an account of a thing, one has no knowledge of that thing. But when he has also got hold of an account, all this becomes possible to him and he is fully equipped with knowledge.

It is perfectly clear why the 'dream' occurs to Socrates at this point of the dialogue. It is suggested by the third definition according to which knowledge is true belief 'with logos' (201c); or conversely, that true belief 'without logos' is no knowledge (*τῇν δὲ ἄλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης*). The dream-theory is then criticized and rejected because the simple elements out of which it constructs a body of knowledge are said to be 'without logos' (*ἄλογα*) and 'unknowable' (*ἄγνωστα*).

The 'dream' is traditionally ascribed to Antisthenes. Whether this is correct or not, it is obviously an ingenious theory on its own; moreover, it has interesting modern parallels. In an unpublished paper by Professor Ryle,¹ which he kindly permitted me to read in typescript, the 'dream' is praised both as a 'first-rate, precognitive' anticipation and as a criticism of Logical Atomism. Wittgenstein acknowledged these parallels. In the *Philosophical Investigations*,² he cites a substantial portion of the 'dream' and adds: 'Both Russell's

¹ Cited by R. C. Cross, 'Logos and Forms in Plato' (*Mind*, lxxiii, 1954).

² *Ibid.*, p. 21 (paragraph 46).

'individuals' and my 'objects' (*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*) were such primary elements.' He then asks: 'But what are the simple constituent parts of which reality is composed?' This question, as is known, leads to a radical revision of the Logical Atomism of the *Tractatus*. As far as Lord Russell is concerned, he has also employed epistemological models similar to the 'dream' in his later writings, like *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* and *Human Knowledge*.

I do not wish to pursue these recent parallels; instead, I wish to consider a preliminary question of more limited interest. Why does the criticism of the 'dream' rest on the assertion that the primary, simple elements have a name, but are without *logos* and unknowable? To approach this question we may first ask: what are these elements, or 'letters'? Plato frequently employed the analogy of letters and syllables in his writings.¹ Generally, 'letters' may refer either (a) to the simplest material elements in nature (or in the arts and crafts) or (b) to the simplest elements in language; and it is not always clear whether Plato means primary material elements or primitive linguistic elements. In either case, however, the elements are both simple and unanalysable. 'Syllables', then, designate either (a) material compounds, including the ordinary objects of this world, or (b) the combination of letters in ordinary language. In addition, (c) the analogy is also used in connexion with Plato's own theory of Forms, as in the *Sophist* and *Timaeus*; it then leads to entirely different results, but these will not concern us in the subsequent discussion.

Socrates' 'dream' in the *Theaetetus* introduces an interesting variation of the first two meanings of the analogy; for the elements are said to be 'perceived' or 'perceivable' (*αἰσθητά*) and to have a simple name. In other words, they designate, as for some recent epistemological theories, simple perceptual qualities, sensations, or sense data. This, as we shall see, is extremely relevant to the original question we raised: to wit, why are these simple elements of perception, or the names belonging to them, without a *logos* and unknowable? This relevance, however, is not shown in the statement or in the subsequent criticism of the dream. On the contrary, both exposition and criticism seem to take these characteristics for granted; or, more precisely, the statement of the 'dream' justifies this basic assumption in language so condensed and oblique that the reasons for it are not easily apparent. They become more apparent, I think, when we approach the 'dream' by comparing it with the lengthy analysis of perception in part I of the *Theaetetus* (156 f.)—a comparison which, to my knowledge, has not been noticed before despite the increasing interest in the dialogue in recent literature.² That there is a parallelism between this analysis of perception and the 'dream' may be shown from the language used in the two

¹ In addition to the *Theaetetus*, the analogy occurs in the *Cratylus* (422 ff., 425 ff., and throughout within the same metaphysical context of Heracliteanism as in the *Theaetetus*), in the *Phaedrus* (244 ff.), the *Philebus* (17-18 ff.), the *Politicus* (278 ff.) and, within the context of Plato's own theory of Forms, in the *Timaeus* (48b ff.), and in the *Sophist* (253 ff.). If the Seventh Letter is not spurious, it contains similar material in the philosophical interlude (342 ff.; cf. also *Laws*, 895d ff.).

² After Henry Jackson's early article on 'Plato's Later Theory of Ideas: The *Thea-*

tetus' (*The Journal of Philology*, xiii), important recent contributions are: F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (London, 1935); W. F. H. Hardie, *A Study in Plato* (Oxford, 1936), especially chap. iii; J. W. Yolton, 'The Ontological Status of Sense-Data in Plato's Theory of Perception' (*The Review of Metaphysics*, iii, 1949); Richard Robinson, 'Forms and Error in Plato's *Theaetetus*' (*The Philosophical Review*, lix, 1950); R. C. Cross, op. cit.; and George Nakhnikian, 'Plato's Theory of Sensation I, II' (*The Review of Metaphysics*, ix, 1955, nos. 1 and 2).

parts, which reveals notable similarities: (1) In both passages, we are dealing with *αἰσθητά* (157c and 202b); and the former passage makes it perfectly clear that, in the context of this dialogue, *αἰσθητά* mean perceptual qualities like 'white', 'hard', 'hot', *καὶ πάντα* (156e).¹ (2) Both passages claim that the senses or sensations (*αἰσθήσεις*) and what is perceived, i.e. the qualities (*αἰσθητά*), have 'names only' (*ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα*, 156b; *ὄνομα μόνον ἔχειν*, 202b, 201e).² (3) Both passages agree in the terms which are excluded from the names of perceptual qualities; to wit, (a) *του, ἐμοῦ, τόδε, ἐκεῖνο*, 157b, and (b) *ἐκεῖνο, ἕκαστον, μόνον, τὸ τό (τοῦτο)*, 202a; or (a) *αὐτό καθ' αὐτό*, 157a, and (b) *αὐτό καθ' αὐτό*, 205c; or (a) *οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὄνομα*, 157b, and (b) *οὐδ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα*, 202a. More specifically, (4) existence or non-existence cannot and must not be attributed to *αἰσθητά*: e.g. (a) *τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον*, 157b, and (b) *ἤδη γὰρ ἂν οὐσίαν ἢ μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ προστίθεσθαι*, 202a. Finally, (5) both passages use the distinction between 'parts' (*μέρη*, 157b and 204a, etc.) 'of which we and all else are composed' (201e), and compounds which, according to the language of part I, include 'man, stone, or any living creature or kind' (157c).

It is hard to escape the conclusion that there is a closer connexion between these two parts of the *Theaetetus* than has previously been noticed. Otherwise, we should have to imagine that Plato, when he composed the 'dream', did not remember that he had earlier used a similar theoretical model; to wit, perceptual data which have names only and compounds or 'syllables' like man or stone composed of these primary elements; and that he had used practically identical language in characterizing the simple perceptual elements. These linguistic similarities, however, also suggest that the earlier and much longer analysis may contain the theoretical background which is relevant for the highly compressed language in which the 'dream' is presented. Reading the 'dream' against this background, I think, helps to explain why the simple elements of perception, or the names we give them, are without *logos* and unknowable. This assertion which is stated as a basic assumption in the dream-theory is, as it were, a moral to be drawn from the analysis in part I. For in this analysis Plato deals at length with various arguments which tend to support the conclusion that the names assigned to simple perceptual qualities like white, hot, or hard are both defective as descriptions of experience and incomplete and unsatisfactory as instruments of knowledge.

They are defective for two reasons: (1) Innumerable perceptual experiences are 'nameless' (*ἀνώνυμοι*, 156b); (2) the names belonging to these experiences introduce a false fixity (157b ff.). Perceptual qualities arise out of a complex interaction between moving particles in the environment with moving particles in the organism.³ Hence, 'we must not admit' any expressions which are fixed and definite, such as we have just listed in the comparison between part I and the 'dream'; for they would introduce a degree of specificity and fixity which is incompatible with the analysis of perception as a process of continuous

¹ i.e. not simple substances like 'gold', as Cornford also believed; cf. op. cit., p. 144.

² In part I Plato speaks only of *αἰσθήσεις* as having names, but adds explicitly that the class of *αἰσθητά* is to be treated analogously: *τὸ δ' αὖ αἰσθητὸν γένος τούτων ἐκάσταις ὁμόγονον*, 156b.

³ For the latest detailed explication of the perceptual process according to Plato see George Nakhnikian, op. cit.; cf. also Rupert C. Lodge, *Plato's Theory of Art* (London, 1953: chap. xii) where the same problem is considered most carefully.

motion. 'Since there is nothing constant here—the flowing thing does not flow white but changes so that the very whiteness itself flows and shifts into another colour, in order that the thing may escape the charge of constancy in that respect—can we ever give the name of any colour and be sure that we are naming it rightly?' (182d). In other words, 'some new dialect will have to be instituted for the exponents of this theory, since as it is, they have no phrases to fit their hypothesis—unless indeed it were "not even no-how". That might be an expression indefinite enough to suit them' (183b). Words, then, are defective because they are too specific and definite; in simple expressions like 'this white here', the prefix 'this' and the name 'white' freeze that which is in constant motion. Hence, these simple names (or letters) distort and falsify the perceptual experiences which they purport to describe. And 'anyone who talks so as to bring things to a standstill is easily refuted' (157b; 183a). This is said to hold for 'perceptions of any sort' (182d-e).

In the light of these remarks it is, I think, doubtful whether Plato held the view, which Cornford and others have attributed to him, according to which he believed in the indubitability or 'infallibility' of simple judgements of perception.¹ It is true, as Jackson first pointed out,² that the 'theory' of sense perception which Plato develops after Heraclitus and Empedocles is not refuted in the *Theaetetus*; but it does not follow that Plato, for this reason, also subscribed to the thesis which he attributes to Protagoras that 'perception . . ., as being knowledge, is infallible' (152c, 160c). Aristotle did hold such a view with regard to simple perceptual data;³ but, so far as I can see, such a conclusion does not follow from Plato's analysis and criticism of sense perception in part I of the *Theaetetus*. On the contrary, it would be more consistent to attribute to him some sort of a Bergsonian view according to which we distort the nature of perceptual qualities given in the *durée* of the world of experience as soon as we assign names to them. We do so, of course, as a matter of habit (157b); but we can never give to a percept 'the name of any colour and be sure that we are naming it rightly'.

Some critics have distinguished between an 'extreme' and 'modified' Heracliteanism (or Protagoreanism) and have attributed to Plato the 'modified' version only.⁴ But in so far as we modify his analysis of perception to allow for some degree of constancy in the flow of qualities, or in the names attached to them, this element of constancy is not to be found in the analysis of the perceptual process itself, which is supposed to represent Plato's own views on the subject. Names like white or hot (though given as a matter of course) bring the process itself to a 'standstill'; and that modification is a form of distortion, imposing a limiting condition, as it were, upon the conditions of constant change. Moreover, as I shall presently argue, the name is 'statable' (*ῥητός*) only in the form of a primitive sentence; and this condition imposes another limitation upon the contents of immediate experience. (Dreams, hallucinations, etc., which are explicitly mentioned to show that Protagoras' views cannot be easily disposed of would, of course, be subject to the same limiting conditions.) I am not convinced, therefore, that Plato believed that any statement was an absolutely certain and correct rendering of the contents of immediate experi-

¹ Cf. Cornford, *op. cit.*, pp. 29, 32, 49, 54.

² Cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 250 ff.; Jackson is cited by Cornford and by Nakhnikian, both of whom agree with the thesis he first put forth.

³ Cf. *De Anima*, 418^a13.

⁴ Cf. Nakhnikian, *op. cit.* ii. 309 ff., adopting Cornford's interpretation of the 'extreme' Heracliteanism in the *Theaetetus*.

ence; and Jackson's original suggestion that 'the lesson taught in the *Theaetetus* is, that no system based on the theory of flux can without inconsistency allow 'knowledge' of sensibles'¹ may still be the most valid inference to be drawn from Plato's own theory of perception. These comments, of course, are compatible with the general view that Plato believed in permanent structural patterns of physical things behind their perceptual qualities. The search for these hidden structures is an indispensable component of the theory of Forms; but it is at least partly motivated by the unknowability of the elusive qualities in experience.

There is a second line of argument which supports the assertion that the simple perceptual elements postulated in the 'dream' are without a *logos* and unknowable and which, I believe, casts further doubt upon the view that Plato believed in indubitable perceptual premisses. For the terms which are excluded from these elements in the two passages compared above—existence and non-existence, this or that, mine or each—are 'attached to everything and . . . distinct from the things to which they are applied' (202a) or in the language of part I, they are 'common . . . to all things' (185c). Plato here refers to the 'common terms' which play a considerable part in the *Parmenides* (129d) and in the *Sophist* (253c) in connexion with his own theory of Forms.² In the *Theaetetus* (184b ff.) Plato employs a threefold distinction: (a) There are qualities which belong to a single sense; e.g. white, hard, warm, or sweet. (b) These qualities may be combined (or 'associated', if this term be permissible) so that we may have a sound and a colour as components of the same act of experience. Finally, (c) there are the aforementioned 'common terms' which are so called because they may be attached to *all* objects of perception. The purpose of these distinctions is to say that neither the operation of combining different perceptions nor the common terms can be traced or ascribed to any special sense organ; Plato concludes that 'the mind in itself is its own instrument for contemplating the common terms that apply to everything' (185c). This recognition of some sort of autonomous activity of the mind, in turn, constitutes the last and perhaps most decisive argument in criticism of the thesis that perception is knowledge. 'Knowledge does not reside in the impressions, but in our reflection upon them. It is there (i.e. in the mind), and not in the impressions, that it is possible to grasp existence and truth' (186d).

This criticism, however, is only one side of the lengthy analysis. The other side is the positive assertion introduced at the beginning of part II that the criticism has shown that 'when the mind is occupied with things by itself', we call this 'making judgements' (187a). Actually, the previous criticism of Protagoras in part I had led to a similar conclusion: the sense-data are unstatable and unknowable, on the one hand, because they change too rapidly; on the other, because in making an assertion with the claim of knowledge we never refer to simple perceptual elements only, or to the 'names' which go with them 'by habit and inobservance' (157b). An assertion of existence, truth, or falsehood is a (predictive) judgement; and making a judgement or verifying a prediction involves much more than sense perception (cf. 167 ff. and 177c ff.).

¹ Op. cit., p. 265. This inference, I believe, also coincides with the results of the linguistic analysis in the *Cratylus*, which leads to the same negative conclusions concerning the knowability of simple sense data or the

'primary names' belonging to them.

² These connexions are noted by Cornford, op. cit., pp. 105-6 and by Sir David Ross in *Plato's Theory of Ideas* (Oxford, 1951, p. 103).

For in making a statement, even in formulating a simple perceptual judgement like 'this-white-here-exists' or, in the more sophisticated terminology of modern writers, 'white-here-now-within my visual field', we go beyond the given in and through the present perception. We go beyond the given in several respects: (a) we refer to the past; i.e. we take memory and recognition of similarities for granted; (b) we imply or intend some sort of predictive statement concerning the future (which, according to Plato, introduces an 'objective' standard of verification); finally, (c) we must use at least some of the 'common terms' (or Forms in Plato's later dialogues) which are not a product of perception, but a product of thought.

Thus we are in a position to say why a simple perceptual quality, or the name belonging to it, is without *logos* and unknowable. It is without *logos* (*ἄλογον*) because only 'a combination of names make a *logos* (*οὕτω καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν συμπλεκέντα λόγον γεγονέναι*, 202b).¹ Similarly, it is not a piece of knowledge, or unknowable (*ἄγνωστον*), because it is not a statement, and because it could be known as true or false only if it is 'stated' (*ῥητόν*) in a sentence. In short, *αἰσθητά* and their names are without *logos* and unknowable, because only a complete sentence has (or is) a *logos* and can be known as true and false.

This conclusion coincides with what Plato had to say on the same subject in the *Sophist*. Neither nouns nor verbs strung together arbitrarily make a sentence, but only nouns and verbs 'woven together' in a definite (and presumably meaningful) way as in 'a man learns'. This is the 'simplest' statement, 'because it gives information about facts or events in the present or past or future. It does not merely name something, but gets you somewhere (*ἀλλὰ τι περαίνει*) by weaving together verbs and names. Hence, we say it "states" something, not merely "names" something, and in fact it is this complex that we mean by the word "statement" (*λόγος*)' (*Sophist*, 262c-d). Thus for making a 'statement' which may be asserted as true or false we need more than names, whether they refer to objects or simple perceptual qualities. Or, if we adopt Cornford's translation, a name belonging to simple perception is not even 'statable' without going beyond the name or the perceptual element which it designates. But if the names referring to simple perceptual elements were sufficient for a theory of knowledge as that sketched in the 'dream', 'no other term ought to enter into the expression' of these primitive terms (202a). Now, since only a combination of names has a *logos* which is knowable and since several other ('common') terms must enter into a significant sentence, we may repeat the conclusion reached above: simple elements alone, or simple names of sense data, are without *logos* and unknowable. I think it is not stretching Plato's meaning unduly and anachronistically if we say that this conclusion was meant to show the inadequacy of constructing a theory of knowledge (as outlined in the 'dream') in which the primitive terms designate simple, unanalysable perceptual data.

These connexions between the 'dream' and part I of the *Theaetetus* help to expand or unpack the compressed statement of the dream-theory itself. They also help to clarify the subsequent criticism of the 'dream' in which the basic assumption that the 'letters' are without *logos* and unknowable is virtually taken

¹ In Cornford's translation: 'A description (*λόγος*) being precisely a combination of names'. Harold N. Fowler's translation (in

the Loeb library edition) reads: 'For the combination of names is the essence of reasoning' (*λόγος*).

for granted. For this criticism rests on a simple dilemma: either we say that we know words or sentences by analysing them into elements which are not known and cannot be known; or we must treat a 'syllable', a compound or a 'whole', like a primitive term, in which case it is again unknowable. This is the gist of the criticism, which has nothing to do with the question of whether a 'whole' is equal to, or more than, the sum of its parts. For it makes no difference to the criticism of the 'dream' whether the 'parts' ('of which we and all else are composed') or the 'wholes' are treated as simple elements. In either case, what matters is that these simple elements are without *logos* and unknowable, and the arguments which support this assertion.¹ I have suggested that this assertion could be taken for granted because the arguments supporting it had been developed in part I of the *Theaetetus*.

Viewed in this perspective, the 'dream' is more than an isolated digression—'a dream in return for a dream': it is an integral part of the dialogue as a whole. It resumes the original theme of perception—which is somewhat lost in the long digression on the nature of error in part II of the *Theaetetus*—and restates certain characteristic elements of the earlier analysis. It is also the key for the concluding section of the dialogue; for, as Cornford observed correctly,² the brief coda of the *Theaetetus* (206–10a), in which three different meanings of *logos* are analysed and rejected, must be read within the context of the dream-theory.

It is not surprising, therefore, that Plato continues to use the analogy of letters and syllables throughout. First, he cites the case of ordinary language (and music) as empirical evidence against the basic assumption of the 'dream', according to which the simple letters are less knowable than complex syllables. 'If we are to argue from our experience' (in learning or understanding a language) 'to other cases, we shall conclude that elements in general yield knowledge that is much clearer than knowledge of the complex and more effective for a complete grasp of anything we seek to know' (206a–b). Presently, however, the same illustration drawn from ordinary language is turned round to argue against the second meaning of *logos* (defined as the enumeration of elementary parts); for in allegedly 'knowing' the individual letters in a name like Theaetetus or Theodorus we may have a case of true belief combined with *logos* which 'we are not entitled to call knowledge' (207b–8b) in the ordinary sense of the word. Finally, the third meaning of *logos* (defined as the statement of the distinguishing mark of a thing) also falls under the shadow of the 'dream'; for (a) the distinguishing mark is a perceptual quality, 'brightness' of the sun, 'snubness' of Theaetetus, and all other qualities 'that I have seen' (*ὧν ἐγὼ εἶωρακα*, 209c) and (b) the refutation is reminiscent of the dilemma posed by the 'dream': either I know Theaetetus when I have true belief about these perceptual qualities, in which case I do not need the addition of *logos*; or Theaetetus is something other than the bundle of these perceptual qualities, in which case the distinguishing marks 'that I have seen' do not help me to know what I mean by this kind of knowledge.³ Thus, in addition to its retrospective function, the 'dream' also looks forward to the inconclusive ending of the *Theaetetus* and, beyond this dialogue, to the more conclusive analysis of the *Sophist*.

¹ Cf. 205c: 'But if the syllable is a unity without parts (*ἀμερές*), syllable and letter likewise are equally incapable of explanation (*ἀλογον*) and unknowable' (*ἀγνωστον*).

² Op. cit., pp. 151, 154, 162.

³ Cf. Jackson's summary of the argument, op. cit., p. 261.

The analogy of letters and syllables, as we have said above,¹ recurs frequently in Plato's works; and the negative results of this method of division, as in the *Theaetetus* and *Cratylus*, also throw a light upon the different use of this analogy within the context of Plato's own theory of Forms, as in the *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, and *Timaeus*. These dialogues show that Plato used the analogy for his own purposes; but the 'letters' or basic elements which he admitted into his own philosophical vocabulary are quite different from the simple perceptual elements, or the names we assign to them, which, according to Socrates' 'dream' in the *Theaetetus*, are inadequate and defective as primitive terms for a theory of knowledge.

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¹ See p. 132, n. 1 above.

SOME 'PAST OPTATIVES'

GREEK literature embodies a number of instances of the optative in main clauses that are acknowledged either definitely or probably to have a reference to past time. These are mostly well known, but the object of this article is to reconsider them and to attempt an explanation. They are certainly commonest in the Homeric period, but later examples are by no means wanting.

Of the Homeric examples the clearest are those found in unfulfilled conditions in past time: *καὶ νῦν κεν ἔνθ' ἀπόλοιο ἄναξ ἀνδρῶν Αἰνείας | εἰ μὴ ἄρ' ὄξυ νόησε Διὸς θυγάτηρ Ἀφροδίτη*, *Il.* 5. 311-12; *ἔνθα κε ρεία φέροι κλυτὰ τεύχεα Πανθοῖδαο | Ἀτρεΐδης, εἰ μὴ οἱ ἀγασσάτο Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων*, *Il.* 7. 70-71; also *Il.* 5. 388 (ἀπόλοιο); 2. 81 (φαῖμεν, possibly present); *Od.* 2. 185 (ἀνίεις, ambiguous). There are also certain potential usages which, though possibly referring to the future, are most naturally taken as past: *φαίης κε*, *Il.* 3. 220; 15. 697; *οὐδέ κε φαίης*, *Il.* 4. 429; 17. 366. These are common and stereotyped phrases; but cf.: *οὐκ ἂν ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσῆϊ γ' ἐρίσσειε βροτὸς ἄλλος*, *Il.* 3. 223; *Τυδείδην δ' οὐκ ἂν γνοίης ποτέροισι μετείη*, 5. 85; also *Il.* 4. 223 (ἴδοις); 4. 539; 13. 127; 17. 399 (ἀνόσαιτο); 12. 59 (ἐσβαίη); 13. 343 (θρασυκάρδιος εἴη); 19. 90 (ῥέξαιμι); *Od.* 5. 74 (θηήσαιτο); 7. 293 (ἐλποιο); 9. 242 (ὀχλίσειαν); 13. 87 (ὀμαρτήσειεν); 22. 12 (οἴοιτο).

In post-Homeric Greek the 'past optative' still lingers, mainly in potentials; in Herodotus we find: *εἴησαν δ' ἂν οὗτοι Κρήτες*, 1. 2; *τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ οἱ ἀποδομνοὶ λέγοιεν . . . ὥς*, 1. 70; *τάχα δ' ἂν καὶ τὰ χρηστήρια ταῦτά οἱ πρόλεγοι*, 8. 136; *ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν καὶ φθόνῳ ἂν εἴποιεν*, 9. 71; *sim. ἐπαύροιο*, 7. 180; *εἴεν*, 7. 184; *εἴη*, 2. 98; 5. 59, 60; also a full conditional: *εἰδείη μὲν γὰρ ἂν . . . Ὀνήτης, εἰ τῇ χώρῃ πολλὰ ὠμυλῆκώς εἴη*, 7. 214. Such usages in Ionic Greek are perhaps not surprising; but Attic contains: *αἴτι νῆσοι | οὐκ ἂν πολλὰ εἴεν*, *Thuc.* 1. 9; *πῶς ἂν ἐπιβουλεύσαιμι*; [*ἐπεβούλευσά τι Blass*], *Ant.* 4 β 5; *εἰ γὰρ ἂν εἰδείην [ἦδεν Emperius]* *Lys.* 7. 16 (the corrections are only due to a presupposition that the construction is at fault); *φαίης ἂν, εἰ παρήσθ', ὅτ' ἡγάπα νεκρούς*, *Eur. Supp.* 764.¹ A similar reference is also shown, occasionally, by the optative of wish; with introductory particle: *αἶ γὰρ δὴ Ὀδυσσεύς τε καὶ ὁ κρατερὸς Διομήδης | ὦδ' ἄφαρ ἐκ Τρώων ἐλσαίατο μώνυχας ἵππους*, *Il.* 10. 536-7;² *εἰ γὰρ . . . εἴην*

¹ The Herodotean examples (though not the Homeric) are said by Kühner-Gerth (*Griechische Grammatik*, i, § 396 (a)) to refer to past time from a present standpoint—'may have said', 'are likely to have been', etc.—and in some cases (1. 2; 2. 98; 5. 59) actually to refer to present time. *Hdt.* 1. 2 is regarded by Goodwin as a 'future realisation' (*Moods and Tenses*, § 238); *sim. Thuc.* 1. 9. The latter, however, is taken by Forbes to mean 'they would not be called "many" by the poet' (see also Kühner-Gerth, loc. cit.; this again makes the optative 'present' rather than either 'future' or 'past'); and both Goodwin and Forbes deny that these have any connexion with the Homeric and other Herodotean 'past optatives'. The transla-

tions 'they might possibly be Cretans' (Turner), 'these may have been Cretans' (Monro), etc., are too weak; the optative does not in itself imply doubt: 'they would be Cretans', 'they (certainly) would not be many', etc.

² Taken by Goodwin to refer to future, with meaning 'may it prove that they have driven' (*M.T.* § 93); this itself, however, is equivalent to a past wish—or, since there is admittedly nothing unfulfilled about it, a past hope: 'may they have driven' or 'I hope they drove/have driven', and Goodwin himself, in speaking of 'laxity of usage' and comparing this with clear cases of the Homeric 'past optative', comes near to dispensing with the future interpretation altogether.

ἤματα πάντα, τέκοι δέ με πότνια Ἥρη, 13. 825-6; pure optative: νῦν μὲν μήτ' εἴης, βουγάε, μήτε γένοιο, *Od.* 18. 79. Later instances: μὴ γὰρ εἶην ἐκ Δαρείου . . . γεγονώς, *Hdt.* 7. 11; ὡς ὄλοιο παγκακῶς | ἦτις . . . ἤρξατ', *Eur. Hipp.* 407-8; ὅπου κακῶς ὄλοιο, *Hel.* 1215.

What is of especial importance is how these cases can be made part of a general view of the optative. Those who hold to the tradition that the optative, whatever its original meaning (wish or possibility), had primarily a future reference naturally find here, whenever the context will conceivably bear it or where some special interpretation is possible, a future, or at most a present, meaning, and elsewhere simply an exception to the rule—hence Goodwin's 'future realisations' and Kühner-Gerth's 'present standpoint' already noted, and similarly Hahn's 'transference' theory.¹ In line with such views we might suppose that in some cases at least the writer or speaker is projecting himself into the past and adopting the temporal standpoint of the events he is describing; the mood, so regarded, might be called a 'vivid' or 'historic' optative. But the most convenient supposition—one that may be held to explain all such instances in the same way, in place of the varying explanations commonly given, and at the same time to make them accord with a general theory—is that the optative as such has no temporal reference at all, as indeed might be expected, since moods, after all, are not tenses; it simply supplies the notion of potentiality and may be fitted into *any* temporal context, and in this way be given a 'temporal application'—but it takes on such temporal colouring as it has by reflection from its surroundings rather than possessing it in its own right. The optative is thus essentially timeless,² and this explains two marked features: (i) in the earliest period it is in fact used of (i.e. applied to) *any* time—past, present, or future; (ii) it is seen to be especially suitable for those cases where the temporal aspect is not particularly relevant and where there is no desire to stress it (as in many of the Homeric potentials quoted), or where there is in fact a mixture of tenses (*Il.* 2. 81 and *Od.* 2. 185, cited above, are perhaps both 'past' and 'present', *sim. Il.* 3. 41; *Od.* 1. 236; and such wishes as εἰ γὰρ σ' ὡς θέλοι φιλέω γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη, *Od.* 3. 218, are possibly to be taken as applying to both present and future). Or, again, it may be used where a strictly 'general' circumstance is in fact referred to: ἀνὴρ δέ κεν οὐ τι Διὸς νόον εἰρύσσαιτο, *Il.* 8. 143; ῥεῖα θεός γ' ἐθέλων καὶ ἀμείνωνας . . . θωρήσας, 10. 556-7; γηθήσειε, 9. 77; φέροι, *Od.* 9. 131, and similar potentials (*Od.* 5. 74; 7. 293; 9. 242 may come within this class; cf. μαχέοιτο, *Il.* 1. 272); wishes: εἰ γὰρ . . . εἶην ἤματα πάντα, *Il.* 13. 825-6; εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼν ὡς | εἶην ἀθάνατος καὶ ἀγήρως ἤματα πάντα, 8. 538-9 (cf. *Il.* 16. 722), though such usages are often taken as 'present' (many individual cases cannot, of course, be precisely classified as to temporal application—nor is it always clear whether or not there is a temporal

¹ For the very commonly held futuristic interpretation of the optative see Goodwin, *M.T.*, pp. 385 ff. and §§ 234 f., 243, 401; Monro, *Homeric Grammar*, § 315; Thompson, *Greek Syntax*, p. 133. Hahn: 'the optative . . . got transferred to past unreal conditions in place of the past indicative', *Subjunctive and Optative* (American Philological Association Monographs), § 129; *sim.* Goodwin, *M.T.*, p. 388 (4). But the evidence is quite consistent with the optative being the original

construction for all tenses and the indicative itself a later substitute.

² Goodwin and perhaps Monro occasionally seem to imply this (*M.T.*, § 442; *H.G.*, § 299), but they do not make the principle either original or operative throughout; on the contrary, it conflicts with their basic theory. *Sim.* Schwyzler, *Griechische Grammatik*, ii. 320, 324, 328; see also Chantraine, *Grammaire homérique*, ii, §§ 323-5.

application). This 'timeless' interpretation applies not only to the Homeric usage, still less to certain Homeric potential instances alone, as Goodwin seems to imply (*M.T.* § 442), but concerns the nature of the optative in itself, which it preserved throughout its existence. The use of the indicative tenses, generally with *κε* or *άν* in the case of potentials and conditions, gradually ousted the optative from the past, and to a lesser degree from the present, sphere (in Homer the past has already ceded much ground, though the present remains fairly well established); and in Attic, when the optative has a specific application at all, the tense-reference is for *this* reason generally to the future. But it is not surprising that such vestiges of its old dominion as have been indicated remain, and these, therefore, need not be emended or otherwise explained (besides the 'past optative' an occasional use of the 'present optative' is found: οὐδ' *άν* σὺ φαίης, εἰ σε μὴ κνίζοι λέχος, Eur. *Med.* 568; εἰ δὲ σωφρονεῖν | ἔγνωθ' . . . εὐδαιμονοῖτ' *άν* [εὐδαιμονοεῖτ' *άν*, Musgrave et al.], *Bacch.* 1341-3; λέγουτ' *άν*, εἰ μὴ γλώσσαν ἐγκλείσαι φόβος Soph. *Ant.* 505).¹ But such references, to whatever time, are always contextual rather than logical, a matter of application, not of meaning; while many optatives often taken as 'future' may still be taken as mixed, or general (i.e. without specific temporal application), whether in potentials: τεάν, Ζεῦ, δύνασιν τίς ἀνδρῶν ὑπερβασία κατάρχοι; Soph. *Ant.* 604-5; ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ γένοιτ' *άν* ποτε καὶ κακός, Plat. *Prot.* 345 b, or in the corresponding type of conditional: οὐ πολλὴ *άν* ἀλογία εἴη, εἰ φοβοῖτο τὸν θάνατον ὁ τοιοῦτος; Plat. *Phaed.* 68 b, or in wishes: εἴ μοι συνεῖη . . . μοῖρα, Soph. *O.T.* 863; (perhaps) εἴ μοι γένοιτο φθόγγος, Eur. *Hec.* 836; εἰ γάρ . . . ὦ Ζεῦ καὶ θεοί, ἐν τούτῳ εἴη, Plat. *Prot.* 310 d.² Common potentials (φαίην *άν*, βουλοίμην *άν*) often seem to include present time, or to be general and timeless, and similarly some common wishes: πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν, Plat. *Phaedr.* 279 c.

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¹ Such examples as εἰ ἐπίστευον . . . ἐπιτιμώμην [ἐπετιμώμην cod. E], Isoc. 12. 149; εἰ ἐβουλόμην . . . ἐξορῶμην [ἐξωρῶμην Gilbert; cod. B], Xen. *Comm.* 3. 5. 8, if correct readings, are probably 'future' rather than either 'present' or 'past', and represent a change of viewpoint. Eur. *Bacch.* 1343 has only been found puzzling because it has been thought that εὐδαιμονοῖτ' *άν* refers necessarily to the future.

² Some of the 'past optatives' already quoted may be of this kind. Eur. *Supp.* 764: φαίης perhaps general (if not 'present'). Sim. *Od.* 18. 79: γένοιτο ('would that you had neither existence nor birth'), though a past reference is fitting ('would that you did not exist now, nor had ever existed'—or 'come into existence', inceptive aorist—'before'). Moorhouse in *C.R.* lxii. 61 admits that the mood may be timeless and rightly denies a past meaning; but he ignores the possibility

of a past application. It comes to very much the same thing here if we say that 'to have birth' (now or in general) involves, and to that extent includes, to have been born at some time in the past and that Antinous may well be allowed to be thinking of the latter rather than of the former: 'would that you did not exist now' (compatible with 'would that you had perished long ago'); 'nay rather, would that you had never been born in the first place'. Similar considerations apply to τέκοι in *Il.* 13. 826, and to εἴην . . . γεγονώς in *Hdt.* 7. 11 where the perfect may be taken as having a present or timeless force. Eur. *Hipp.* 407: ὡς ἔδοιτο, 'formelhaft', Wecklein (and cf. *K.-G.* i, § 395 (3)); possibly without a specific temporal reference, therefore, though if there is one, it must be past. *Hel.* 1215 may be likewise taken as general, simply, or as having a mixed reference: 'I hope he perished or may yet perish.'

SOPHOCLES. OEDIPUS TYRANNUS 334-6

- 334 OIA. οὐκ, ὦ κακῶν κάκιστε, καὶ γὰρ ἂν πέτρου
 335 φύσιν σύ γ' ὀργάνειας, ἐξερεῖς ποτέ,
 ἀλλ' ὦδ' ἄτεγκτος ἀτελεύτητος φανῇ;
 TEIP. ὀργὴν ἐμέμψω τὴν ἐμήν, τὴν σὴν δ' ὁμοῦ
 ναίουσαν οὐ κατείδες, ἀλλ' ἐμέ ψέγεις.
 OIA. τίς γὰρ τοιαῦτ' ἂν οὐκ ἂν ὀργίζοιτ' ἔπη
 340 κλύων, ἃ νῦν σὺ τήνδ' ἀτιμάζεις πόλιν;

337 ὀρμήν L first hand.

All editors have taken the words καὶ γὰρ ἂν πέτρου φύσιν σύ γ' ὀργάνειας to mean 'thou wouldst anger a very stone'. So did the scholiast.

It is, however, a very difficult interpretation. For in 337-8 Teiresias complains that Oedipus has blamed his (Teiresias') anger and not noticed his own. But if Oedipus said 'thou wouldst anger a very stone', then he had done exactly the reverse; he had admitted his own anger, and he had made no explicit reference to Teiresias'. Furthermore, lines 339-40 would be a very weak repetition of the idea already expressed more forcibly in lines 334-5.

It seems much better to take ὀργάνειας intransitive, and πέτρου φύσιν as an internal accusative. 'You must have an ὀργή of very rock.' ὀργή means something between 'temperament' and 'anger', and 'bad temper' is generally thought of in Greek as being particularly stubborn and rocklike; see L. S. J. s.v. ὀργή, and consider the implacable anger of Achilles in the *Iliad*. The optative in the sense of 'must have' (something is 'like to be so, to judge by all the indications'—sometimes gaining the slightly stronger force of 'must be so', or 'so then it is so') occurs again in *O.T.* 1182 τὰ πάντ' ἂν ἐξήκοι σαφῆ, and since ὀργή also implies 'temperament', φύσιν is not too unlikely an internal accusative after it.¹ Elsewhere in tragedy ὀργαίνω is intransitive (e.g. *S. Tr.* 552, *Eur. Alc.* 1106), and I cannot find instances of the transitive use of this verb. The aorist is more difficult to explain; possibly it is used on the analogy of ἔφυν, possibly there is something of 'immediate past'.²

Clearly it is difficult for us now to feel the force of an optative or of an internal accusative; but there is no reason for supposing that an ancient Greek would have experienced the same difficulty. Therefore I do not see that any scholar has the right to raise his eyebrows at my interpretation and say 'Impossible'. But let us examine the alternative, and see whether there is any way

¹ For the internal accusative compare Aristophanes, *Wasps* 455 βλεπόντων κάρδαμα. For the 'inferential' optative (as I would call it) compare such expressions as the following, which are taken from Kühner-Gerth, *Griechische Grammatik*, i. 232-3: Hdt. 3. 23 διὰ τοῦτο ἂν εἰεν μακρόβιοι, Thuc. 1. 9 αἶθραι δ' οὐκ ἂν πολλὰ εἴσαν, Plato, *Republic* 444 d ἀρετὴ ἄρα, ὡς εἰκεν, ἡγιάει τις ἂν εἴη. Kühner-Gerth's interpretations of these optatives seem inadequate. Perhaps the basic meaning of the optative is 'a thing is like to be so', and

hence the various shades of meaning in literature.

² Mr. W. B. Sedgwick pointed out to me that the three lines instead of two break the regularity of the speech divisions here. One might therefore suspect that line 336 was added by someone who misunderstood the first two lines. But irregularity seems to be a feature of this angry dialogue, and the line does not look particularly like the work of an interpolator.

of explaining away the difficulties that abound in the interpretation which takes *ὀργαίνω* transitive. We should have to explain it along some such lines as the following:

Sophocles deliberately frames the speech of Teiresias in lines 337-8 in such a way that it shall be riddling to Oedipus. It must look to Oedipus as if Teiresias has utterly reversed the sense of his own words. Oedipus had, in lines 334-6, virtually admitted his own anger and he had made no explicit reference to Teiresias'; yet Teiresias complains that Oedipus has blamed his (Teiresias') anger and not noticed his own. But of course there is the underlying meaning in *τῇ σὴν δ' ὁμοῦ ναλοῦσαν*, which is known to Teiresias and the audience, but not to Oedipus. Finally, Oedipus is left, in lines 339-40, feebly repeating the protest which he had already expressed more strongly in lines 334-5.

This seems to be the only possible explanation, once we take *ὀργαίνω* out of its normal sense by making it transitive. We have to assume that Sophocles has put deliberately riddling language into the mouth of Teiresias. There is no middle course. If this explanation were correct, it would give us a fascinating insight into Sophocles' dramatic technique. On the other hand, illogicalities, like entities, should not be multiplied without necessity; and since (in spite of difficulties) the intransitive interpretation seems to be possible, and even to derive support from the usage of *ὀργαίνω* and from the use of the optative at *O.T.* 1182, I maintain that *ὀργαίνω* should be taken intransitive and the passage interpreted as I have suggested.

N. BOOTH

THE EUNUCH BAGOAS

A Study in Method

THE stage of Alexander's great drama is thronged with minor characters playing their walk-on parts or acting as heroes or villains in their own little scenes. Their names, often unknown to—or ignored by—our main sources, have been gathered with monumental diligence by Berve,¹ who has provided a basis for some *akribeia* in a study traditionally befogged with generality and prejudice. In this country the study of Alexander is necessarily under the spell of Tarn's masterly work,² based on a thorough discussion of the sources.³ To agree or to disagree, we must always come back to him; and disagreement, in the main, has been confined to details.⁴ But it is on detailed study that a general interpretation must be based, especially in the case of such a vast subject; and an investigation of that minor villain, the eunuch Bagoas, may turn out to be not devoid of general interest.

'Bagoas', in eastern lands, was a common name for a eunuch, and more particularly for a eunuch of the Great King.⁵ The best-known bearer of the name was the treacherous friend of Artaxerxes Ochus,⁶ who, more than any other individual, may be said to have been responsible for the downfall of the Achaemenid Empire. A eunuch by that same name appears three or four times in the story of Alexander; it is he—whom 'some modern writers have taken for a real person', but whom Tarn has argued out of existence⁷—with whom we shall be concerned.

(i)

Of the chief incidents in connexion with which he is mentioned, two are reported by Curtius and one by Plutarch and Athenaeus.⁸ Each of these incidents is individually discussed and rejected by Tarn, and we must examine them, and his arguments, in detail. The first, reported by Curtius, deals with the beginnings of Alexander's friendship for Bagoas: among the gifts by which Nabarzanes hoped to buy safety and favour was Bagoas, formerly Darius' favourite and in due course Alexander's; and it was mainly his entreaties that made Alexander pardon Nabarzanes.⁹ It is, says Tarn, 'a silly story'; and he gives three reasons for rejecting it: first, that Alexander would have made up his mind at once (for such was his character); next, that Curtius, 'in his usual careless fashion', has forgotten that Nabarzanes surrendered *accepta fide* anyway; finally, that Alexander 'put no one to death for Darius' murder (which after

¹ *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage*, vol. ii, München, 1926.

² *Alexander the Great*, 2 vols., Cambridge, 1948. (All references to Tarn are, unless the contrary is stated, to this work.) Many of his views had been known and influential for years, having appeared in the *Cambridge Ancient History* and in periodicals.

³ Vol. ii, part i.

⁴ e.g. J. R. Hamilton, *C.Q.*, n.s. iii (1953), 151 f.; v (1955), 219 f. Abroad reaction has at times been more vigorous (e.g. Wüst,

Historia, ii (1954), 418 f.; and Hampl, *Robinson Studies*, ii, 816 f.).

⁵ Cf. *Ov. am.* ii. 2. 1; and—an incredible farrago—*Pl. n.h.* xiii. 41.

⁶ *R.E.* s.v. 'Bagoas', no. 1.

⁷ *Op. cit.* ii. 319–22.

⁸ Thus Tarn's statement that 'the only one of our extant writers who features Bagoas is Curtius' (p. 320) must be called misleading. We shall see the importance of that later.

⁹ *Curt.* vi. 5. 23.

all relieved him of the difficulty of dealing with his rival)' and that Nabarzanes therefore did not need Bagoas' intercession.

The first argument does not carry much weight: Alexander is in fact, like lesser men, known to have put off decisions or even changed his mind. Moreover, as we shall see, it is based on a misunderstanding of what Curtius actually said. The second deserves some comment, as it shows in paradigmatic fashion the havoc wrought by prejudice in source criticism. Careless Curtius undoubtedly can be—though not, perhaps, as often as Tarn asserts;¹ but it would take a good deal to make us believe that he has flatly contradicted himself within two sentences (i.e. thirty words). For the whole Bagoas incident—so far from being 'featured'—takes up precisely one sentence of twenty-six words, and the giving of the *fides* is mentioned immediately before. There must surely be limits to the stupidity that we may be asked to impute to ancient scholars; and though they may sometimes be in doubt, there can be no doubt here; for Curtius, with all his faults, is no mere chatterbox or even compiler. When these limits seem to be transgressed, it is time to examine our premise and the text. In fact there is neither contradiction nor even difficulty. A little earlier² Curtius quotes a letter from Nabarzanes offering surrender. It is not the sort of document that invites belief; but that is beside our point. In this letter Nabarzanes asks for Alexander's *fides*, which he says he will trust; and he receives the promise 'inviolatum, si uenisset, fore'.³ This clearly was the *fides* on the strength of which he surrendered. However, even if he could indeed trust Alexander (and we shall consider this presently), inviolability was surely not the same as forgiveness. The different degrees of treatment possible are well illustrated by the case of Artabazus, who, just before Nabarzanes' arrival, is sent home 'geminato honore quem Dareus habuerat ei'.⁴ What Curtius has told us is that, after Nabarzanes has come in under promise of life and freedom (if it does extend to this), Bagoas' entreaties not only confirm his safety, but gain him complete pardon. We may now add that this probably happens straight after their arrival, so that Tarn's first argument is beside the point: Curtius does not say that Alexander only made up his mind 'mox';⁵ but, mentioning in passing that Bagoas had been Darius' favourite and in due course ('mox') became Alexander's, he says that it was chiefly the beautiful boy's entreaties that made Alexander take his decision about Nabarzanes. There is nothing to tell us when this happened, but the inference is surely that it was at once; Bagoas, clearly brought along for the purpose of capturing Alexander's heart, had no doubt been carefully coached in his role of suppliant.

Curtius' account of this incident, therefore, is quite self-consistent. Nor need we wonder that Arrian omits it in *his* account; for there Nabarzanes' surrender merely gets a brief mention, apparently in the wrong place, before Alexander's entry into Hyrcania—i.e. where Curtius reports the offer of surrender by letter. Berve⁶ saw that this will not do and that Curtius is more plausible; though, oddly enough, he then concluded that Nabarzanes was probably put to death! Nabarzanes indeed is not heard of again; but we need not doubt his pardon: the forgiveness obtained for him by the beautiful Bagoas did not extend to entrusting him again with a position of power. It is noteworthy that Nabarzanes

¹ Op. cit. ii. 96.

² vi. 4. 8 f.

³ vi. 4. 14.

⁴ vi. 5. 22 (inaccurate).

⁵ Which, incidentally, does not mean 'soon' (thus Tarn), but 'in due course', 'later'.

⁶ Op. cit. 269.

was the *first* of Darius' murderers who surrendered, at a time when the others were still dangerous. Alexander never sacrificed policy to emotion, and we may well believe that he intended to pardon the traitor at once, to encourage the others; but his lot, henceforth, was *cum dignitate otium*.

We come to Tarn's last argument—that none of Darius' murderers were executed for the murder, because Alexander did not mind it very much. This statement needs separate investigation, which must be left for another occasion. Here we need only notice that, in two cases out of the three concerned, Tarn has simply rejected the source (which in both cases happens to be Arrian) for the sake of a *a priori* construction. Bessus, the organizer of the deed,¹ was later, after his capture, asked by Alexander why he had betrayed and killed his king; when his answer was unsatisfactory, he was flogged in public, with a herald proclaiming that this was his punishment for the crime with which Alexander had charged him. It could hardly be made clearer, both to those present and to posterity, that his plot against, and murder of, Darius were the reason for his punishment. And when we are next told that he was thereupon sent to Bactra for execution—though the precise form of his trial may not be quite clear—it is surely flying in the face of the evidence to deny that he was executed for the murder of Darius.² Who, we might ask, is this source that is so nonchalantly brushed aside? None other than Ptolemy³—who, apart from his other claims to belief, was the officer who actually captured Bessus and had no reason whatever to misreport the facts of his reception. After this it comes almost as an anticlimax when Arrian's explicit statement that Barsaentes, another of the murderers, was later executed for the deed is simply denied.⁴

The capture of Bessus and that of Barsaentes came after the surrender of Nabarzanes: there was no one to encourage and clemency was pointless. Thus it may not be said that Nabarzanes was frightened by their fate. Yet Alexander's eagerness to take Darius alive, the honours paid to his dead body, and indeed Alexander's claim to be the successor of the Achaemenid kings,⁵ already augured ill for the murderers: Barsaentes, despite the example of Nabarzanes' pardon and the hopelessness of further resistance, would not take the risk of surrendering and preferred flight into uncertainty that proved to be death.⁶ It is quite possible that Alexander had announced his intentions towards the murderers; but in any case it is clear from the facts that Nabarzanes had good reason to be afraid, perhaps even after the *accepta fides*: a despicable traitor himself—at least in Alexander's official view—he might well wonder whether

¹ This, implied by Arrian (see next note), is stated by Diodorus (xvii. 73. 2) and Curtius (v. 13. 13 f.). Cf. also Plut. *Al.* 43. 2.

² The passage (Arr. iii. 30. 4 f. [references to Arrian are, unless otherwise marked, to the *Anabasis*]) is so important that it must be quoted in full (only Bessus' unsatisfactory excuse is omitted, as the details are not relevant to this question): *Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ἰδὼν τὸν Βήσσον ἐπιστήσας τὸ ἄρμα ἤρτο ἀνθ' ὅτου τὸν βασιλέα τὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἅμα οἰκεῖον καὶ εὐεργέτην γενόμενον Δαρείον τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ξυνέλαβε καὶ δῆσας ἤγεν, ἔπειτα ἀπέκτενε. . . Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖσδε μαστιγοῦν ἐκέλευεν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐπιλέγειν τὸν κήρυκα ταῦτ' ἐκεῖνα ὅσα αὐτὸς τῷ Βήσσῳ ἐν τῇ πίστει ὠνείδισε. Βήσσος*

μὲν δὲ οὕτως αἰσθηθεὶς ἀποπέμπεται ἐς Βάκτρα ἀποθανούμενος. But cf. Tarn (i. 70): 'He was condemned, not for the murder of Darius, but for assuming the tiara.'

³ καὶ ταῦτα Πτολεμαῖος ὑπὲρ Βήσσου ἀνέγραψεν, as Arrian informs us in the next sentence, before passing on to an unimportant variant in Aristobulus.

⁴ ἀποθνήσκει πρὸς Ἀλεξάνδρου τῆς ἐς Δαρείον ἀδικίας ἕνεκα, says Arrian (iii. 25. 8), 'who is wrong in saying that he was executed for Darius' murder' (Tarn, ii. 321, n. 3—without argument).

⁵ These are reported by all the sources; see the standard works.

⁶ Arr., l.c.

perfidy would be deemed a fair weapon against him. The choice and the fate of Barsaentes provide a fitting commentary on the hesitation of Nabarzanes. Thus closer investigation completes the vindication of Curtius: Nabarzanes' *dona ingentia* and the entreaties of Bagoas indeed seemed necessary, not only to secure a full pardon, but to insure himself against the treachery that he must suspect because he deserved it. In fact he was the only one of those concerned in Darius' murder who gained his pardon.¹ Curtius is not only consistent, but credible. Only misrepresentation of what he says, and the rejection of Arrian where he is based on Ptolemy at his most reliable, can turn his account into 'a silly story'. It is interesting that such methods should be necessary, and that they should be adopted.

(ii)

The second incident is more important and no less instructive. I cannot improve upon Tarn's summary:²

'The other story which Curtius has to tell about Bagoas is that Orxines, for long satrap of Persis and the noblest of the Persians, visited Alexander and gave presents to all his friends except the eunuch Bagoas; Bagoas in revenge accused him of robbing Cyrus' tomb, and Alexander thereupon put him to death.'

Now comes the commentary:

'This story is an even clearer fabrication than the other. Orxines indeed existed, but he was very different from Curtius' account of him.'

There follows a summary of Arrian's account of Orxines (vi. 29-30), which indeed is very different. This leads Tarn to the conclusion: 'In face of these considerations, the whole of Curtius' account of Bagoas falls to the ground.' The account is then said to be a lie due to the Peripatetics—a point to which we shall have to return.

It is a perfect example of *petitio principii* in source criticism: it must be obvious that, if we start with the assumption that Arrian's account is true, then Curtius' is indeed a fabrication. In the same way, if we were to start with the assumption that Curtius has the truth, then Arrian's story might be called a fabrication. The odd thing is that, as we saw in our discussion of the first incident, the discrediting of Curtius was there achieved by means involving the complete rejection of Arrian (and Arrian at his best); while here the same result is brought about by taking Arrian, without discussion, as gospel. It is evidently the desire to discredit Curtius, in the whole matter of Bagoas, that has fashioned the appropriate means.

The way to arrive at a useful result is surely different. This may be one of those numerous cases where the historian must despair of arriving at certainty. But, given two contradictory accounts, we must start by asking: 'If one of them is true, how and why did the other come into being?' *Bona fide* error is here impossible, and Tarn, knowing this, feels that he must make some attempt to answer—or anticipate—the question. Curtius, according to him, was a moralist following the Peripatetic view of Alexander; in fact, he was the first

¹ That Satibarzanes, also pardoned, was deemed innocent of the murder (as he probably was) must be shown elsewhere: it is,

in any case, not an uncommon view. The fate of Bessus and Barsaentes is clear.

² ii. 321.

to write it up into a unified account; and the Peripatetics, for purposes of their own, did not stop at any lie to discredit Alexander. We shall have to return to this in the next section. But as far as Curtius' account is concerned, we have already seen that rejection here is *a priori*: the question asked is not 'Which account is true?', but 'How did Curtius come to write this lie?' And it is clear that the answer will not satisfy anyone not already convinced. Orxines' death was one of a series of punitive measures against satraps and commanders that began when Alexander was still in India¹ and extended over the whole period of his return. To the historian they present an interesting mixture of motives (not always easy to disengage) as well as of persons—Iranians, Macedonians, and even a Thracian. The simple tale of the just king punishing those who had transgressed in his absence belongs to romantic biography and to official apologia. Let us look at one or two of these cases.

Apollophanes, the satrap of the Oreitae and Gedrosia, perhaps provides the clearest illustration. He had been recently appointed to his post; yet on Alexander's arrival at his capital Pura he was deposed.² The reason given was that he had failed to execute his orders, clearly in connexion with Alexander's march through the Gedrosian desert. (Thus Arrian, in a list of satrapal appointments that bears the stamp of the official source.) Yet in another connexion³ Arrian reports that Apollophanes, still as satrap, fell in the battle in which Leonnatus defeated the rebellious Oreitae; and he actually refers back to his *Anabasis*, where the battle is mentioned in passing.⁴ How can the seeming contradiction be resolved? That Arrian has made a mistake in reproducing the changes made at Pura⁵ is most unlikely; nor is it easy to see how or why he should have falsely introduced the obscure satrap into his account of Leonnatus' victory.⁶ But we have, in fact, no reason to reject either of Arrian's statements: it is a false dilemma. On his arrival at Pura, after the terrible march through the desert, the King at once announced the deposition of the satrap in whose territory the disaster had been suffered: Alexander himself had, for once, been at fault, and a scapegoat had to be found immediately.⁷ The absurdity of this hasty measure was demonstrated before long: Apollophanes had in fact, as we have seen, been fighting rebellion on his eastern borders and had died in action; and Alexander received Leonnatus' dispatch while still at Pura.⁸ It seems that this mishap was not the end of the search: Abulites, satrap of Susiana, and his son Oxathres, governor—probably under him—of Paraetacene, were later executed for maladministration.⁹ That is all Arrian gives us: he, in the context, is dealing only with satrapal maladministration and presenting the classic picture of Alexander's wrath at it. Plutarch adds some graphic details that Arrian's silence by no means disproves: that Alexander personally killed Oxathres; and, above all, that Abulites was charged with having sent money instead of supplies and that this was at least one important reason for his punishment. It is clear that the search for a scapegoat had continued.

More might be said about other victims of Alexander's anger, suspicion, or

¹ Tyriaspes (Arr. vi. 15. 3).

² Arr. vi. 22. 3; 27. 1.

³ *Ind.* 23. 5.

⁴ vii. 5. 5.

⁵ Thus Berve (op. cit. 57, with references).

⁶ This is generally recognized: e.g. Tarn, who reports Apollophanes' death as fact (i.

107—ignoring the deposition!). Cf. last note.

⁷ Alexander's responsibility is rightly stressed by Schachermeyr (*Alex.* 382 f.). Cf. Nearchus' apologia (Arr. vi. 24. 2).

⁸ Curt. ix. 10. 19. On the chronology cf. Diod. xvii. 105. 8.

⁹ Arr. vii. 4. 1; Plut. *Al.* 68. 3.

policy; but that would take us too far. It should now be clear, however, that it is possible to add to Arrian's simple account of these matters. We may thus return to the question with which we started. Tarn's theory of the 'Peripatetic lie' will not serve the purpose for which it was advanced: it invites the further question of why, of all the Macedonians, Persians, &c., affected by these measures, it should be, not a Macedonian noble like Cleander, brother of the great Coenus, but—Orxines, a Persian about whom we know practically nothing and who (if Tarn's view be true) was in fact proved genuinely guilty of tomb-robbery, sacrilege, and mass-murder—why it should be he, of all men, who should become the hero of a myth invented by Greek philosophers, as the just man nobly defying the tyrant's vile creature. Perhaps some answer could be found: it is said that even Ptolemy's astronomy could be sustained by means of a sufficient number of *ad hoc* hypotheses. But there is no reasonable explanation of why a philosopher should have dug up the name of Orxines and coupled him with a wholly imaginary eunuch in a moral tale.

Thus, if Arrian's account is true, we are confronted with an insoluble puzzle. It would not be the only one in history; but there is no need to leave matters at that, if we can help it. For if we turn our question round, the puzzle disappears. Supposing Curtius' account is, in outline, true—can we say how and why Arrian's departure from the truth originated? It has long been recognized that Arrian, where—as, probably, most of the time—he is following Ptolemy, has both the merits and the faults of an 'official version'. The merits are great and well known; but with them we are not concerned just now. The faults, oddly enough, no one has seen and characterized more clearly than Tarn. Speaking about figures of Macedonian and enemy losses, he says (unanswerably): 'Ptolemy used his figures for the honour and glory of Alexander (and of himself as one of his principal lieutenants); that is all.'¹ And he shrewdly adds that we are accustomed to this type of propaganda today. Yet he fails to extend this to political matters. That Ptolemy's retouching of facts, in the King's interests or his own, can pass the bounds of mere *suggestio falsi*, he will not recognize even where no other conclusion is possible from evidence he himself advances.² That Ptolemy, giving the official or his own version of highly important political controversies, can be taken to tell the truth and nothing but the truth, is almost an article of faith for him. We need only mention the obscure and discreditable affair of the 'conspiracy of Philotas'.³ Admittedly Ptolemy's history was not an apologia of the type of Chares' or Aristobulus'.⁴ But there is not a single case, in Alexander's numerous political conflicts with his victims, where the King is clearly in the wrong and his opponent's point of view admitted as valid—any more than there is a case

¹ ii. 137.

² In the case of Aristonous (ii. 109): 'Either then our sole, and very circumstantial, account of the reason for Aristonous' honours is untrue, or else Ptolemy doctored the official record, which is almost incredible. I cannot resolve the dilemma.' The better-known case of Cleomenes might also be cited. On the credibility of Ptolemy cf. also n. 4 (below). Tarn has no such doubts and hesitations in one case, where his own main theories are concerned. In his discussion of the Opis banquet (ii. 443 f.) a dubious secondary

source is preferred to Ptolemy on the grounds that the latter would disapprove of Alexander's policy (as constructed by Tarn).

³ Tarn, i. 62–63.

⁴ The overrating of Aristobulus—whose prejudices, recognized even in antiquity, are congenial to his own—is one of the serious faults of Tarn's source criticism. (Cf. ii. 42.) But we cannot discuss that here. However, in the well-known account of the journey to Siwah his ravens compare favourably with Ptolemy's talking snakes (Arr. ii. 3).

where military incompetence is freely admitted. If, then, the story of Orxines, such as we find it in Curtius, did happen to be (in outline) true, can we seriously imagine that Arrian would have found it in Ptolemy? It is only from Plutarch and Curtius that we get some circumstantial details—certainly not, on this account, to be disbelieved—of the intrigues round Philotas; and, though we find it in Arrian, it is not from Ptolemy that we get some information about the *proskynesis* affair.¹ It is only thus that we can dispel Ptolemy's myth—which is usually Arrian's—of the perfectly integrated machine that made up Alexander's Court and General Staff. It is not Arrian who helps us form a picture of that redoubtable family, the sons of Polemocrates: advancing to high positions under the special protection of Parmenio, whose daughter Coenus married² and under whom Cleander served;³ the first to turn against their protector when it seemed expedient, with Coenus outdoing most of the others in demonstrating hostility to Philotas, and Cleander murdering Parmenio himself—a deed for which his own soldiers never forgave him;⁴ advancing thereby, Cleander to Parmenio's place, Coenus ultimately to a hipparchy;⁵ until misfortune and miscalculation in the end mysteriously destroyed them. Even the character and intrigues of the sinister Hephæstion are not illuminated by Arrian-Ptolemy.⁶ If, then, it was true that Orxines came to grief through the intrigues of Bagoas, we know precisely what Ptolemy would tell us: he would report the official version, listing the crimes for which Orxines was officially said to have been executed; and he would describe him as proved guilty, just as he had described Philotas.⁷

This, of course, is precisely what we do find in Arrian. Thus, while Curtius' account is not reasonably explicable on the hypothesis that Arrian's is true, Arrian's is—not only explicable, but (we may say) inevitable, if we assume the truth of Curtius'. For the unbiased historian the conclusion is obvious: there is no shadow of a reason why Curtius' account should not be accepted as (in outline) true. Not, of course, in every detail: the short speeches, in Curtius' usual manner, are certainly invented; and it is, though, from what we have seen, not impossible, yet at least doubtful whether Orxines was in fact used as the official scapegoat for the violation of Cyrus' tomb,⁸ or whether Curtius has touched up and pointed, by a well-known specific reference, the general charge of tomb-robbery which was certainly advanced. These details, however, though not unimportant in themselves, do not matter for our present purpose: the general conclusion must stand.

(iii)

We have seen that in the two incidents reported by Curtius there is no good

¹ Plut. *Al.* 48–49; Curt. vi. 7 f.; Arr. iv. 12.

² Curt. vi. 9. 30.

³ Curt. vii. 2. 19.

⁴ Curt., ll. cc. Oddly enough Arrian's picture—or lack of one—has so imposed itself that even in works like Berve's and Schachermeyr's the turncoat Coenus appears as the 'biedere Haudegen'.

⁵ Tarn, ii. 178 and 305; *ibid.* 165.

⁶ His feud with Eumenes does appear (vii. 13. 1; 14. 9), whether from Ptolemy (Eumenes' enemy) or not. But his feud with Craterus, and his part in the *proskynesis* affair

and in that of Philotas are not mentioned, and we get practically no characterization.

⁷ Tarn notes and reproduces ἐξηλέγχθη in the account of Orxines (Arr. vi. 30. 2). Compare ἐξηλέγξαι Φιλώταν . . . ἐλέγχους οὐκ ἀφανέσαι (Arr. iii. 26. 2—with a very dubious specimen quoted as the most important of them).

⁸ Arr. vi. 29, *fin.* shows that Aristobulus, at least, knew that the culprits were never found. But Aristobulus knew more than most people about Cyrus' tomb.

reason for doubting the existence of Bagoas and, on the whole, the part he is said to have played in important events. There remains the incident reported by Plutarch and Athenaeus:¹ that Alexander, during a contest in a theatre, kissed Bagoas amid the applause of the audience. This story Tarn indignantly dismisses on two grounds: one—on which he does not insist—that Plutarch is demonstrably wrong in localizing the incident; the other—which, he says, ‘damns the story completely’—that it is said to have taken place in a *theatre*, while it is certain that at this time there was no theatre in those Eastern regions: this is said to show that the story was invented by a Greek, who could not imagine a city without a theatre.² To the unbiased reader it seems almost incredible that such an argument could be seriously advanced as decisive. For one thing, we have the story (at best) only at second hand: Plutarch gives no source for it, while Athenaeus quotes Dicaearchus.³ In a case of this kind very little depends on a word. However, is the word really inappropriate? If we assume that Alexander did hold choral or scenic contests before a Graeco-Macedonian audience,⁴ we can be sure that it would arrange itself in the shape of a ‘theatre’—the only arrangement familiar to the men—and that Alexander would choose a place naturally suitable for such an arrangement. If so, why should it be wrong—so wrong as to be ‘completely damning’—to call that place, at least for the duration of the contests, a ‘theatre’?

It might be thought that our hypothesis—that Alexander would hold such contests in those eastern regions—is a little far-fetched. This brings us to Tarn's other point: where, in fact, is the incident alleged to have occurred? Dicaearchus, in the version we have in Athenaeus, does not tell us; nor need we ascribe that to Athenaeus: we may safely assume, from what we know about the use he makes of it, that he was not interested.⁵ Plutarch—wherever he got it from—seems to place it clearly enough: he puts it in the capital of Gedrosia, i.e. at Pura.⁶ But Tarn rightly insists that this will not do: the arrival in the capital of Gedrosia follows the Bacchic procession through Carmania, while in fact Alexander entered Carmania *from* Gedrosia, to which he never returned. However, even Tarn, eager to discredit the story, does not insist on this. Indeed, the answer is obvious: Plutarch has, by a mere slip, written ‘Gedrosia’ for ‘Carmania’—a kind of mistake that is common and well known.⁷ In fact, Plutarch knows well enough that Alexander entered Carmania from Gedrosia: he has just told us so himself.⁸

¹ Plut. *Al.* 67. 3; Ath. xiii. 603 b.

² ii. 322.

³ Tarn assumes (without question or argument) that Dicaearchus is Plutarch's source. But the differences are such that no common source is indicated. Without going into details of analysis, we may note that in Plutarch drunkenness is the main *motivo*: Alexander's Bacchic revels have just been described, and he acts *μεθύων*; in Athenaeus homosexuality is what matters and is stressed: Alexander is so much the slave of the eunuch—the word is, almost certainly, *ἡττασθας*—that he kisses him in public not once, but twice. In fact, only a few inevitable words are the same in the two accounts—if the same incident were described by two independent observers, the difference could not be greater.

⁴ *θεαρά* (Dic. *ap.* Ath., l.c.).

⁵ See n. 3 (above). The quotation comes from his treatise *On the Sacrifice* (i.e. Alexander's) *at Ilium*—from and about which nothing else is known. But it clearly did not have to deal with Iranian geography: the localization *might* have been there; but if, in the quotation we have, it is not, that need not surprise us. Plutarch probably has it from some *Life* or *History*.

⁶ ἐπεὶ δὲ ἦκε τῆς Γεδρωσίας εἰς τὸ Βασιλεῖον, αὐτὸς ἀνελάμβανε τὴν στρατιὰν πανηγυρίζων.

⁷ ‘The meaningless substitution of one known name for another known name in late writers is common enough’ (Tarn, ii. 315, with examples).

⁸ 66 *fin.*—67 *init.*

Let us correct the *lapsus calami*—using, as we have seen, Plutarch's own indication of how to do it—and see where this leads us. It leads us to a fact which, if mere coincidence, would be astonishing: in the capital of Carmania Alexander did hold choral contests.¹ Now, most of the authors recording these contests do not give the Bagoas story; so no one can accuse them of inventing the games for the sake of it. Indeed, in the case of the apologist Aristobulus, who is Arrian's main source for the games, such an imputation would be absurd. Thus the games must be accepted as genuine. Plutarch, not interested in the games as such, but in Alexander's character, mentions them in passing as the setting for the characteristic anecdote: this lack of interest in the historical background is common enough in the *Lives*—and often excruciating to the modern reader, whose interests are different—and it helps to explain how the geographical slip could occur and pass unnoticed. In Dicaearchus, even less interested in the history and chronology of Alexander's marches, the setting, as we have seen, is sketched even more lightly. However, there is no doubt that the story of Alexander's kissing Bagoas was originally attached to the games that Alexander gave in the capital of Carmania. We can still, if we want to, say *a priori* that the anecdote is of such a kind that it does not merit belief. But we cannot argue it out of existence by examination of its wording and setting; for the former is unexceptionable, the latter recognizably and incontestably historical.

Perhaps we cannot easily get much farther than this: picturesque anecdotes, though often easy enough to disprove with finality, can never be 'proved' against those who simply refuse to believe them. Nor is even a source easily discovered. In Plutarch the story appears connected, by the *motif* of drunkenness, with the Bacchic procession through Carmania; Diodorus, without mentioning Bagoas, gives both the procession and the games; Arrian gives the procession as a tale he rejects, and the games (without Bagoas) as a fact he quotes from Aristobulus; Curtius gives the procession and does not mention the games.² Clearly the mention (or the acceptance) of either the procession through Carmania or the games, or both, does not necessarily lead to that of the eunuch. The case of Curtius is rather remarkable. The precise chronology of the events at Pura, the march through Carmania, and the stay in its capital cannot be disentangled with certainty.³ In Curtius they are divided, for fairly obvious reasons of composition, between the end of Book ix and the beginning of Book x: in ix. 10 he concludes with the Bacchic procession, and in x. 1 comes the story of Orxines, to which we have already referred. Thus at this very point in his narrative Curtius is using a source that dwells on Alexander's feasting and drunkenness and one that knows Bagoas. Yet these elements do not appear

¹ Arr. vi. 28. 3: ἀγῶνα μουσικὸν τε καὶ γυμνικὸν (quoting Aristobulus). Tarn, incidentally, mentions only 'athletic sports' (i. 109)—an interesting unconscious reluctance to admit the hated 'theatre'. Diodorus xvii. 106. 4 makes Alexander (apparently on this same occasion) give σκηνηκοῦς ἀγῶνας ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ—which lets in the Bagoas story by the back door!

² Plut., Diod., Arr., ll. cc.; Curt. ix. 10, 24 f. (a carefully dramatized book-ending); x. 1.

³ Yet some known facts tend to be mis-

represented. Thus the reunion with Nearchus came during or after the games (Arr. vi. 28. 3 and 5; the reasons for the χαριστήρια and ἀγῶνες do not include his arrival; Curt. x. 1. 10: 'haud multo post'; Diod. xvii. 106. 4 f.: picturesque description, genuine or dramatized, of his arrival *during* the games). Yet Tarn makes it precede the games, to help justify the extravagant feasting: 'The reunited army and fleet forgot their hardships in a round of feasting and athletic sports' (i. 109). Even such details can be unconsciously distorted by prejudice!

combined into the story we have in Plutarch. Can we tell whether this is due to the source or to Curtius? Whoever it was, was clearly interested only in the eunuch's political influence (whether or not he actually knew this particular story): incidents (i) and (ii) unmistakably show the same interest and mind. Curtius, however, was far more interested in Alexander's character than in political history as such:¹ riotous drinking and loving are prominently featured, and there is no reason why in this instance they should be deliberately dropped. Curtius cannot have found the incident at the Carmanian games—which he does not mention at all—in the source that gave him the story of Bagoas and Orxines.

We can now consider the important question of the sources of these Bagoas incidents. For Tarn all is too easy: Dicaearchus, wanting—for reasons that we shall have to discuss—to prove that Alexander was homosexual, and having no genuine evidence, 'invented for him a minion, the eunuch Bagoas'; and this theory 'had a long run'.² It is again an interesting study in method. Starting with the emotionally satisfying theory that Bagoas must be a libellous invention, we must, of course, find someone who invented him. Dicaearchus is the only source of respectable antiquity named in connexion with a Bagoas incident; as, therefore, the invention cannot be more recent, it must be due to Dicaearchus. It is too easy, though, to accuse Dicaearchus, whom Cicero thought *ιστορικώτατον*,³ of deliberate lying; and it is quite unjustified. That worthy philosopher, like Theophrastus and Aristotle himself, may have lacked training in modern historical criticism; he may have lacked the intuition that enables modern scholars infallibly to tell a true story from a spurious one; but we have no justification for simply calling him a liar. Moreover, it is hard to see how he *could* have lied: he had, after all, a considerable and serious reputation; and he lived at a time when Alexander was still a familiar figure.⁴ What would his readers among Alexander's veterans—what would the surviving Successor Kings themselves—have thought of one who not only invented an incident like the one we are considering, but stupidly made it up about a character whom both he and they knew to be imaginary? We have already seen⁵ that there is no reason to think that Dicaearchus is Plutarch's source for the incident which they both report; there is certainly none to believe that he wholly made it up—much less that he made up the other two (those in Curtius), written from quite a different point of view and not traceable to the same source as the third.

Yet Dicaearchus, though no mere gossip-writer, might have had a serious reason for the invention—one that might make him take all the attendant risks of ridicule. So the invention now becomes part of the 'Peripatetic attack' on Alexander: the lie was invented by one whose philosophical creed and personal connexions made him hate Alexander; and it was meant to explain (a) Alexander's supposed indifference to women; (b) his deterioration in his later period—neither of which was in fact true.⁶ To use Tarn's own words: we cannot

¹ Cf. his moral comment on the second Bagoas story (x. 1. 39 f.).

² ii. 320.

³ Cic. *Att.* vi. 2. 3.

⁴ *RE*, s.v. 'Dikaiarchos', col. 547. The crucial facts are that he was a pupil of Aristotle, apparently after Theophrastus (Cic. *leg.* iii. 14—incidentally putting him quite clearly outside the main 'apostolic succes-

sion' of the School); and that he was a 'contemporary' of Aristoxenus, himself a contemporary of Alexander and the immediate Successors and a pupil of Aristotle (and son of a man who had known Socrates). See De Vogel, *Greek Philosophy*, ii, frs. 699 and 700 c.

⁵ See p. 151, n. 3 (above).

⁶ Tarn, ii. 320 and 321 respectively.

help feeling that his 'explanations . . . are mutually exclusive and therefore presumably both untrue'. But worse follows: to make all this plausible, Dicaearchus has to be linked with the main tradition of the Peripatetics and described as 'associated with the rule, after Alexander's death, of his enemy Cassander'. For such an association no evidence is cited. Cassander is known to have been a friend of several Peripatetic philosophers of Dicaearchus' generation;¹ but Dicaearchus is not one of them. He, in fact, was fundamentally opposed to the philosophy of Theophrastus, who succeeded Aristotle as head of the School,² and he seems to have quarrelled with Aristotle himself and certainly resented the Master's appointment of Theophrastus as his successor.³

What, however, was this Peripatetic tradition about Alexander, which Dicaearchus is said to have followed and graced with his inventions? It is a theory that Tarn takes from Stroux (who based it on the views of others) and describes as founded on Ciceronian evidence and generally accepted.⁴ The 'Peripatetic portrait' is said to be that of a man well educated and trained by Aristotle, but spoiled by Fortune. It is said to have been invented by Theophrastus in vindication of Callisthenes, then taken over by the School as a whole, thereby becoming influential at Alexandria, and finally written up into an historical account by Curtius in the first century A.D.⁵ What is the evidence for this elaborate theory, which serves as a foundation for such charges of malice, misrepresentation, and even—as we have seen—prurient invention, brought against the most distinguished disciple of Aristotle?

Cicero tells us that in his *Callisthenes* Theophrastus was grieved at Alexander's good fortune and said that Callisthenes had come up against a most powerful and most fortunate man, who did not know how to bear his good fortune; and in another passage he tells us in passing that Theophrastus in that work approves of the saying that it is fortune, not wisdom, that rules human life.⁶ These are—to my knowledge—the only two references, in Cicero or anywhere else, to any possible judgement on Alexander passed by a Peripatetic philosopher after Aristotle. Theophrastus' *Callisthenes* was subtitled *Or about Grief*.⁷ It was not primarily about Fortune, not at all about Alexander. Theophrastus' *Callisthenes*, like—to take two of the most familiar examples—Cicero's *Laelius* and *Cato*, was a disquisition on a philosophical subject dedicated to the memory of a great man: the philosopher's own grief at his friend's death would make it poignant and fitting. About the man himself something would no doubt—as in the examples we know—be said in the introduction, and as he would be the principal speaker, casual allusions might be made elsewhere. Nothing said in such a work can be assumed—unless we have inescapable evidence to the contrary—to be a philosophical theory about Alexander. If we read Cicero's two citations with the name and purpose of the work in mind, we can see clearly enough that it is *Callisthenes*, not Alexander's, fortune that interests his friend: we must not be blinded by the fact that a modern historian's chief

¹ See, most conveniently, *RE*, s.v. 'Kassandros', coll. 2312–13.

² *Cic. Att.* ii. 16. 3 *et al.*; cf. p. 153, n. 4 (above).

³ *Themist. orat.* xxiii. 285 c. We have no reason to doubt the genuineness of the attacks which Themistius had read.

⁴ Tarn, ii. 69 (with n. 1) and *passim*: Stroux, *Philol.* lxxxviii (1933), 229 f. Cf.

Tarn, *A.J.P.* lx (1939), 55, n. 81: 'But it is common ground.' Nothing is added to the discussion in his British Academy lecture (*P.B.A.* xix (1933), 123 f.), to which he sometimes refers.

⁵ Tarn, *passim*; especially ii. 69 and 96f.

⁶ *Tusc.* iii. 21; v. 25.

⁷ *Diog. Laert.* v. 44.

interest will be different. It is Callisthenes whose misfortune is said to have brought him into contact with Alexander ('incidere in' is the phrase used), and it is clearly he whose life illustrates, for his friend, the truth of the old tag about wisdom and fortune. Having paid this tribute to his own feelings and to *pietas*, the author could no doubt pass on to the chief philosophic purpose of the work.¹ As for Alexander, surely no one would deny that he was most powerful and most fortunate: that hardly amounts to a philosophical theory. And the view that his character did not show up too well under good fortune can hardly be called unreasonable or far-fetched even by those who—like Tarn—do not share it. In any case, it was the natural and spontaneous view for the friend of one of his victims; and it was probably shared, without attaining the dignity of being called a philosophical portrait, by the friends of Parmenio. To Theophrastus Alexander was merely a natural hazard for his friend Callisthenes.²

We have, indeed, another Ciceronian *testimonium* on Alexander in a letter to Atticus, written in May 45 B.C.³ It is one of a series in which he discusses the abortive plan of writing a 'symbouleutic' letter to Caesar, which was to restore him to Caesar's favour. The project has by now fallen through, and he refuses to start again, because he does not really know what to write: he knows similar works addressed to the young Alexander,⁴ but that was different. Then (section 3) comes a passage we must quote in full:

'quid? tu non uides ipsum illum Aristoteli discipulum, summo ingenio, summa modestia, posteaquam rex appellatus sit, superbum crudelem immoderatum fuisse? quid? tu hunc de pompa, Quirini contubernalem, his nostris litteris laetaturum putas?'

This is, according to Tarn, a good summary of the 'Peripatetic portrait': it is said to tell us that 'Aristotle turned out a perfectly good and virtuous pupil, but he was ruined by his own fortune and became a cruel tyrant'.⁵ One can only wonder where all this comes from. What Cicero is saying is that even Alexander, though a promising young man and a pupil of Aristotle (i.e. a man who had had the best possible moral education) became a tyrant after he obtained the title of 'king' (i.e. after his accession to the throne). The word *rex* was, as is known, a common term of abuse in Roman politics:⁶ it was obviously not far from men's minds in May 45—a little later Cicero explicitly applies it to Caesar.⁷ That it was in his mind in our context is clear; for he here refers to Caesar's becoming *σύνναος* of Quirinus, who was the deified Romulus—a step that, as Cicero had gleefully hinted at the time,⁸ suggested the traditional end of the founder-king. Caesar, already *rex* and *σύνναος θεοῦ*, would have no use for advice; for even Alexander, who had had plenty of it,

¹ A philosophical fragment in De Vogel, op. cit. ii, fr. 680.

² Even the remark that Theophrastus was grieved by Alexander's good fortune is not Theophrastus', but Cicero's. In *Tusc.* iii. 21 he is presenting (only to demolish it soon) the case that 'qui dolet rebus alicuius aduersis, idem alicuius etiam secundis dolet', so that *misericordia* is necessarily connected with *inuidia* and both ought to be shunned. It is as an example of this that he cites Theophrastus, saying that his grief over Callisthenes' death necessarily implies grief over

Alexander's good fortune.

³ *Att.* xiii. 28. 3.

⁴ Cf. *Att.* xii. 40. 2.

⁵ Tarn, ii. 96-97 (with n. 1): 'The Peripatetic view has long been known, as Cicero gives it.' This is based on Stroux, who says (l.c.) that this passage necessarily reproduces Theophrastus. He does not extend this to the judgement on Caesar.

⁶ See Allen, *T.A.P.A.* lxxxiv (1953), 176f.

⁷ *Att.* xiii. 37. 2.

⁸ *Att.* xii. 45. 3.

and of the best, had become a typical *rex* as soon as he obtained the title. Surely *this* Alexander has nothing to do with Theophrastus and the Peripatetic School: he is the Alexander of a Roman aristocrat chafing under the *regnum* of Caesar. We might as well call Schachermeyr's Alexander the typical Peripatetic portrait.

That Theophrastus disapproved of the king who had killed his friend we may well believe; especially as he was too sensible and too honest to preach the traditional philosophers' comfort that the wise man is happy even under torture.¹ But that this disapproval was ever worked up into a philosophical portrait, much less into a 'doctrine of Chance, which was applied to Alexander',² and that such a view became canonical in the Peripatetic School ever after—that, as far as our information goes, is pure modern invention, unsupported by any evidence whatsoever. The 'Peripatetic portrait of Alexander' must disappear from discussions of his reign—it has bedevilled them long enough. And though Dicaearchus may undoubtedly be called a Peripatetic, he had no connexion—that we know of—with Cassander and his circle, no reason to avenge the death of Callisthenes (the friend of his rival Theophrastus), and none but common decency to share Theophrastus' opinion of the man who killed him.

It follows that we cannot find a shadow of a motive that would make Dicaearchus invent the eunuch Bagoas—an invention, as we saw, as improbable psychologically as it was factually unpalatable. We must conclude that Dicaearchus probably told his story—used in its context only incidentally—not as a new anecdote that he was trying to put into circulation, but as a well-known one that he had got either from an early written account or—quite as probably—from eyewitnesses; that Plutarch got the same story probably from a characterizing source; and that the incidents related by Curtius, both unexceptionably plausible, derive from a serious writer interested in Court intrigue—probably the same one to whom we owe what little we know about the background to the Philotas trial and similar matters. That Ptolemy's official version and Aristobulus' apologia do not mention Bagoas at all is relevant, not to the problem of his existence, but to that of their adequacy and veracity. We may now, moreover, also identify Bagoas with Alexander's host in Babylon just before his death: Berve long ago saw that this identification is almost inevitable.³

As for Curtius, we must give up the simple theory of a 'Peripatetic account' which he, three or four centuries later, was the first to write down coherently. Not that this theory was ever much of a help—it only disguised our ignorance by means of an impressive label, and it led to the rejection, on *a priori* grounds, of much that is good in the tradition. The sources for the history of Alexander cannot be usefully investigated from the premise that the favourable accounts are generally authentic, while unfavourable ones are malicious later concoctions.⁴ This criterion, convenient as it would be, may be satisfying to some admirers of Alexander, but is only the rationalization of prejudice. It would

¹ Cic. *Ac. post.* i. 33; ii. 134; *fin.* v. 77; and especially *Tusc.* v. 24.

² Tarn, i. 82, where Demetrius of Phalerum is also assigned a part in this sinister conspiracy, because he illustrates the mutability of fortune by the quick downfall—still in everybody's mind—of the Achaemenid Empire (*op. Pol.* xxix. 21)! This needs no

comment, but must be mentioned, as the assertion tends to be repeated without scrutiny of the evidence.

³ Ael. *v.h.* ii. 23—'highly suspect' to Tarn, no doubt because unfavourable to Alexander. Cf. Berve, *op. cit.* 99.

⁴ Tarn, ii. 131 and *passim*.

be more true and useful, in view of the known tendencies of Ptolemy and Aristobulus (not to mention men like Chares), to maintain the opposite: that the unfavourable accounts are *prima facie* more plausible because they have not passed through the censorship of the Court Chancery or of admiring apologia. But no one has ever claimed—and no one, we may hope, ever will—that the facts are as simple as that. Much detailed analysis is necessary before such assertions are made; and we have seen by means of one example of such analysis how prejudice can lead to unscientific methods in order to explain away the inconvenient fact. Of the brilliance and integrity of scholars like Tarn there can be no doubt. The former, in Tarn's case, appears from the very nature of his *tour de force*; the latter can be seen, in a most moving instance, where he discusses the death of Parmenio.¹ Much of his detailed investigation will remain an invaluable starting-point for the future historian of Alexander; but the facts will have to be sorted without bias. Perhaps, with what materials we have, a proper history of Alexander cannot be written at all—certainly not for a long time yet.

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¹ ii. 270f.

MORE COLLOQUIALISMS, SEMI-PROVERBS, AND WORD-PLAY IN PLATO

THE following further instances and parallels, and additional usages, may supplement the colloquialisms, &c., in Plato's dialogues which were listed and studied in a former article.¹

1. Colloquialisms

(a) More examples and parallels for usages previously noted:

εὖ μάλα. *Charm.* 154 b 4, *Crat.* 418 b 8, *Phaedo* 92 d 4, *Parm.* 126 c 6, 127 b 1, *Polit.* 290 d 7, *Laus* 630 b 7.

ἐν παντὶ εἶναι. Cf. *Dem. in Con.* 13, εἰς πᾶν ἔλθειν, and Paley's n.

οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ. *Euthyd.* 278 c, τίς γὰρ οὐ βούλεται . . . ; Οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐκ. 303 b 1.

Charm. 175 c, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐκ ἀλογώτερον . . . ἂν φανείη. *Ion* 536 e 3, *Theat.* 178 b 5.

Cf. *Theat.* 160 d, οὐδαμῶς ὅπως οὐ. *Polit.* 308 b 5.

ἡδύς in derisive sense. *Euthyd.* 350 a, σὺ δὲ ἴσως οὐκ οἶε αὐτὰ ὀρᾶν οὕτως ἡδύς εἶ.

ποιός in derisive sense. *Euthyd.* 304 e, χαρίεν γέ τι πρᾶγμα . . . Ποῖον, ἔφη, χαρίεν . . . ; 291 a 1.

Cf. πόθεν; *Euthyd.* 291 b 1, *Gorg.* 471 d 8, *Lys.* 208 b 4, 211 c 4.

Κρόνος as a title of ridicule. Cf. *Ar. Vesp.* 1480, τοὺς τραγωδοὺς φησιν ἀποδείξειν Κρόνους.

Nub. 1070, σὺ δ' εἰ Κρόνιππος.

Cf. use of ἀρχαῖος: *Euthyd.* 295 c, ἀρχαιότερος εἰ τοῦ δέοντος.

μυρία. *Ap.* 23 b, ἐν πενία μυρία εἰμί. *Charm.* 163 d 4.

πρᾶγμα of persons. *Meno* 100 a, τοιοῦτος ὥσπερ παρὰ σκιᾶς ἀληθές ἂν πρᾶγμα εἶη πρὸς ἀρετήν.

χρῆμα. Cf. *Ar. Vesp.* 933, κλέπτειν τὸ χρῆμα τάνδρος.

(οὐδ') ὅτιοι. *Rep.* 422 c, κἂν ὅτιοι ᾖ.

Cf. *Ar. Vesp.* 598, οὐδ' ὅτιοι τούτων ἔδρασας. *Plut.* 457.

Dem. de Cor. 39, ῥᾶον ὁμνῆναι κάπιορκεῖν ἢ ὅτιοι.

(b) Additional colloquial usages:

ἀμέλει in answer. *Rep.* 422 c, ἀμέλει . . . οὐδὲν ἂν γένοιτο θαυμαστόν. 450 a 5, 500 a 8, 539 e 2, *Phaedo* 82 a 6.

Cf. *Ar. Nub.* 488, Σω. πῶς οὖν δυνήσεται μαθάνειν; Στ. ἀμέλει καλῶς.

Cf. 877, 1111, *Ach.* 368, *Ran.* 522.

εἰ μὴ μαίνομαι. *Euthyd.* 283 e, Νῆ Δία, ἔφη, εἰ μὴ μαίνομαι γε.

Cf. *Ar. Nub.* 660, ἀλλ' οἷδ' ἔγωγε τάρρεν', εἰ μὴ μαίνομαι.

καταντλῶ. *Rep.* 344 d, ὥσπερ βαλανεὺς ἡμῶν καταντλήσας κατὰ τῶν ὥτων . . . τὸν λόγον. The simile gives point to a colloquial usage.

Rep. 536 b, καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐτι πλείω γέλωτα καταντλήσομεν. *Lys.* 204 d 5.

¹ C.Q. xl (1946), 3-4.

Cf. Ar. *Vesp.* 482-3, *ὅταν ξυνήγορος | ταῦτά ταυτά σου καταντλή.* (Cf. use of πλύνω, Ar. *Ach.* 381, Dem. 39. 11, 58. 40.)

μοι δοκῶ with infinitive. *Rep.* 336 d, καί μοι δοκῶ . . . ἀφωνος ἂν γενέσθαι. *Phaedo* 91 a 6, *Prot.* 340 a 1, *Ap.* 34 d 2, *Crat.* 402 a 4.

Cf. Ar. *Ran.* 1421, τοῦτον ἄξειν μοι δοκῶ.

οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις. *Symp.* 185 e, οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις λέγων. 214 e 9, οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιμι. *Euthyd.* 272 d 7, *Phaedo* 100 c 1.

Cf. Ar. *Ecll.* 118, οὐκ ἂν φθάνοις . . . περιδουμένη. *Plut.* 874, 1133.

οὗτος ἀνὴρ in protest. *Gorg.* 467 b, Π. οὗτος ἀνὴρ—Σ. οὐ φημι ποεῖν κτλ. 489 b 7, 505 c 3.

Cf. ἀνθρωπος in comedy (mock-tragic?). Ar. *Vesp.* 168, ἀνθρωπος οὗτος μέγα τι δρασείει κακόν. *Nub.* 492, *Ecll.* 811.

πλέον θάτερον. *Phaedo* 114 e, πλέον θάτερον ἡγησάμενος ἀπεργάζεσθαι. *Euthyd.* 280 e 5, 297 d 2.

Cf. Isocr. 19. 25, πλέον θάτερον ἐποίησαν.

χθές καὶ πρόην. *Laus* 677 d, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν χθές καὶ πρόην γεγονότα.

Gorg. 470 d, ἐχθές καὶ πρόην κοπεῖσι.

Cf. Ar. *Ran.* 726, χθές τε καὶ πρόην κοπεῖσι. Isocr. 6. 27.

κομιδῇ. *Euthyd.* 271 c, κομιδῇ παμμάχω. *Gorg.* 501 a 4, *Charm.* 155 d 3, *Rep.* 442 a 3, *Polit.* 270 e 8, 290 c 2.

Cf. Ar. *Plut.* 838, κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνο. *Euthyd.* 296 b, τοῦτ' ἐκεῖνο, ἔφη· ἦκει τὸ αὐτὸ παράφθεγμα. *Phaedr.* 241 d 2.

Cf. Ar. *Ach.* 41 and *Lys.* 240, τοῦτ' ἐκεῖν' ὁ γὰρ λέγων. *Av.* 354. (Cf. Eur. *Or.* 804, and Jebb's n. on *Soph. El.* 1115.)

Ellipsis. To οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ etc. add other phrases involving ellipsis and/or attraction.

ὅπως with future indicative in independent commands. *Gorg.* 489 a 1, καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἀλώσει . . . αἰσχυρόμενος. 494 c 5, *Rep.* 336 c 6.

Cf. Ar. *Nub.* 1177, νῦν οὖν ὅπως σώσεις με. *Eq.* 759, *Av.* 1333, 1494. (See Goodwin, *M.T.* 273, L. S. J. s.v. ὅπως A iii. 8.)

οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως etc. *Euthyd.* 280 b, συνωμολογησάμεθα . . . οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἐν κεφαλαίῳ. *Rep.* 400 b 6.

Gorg. 513 c, οὐκ οἶδ' ὀντινά μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εὖ λέγειν. *Phaedr.* 227 c 4.

Phaedr. 265 b, οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπη . . . ἀπεικάζοντες.

Theaet. 197 d, κατεσκευάζομεν οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτι πλάσμα.

Crat. 396 d, προσπέπτωκεν . . . οὐκ οἶδ' ὅποθεν.

θαυμαστὸν ὅσον etc. *Theaet.* 150 d, θαυμαστὸν ὅσον ἐπιδιδόντες. *Ep.* VII. 325 d 6, *Lach.* 184 c 2.

Symp. 217 a, θαυμάσιον ὅσον.

Rep. 331 a, εὖ οὖν λέγει θαυμαστῶς ὡς σφόδρα. *Gorg.* 471 a 9, *Phaedo* 92 a 2, 96 a 7, 102 a 4.

Rep. 527 e, ἀμηχάνως ὡς εὖ. 588 a 8, *Phaedr.* 263 d f.

Phaedo 66 a, ὑπερφυῶς . . . ὡς ἀληθῇ λέγεις. *Theaet.* 155 c 8, *Symp.* 153 c 5, *Gorg.* 477 d 6, 496 c 4.

Cf. Ar. *Plut.* 750, ὄχλος ὑπερφυῆς ὅσος. (ὑπερφυῆς is frequent in Ar.)

Cf. also Dem. 19. 44, *θανμάσια ἤλικα*. Hdt. 4. 194, *ἀφθονοὶ ὄσοι*. Theocr. 1. 45, *τυτθὸν δ' ὅσον ἀπωθεν κτλ.*

2. Poetic expressions

(a) More parallels:

For *Rep.* 607 c, *βίη μὲν, ὅμως δὲ . . .*

Cf. Ar. *Nub.* 1363, *μόλις μὲν, ἀλλ' ὅμως*.

Eur. *H.F.* 1365, *οἴκει πόλιν τήνδ', ἀθλίως μὲν, ἀλλ' ὅμως*.

(b) Additional instances:

Ap. 20 c, *οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἐρῶ τὸν λόγον*. See Adam's n., and cf. *Symp.* 177 a 2, *ἡ μὲν μοι ἀρχή . . . ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν Εὐριπίδου Μελανίππην· οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος, κτλ.*

Phaedr. 264 a, *Φαῖδρε, φίλη κεφαλή*. *Ion* 531 d 12. *Euthyd.* 293 c 4.

Phaedr. 234 d, *μετὰ σοῦ τῆς θείας κεφαλῆς*.

Cf. *Il.* 8. 281, *Τεύκρε, φίλη κεφαλή*.

Rep. 497 e, *παρὼν δὲ τήν γ' ἐμὴν προθυμίαν εἴσει*. See Cornford's n.; he remarks on iambic rhythm.

Soph. 217 c, *μὴ τοίνυν . . . ἀπαρνηθεὶς γένῃ*. τόσονδε δ' ἡμῖν φράζε. See Campbell's and Cornford's nn.

3. Proverbs and Familiar Sayings

(a) More parallels:

πάντα ἀγαθὰ. Cf. Ar. *Plut.* 1190, *πάντ' ἀγαθὰ τοίνυν λέγεις*.

πᾶσαν φωνὴν ἰέναι. Cf. Ar. *Vesp.* 562, *πάσας φωνὰς ἰέντων*.

οὐδὲν οἶον. *Gorg.* 481 b 9, cf. Ar. *Lys.* 135.

οὐδαμοῦ φανῆναι. Cf. Xen. *Mem.* 1. ii. 52, *ὥστε μηδαμοῦ . . . τοὺς ἄλλους εἶναι πρὸς αὐτόν*.

(b) Additional instance:

πάντα χρήματα—philosophic jargon.

Prot. 361 b, *πάντα χρήματά ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη*.

4. Word-play

(a) More examples:

Use of *οὐκ . . . ἀλλὰ . . .* (also assonance):

Euthyd. 285 c-d, *εἴ μοι ἡ δορὰ μὴ εἰς ἀσκὸν τελευτήσῃ, ὥσπερ ἡ τοῦ Μαρσίου, ἀλλ' εἰς ἀρετὴν*.

Explanation (here preceding a figurative phrase):

Crat. 413 a, *δοκῶ τε ἤδη μακρότερα τοῦ προσήκοντος ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ ἐσκαμμένα ἄλλεσθαι*.

(b) Additional instances:

Theaet. 183 c, *ἓνα ὄντα Παρμενίδην*. Cornford suggests play on *ἐν ὄν*.

Gorg. 525 a, *πάντα σκολιὰ ὑπὸ ψεύδους . . . καὶ οὐδὲν εὐθὺ διὰ τὸ ἀνευ ἀληθείας τεθράφθαι*. Double sense of *σκολία* and *εὐθύ*.

Gorg. 511 c, *ἡ τοῦ νεῖν ἐπιστήμη . . . σφίξει . . . τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ὅταν εἰς τοιοῦτον ἐμπέσωσιν οὐ δεῖ ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης*.

Mixture of literal and figurative sense of *ἐμπίπτειν*.

Cf. *Theaet.* 174 c *εἰς φρέατά τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν ἐμπίπτων*.

THE TEXTUAL TRADITION OF LIVY 21-25¹

The purpose of this article is to re-examine the more important extant manuscripts of Livy 21-25 with special reference to omissions and significant errors, and on this basis to try to establish their interrelationship in stemmatic form. A stemma for Books 26-30 has already been drawn up by Professor S. K. Johnson in O.C.T. vol. iv, but, since the tradition for those five books is slightly different from that of the first half of the third decade, it has seemed worth while to draw up a stemma for Books 21-25 independently. The manuscripts to be considered, and the sigla to be employed, are as follows:

Codex Puteanus	P	saec. V
Codex Colbertinus	C	saec. X
Codex Romanus	R	saec. IX
Codex Mediceus	M	saec. X
Codex Bambergensis	B	saec. X uel XI
Codex Cantabrigiensis	D	saec. XII
Codex Agennensis	A	saec. XII uel XIII
Fragmenta Monacensia	F-M	saec. XI

It is clear that all the manuscripts of these books that have survived are derived from the Puteanus. This is proved by the fact, first, that all the omissions and serious corruptions that occur in the Puteanus are also contained in the other manuscripts (e.g. 21. 44. 7; 44. 9; 52. 11; 22. 3. 9; 10. 8; 61. 10; 23. 8. 7; 49. 4; 24. 18. 3; 38. 1; 25. 28. 9). Further evidence is provided by passages where a corruption has arisen in the other manuscripts by what appears to be the result of a wrong division of the words in the Puteanus (e.g. 22. 51. 3). Secondly, in all cases where the Puteanus contains an error and one of the later manuscripts has what appears to be the true reading, the circumstances are such as to make it possible, if not probable, that the preservation of the correct reading is the result of emendative correction rather than correction by reference to some outside source.²

As regards the relationship between the Colbertinus and the other manuscripts, on several occasions that codex agrees with the Puteanus against the Romanus. In some of these cases P and C preserve the true reading where R is in error:

22. 12. 2, *limitibus* PC; *militibus* R

23. 3. 6, *cooptabit* P¹C; *cooptabili* P; *quo optabilis* R

13. 7, *quattuor milia* (∞ ∞ ∞ ∞) Numidarum PC; XL numidarum R

25. 14. 2, *castris* PC; *castros* R.

In others P and C contain a different form of error to R:

23. 5. 5, *est* PC; *deesse* R

25. 3. 18, *in summoto locuneo* PC; *in summoto locuineo* P²R.

In still further cases an error in P is corrected in C but omitted in R, or a true

¹ I wish to express my thanks to the Sheffield University Research Fund for their generous financial assistance towards the preparation of this article.

² There are a number of readings in the

Agennensis that at first sight might suggest the possibility of contamination with some source other than the Puteanus, but closer consideration leads to the conclusion that they are all emendative.

reading in P appears in an erroneous form in C, but is likewise omitted in R:

22. 13. 6, a suo C; ad sue P; a R

23. 16. 15, quingentis (B) P; V C¹ in ras.; om. R.

These passages indicate that the Colbertinus was derived, possibly directly, from the Puteanus, and was not copied from the Romanus. On the other hand, numerous omissions in the Colbertinus that do not occur in the other codices (e.g. 21. 27. 4; 22. 19. 10; 39. 20; 49. 15; 23. 8. 8; 24. 16. 17) prove that none of the other extant manuscripts was derived from the Colbertinus, with the possible exception of the Fragmenta Monacensia. No omissions occur in the Colbertinus at the points where the Fragmenta Monacensia have survived; they share a few small errors, involving one or two letters:

23. 33. 6, ait M¹DA; it PRM; id CF-M

47. 3, exierant PRMDA; exierunt CF-M

48. 5, teneri A²; atteneri P²RMD; attineri CF-M

48. 10, Fuluium PRMDA; Fuluium CF-M;

while in 49. 2, where C reads:

missi at tarentum,

the reading of F-M, 'missi ad tarentum', is very close to it. But the evidence is insufficient to arrive at any firm conclusion on whether the Fragmenta Monacensia were derived from the Colbertinus; one can only say that it is not impossible.

The most controversial point arises in connexion with the Mediceus, which Conway, in O.C.T. vol. iii, maintains was copied directly from the Puteanus. Prior to this it had been generally held that it was derived from the Romanus, a view to which Professor Johnson, in O.C.T. vol. iv, himself inclines. Unfortunately most of the examples cited by Conway in O.C.T. vol. iii, p. xv, are inappropriate or inconclusive. In 23. 18. 6 and 22. 7, the preservation of the true reading in the Mediceus can easily have been the result of a slight and obvious emendative correction. In 22. 18. 6 and 20. 2 the erroneous reading shared by P and M is also given by one of the correctors of R. The other examples quoted, however (22. 16. 4; 31. 1; 23. 3. 3), afford some evidence in support of Conway's view. There are, however, certain examples of common errors that point conclusively to the derivation of the Mediceus from the Puteanus and not from the Romanus, though, with one exception (23. 11. 11), they are not mentioned at all in O.C.T. vol. iii:

22. 17. 2, ex campie a capite P; ex capite a capite P¹M; ex capite R

39. 5, si certaturus PM; certaturus P¹R

39. 11, inde PM; in sede P¹RM¹

59. 10, in nobis me PM; in nobis P¹RM¹

61. 11, hilhirpinipapulorum PM; Hirpini Apulorum P¹R

23. 11. 11, hannibalilli PM; Hannibali P¹RM¹

21. 7, uocauerat PM; uouerat P¹RM¹.

These instances, taken in conjunction with the ones referred to above, make it highly probable that both the Mediceus and the Romanus were copied from the Puteanus. The fact that, where R and M have a common error or omission (23. 13. 7; 16. 15), this generally seems to have been due to the misunderstanding of a letter or a symbol in P indicates that the Mediceus, no less than the Romanus, was derived from the Puteanus directly. However, at the very

end of this half-decade, there occurs an error in R and M that is not found in P:

25. 41. 13, Pupio Sicilia P; Pupio urbana Sicilia RM.¹

This shows that the derivation of M from R, which, according to Johnson, is applicable to Books 26-30, began at some point before the end of Book 25.

The Mediceus contains a number of omissions that are not found in other codices (e.g. 22. 14. 4; 19. 6; 24. 16. 12; 25. 21. 5; 37. 7; 38. 1), which indicates that none of the other manuscripts was derived from it. In addition it contains certain errors that are not found elsewhere:

22. 18. 2, uenissent M; peruenisset PCRDA
 39. 1, nihil collega M; collega PR; collegae CDA
 23. 19. 13, aditumque M; adicitumque P; radi R; radicumque P¹CR¹DA
 31. 1, quo die eo M; quo eo PCRDA.

It is generally believed that the Bambergensis, the Cantabrigiensis, and the Agennensis were all derived from the Romanus, and not directly from the Puteanus. Such evidence as there is in the form of relevant errors and omissions supports this view:

22. 12. 2, militibus RDA; limitibus PCM
 13. 6, ab (a R) itinere R¹DA; a suo itinere C; ad sue itinere P
 23. 5. 5, desse RD; est PCMA²
 47. 3, iam RDA; in PCM
 24. 34. 12, isse se aduersa RMDBA; ipse aduersa P; ipse aduersa P²;
 spes est uersa C
 36. 7, aduentantibus R¹M¹BDA; habentibus P; habentibus P²; habentantibus C; habitantibus P²R; haudentantibus M.

On the other hand, the only occasion where DA agrees with P against R is in 23. 44. 5:

- quam triginta (xxx) PC²MDA; quam xxx R.

Here the reading in DA could easily have been due to a copyist's error in misreading 'xxx' for 'xxxx'. In those cases, too, where R is in error and BDA have the true reading, the preservation of the correct reading in these codices could have been the result of a simple emendation of the reading in R.

There is some indication that B, D, and A were derived from some common source below the Romanus in their line of descent from that codex. There are a number of errors that they share in common where R has the true reading or a different, and often less aggravated, form of error:

24. 29. 1, ut BDA; d PCRM; ad M²A²
 25. 12. 4, curato BDA; cum rato PCRM
 23. 3, quam BDA; umquam PCRM
 28. 4, ab eo BDA; adeo PCRM.

In addition:

22. 33. 5, exierat . . . obsides PCRM; om. DA
 39. 3, claudicet res p. DA; claudet rei p. PC²?RM; clauderet rei p. C
 24. 8. 10, uram BD; suram PCRM; curam A²
 20. 5, fuifulae BD; fugifulae PCRMA.²

¹ The O.C.T. app. crit. wrongly gives: readings in A mentioned in the footnote on Pupio Sicilia PR. p. 161.

² This appears to be one of the emendative

In a number of passages BDA differ from R in preserving the true reading:

- 24. 20. 13, *hostibus* BDA; *hospitibus* PCRM
- 23. 3, *id, ipsum* BDA; *ipsum* PCRM
- 26. 11, *precibus, puellis* BDA; *precipue uelis* P; *praecipue uelis* CRM; *precipue puellis* M¹
- 26. 13, *spatio* BDA; *stipatio* PCRM
- 40. 10, *quieuere* BDA; *quieuene* P; *quietenene* P²RM.

This would indicate that their common exemplar had been revised by a correcting scribe.

In some of the cases where BDA preserve the true reading there seems to have been some contamination between them and the correctors of the Colbertinus and the Mediceus, and perhaps with the Mediceus itself:


- 23. 37. 4, *facibus* C²M²DA; *facium* C²; *fa bius* PCRM
- 24. 8. 16, *opponant* DA; *opponanant*¹ B; *opponam* C⁴; *oppugnabant*, PC²RM; *oppugnando* C² in ras.
- 21. 4, *ceteri* C²M²DA; *cet&eri* B; *ceperit* PCR; *coeperit* R¹M
- 36. 3, *quinque* C²M²BDA; *quinti* PCRM
- 25. 20. 4, *cladem quae* M¹ (*uel* M⁴)BDA; *eademque* PCRM
- 36. 7, *clitellae* M¹BDA; *clientellae* PCRM.

There also seems to have been some contamination between the correctors of M and the Agennensis:

- 22. 14. 6, *pro! dolor* M²A; *pro!* PCRD
- 15. 11, *immunito* M²A²; *immunuto* A; *adminuisse* P¹C²RMD.

Certain omissions in the Cantabrigiensis prove conclusively that neither the Agennensis nor its 'twin', the Laurentianus Notatus, was derived from it (e.g. 21. 13. 2; 32. 11; 22. 22. 18; 23. 11. 5; 44. 2). Similarly certain errors and omissions in the Bambergensis that are not repeated in the Cantabrigiensis or the Agennensis (e.g. 24. 16. 12; 22. 1; 32. 4; 42. 10; 25. 23. 5) indicate that D and A were not derived from B.

In the light of the evidence collected above the following stemma has been drawn up:




The main difference between this and Professor Johnson's stemma in O.C.T. vol. iv is, of course, the position of the Mediceus. Apart from this the only result has been to confirm that Professor Johnson's conclusions are also valid for Books 21-25.¹

T. A. DOREY

¹ I should like to thank Dr. A. H. McDonald of Clare College, Cambridge, for his advice and encouragement.

CORRIGENDUM

On p. 164 of *Classical Quarterly* n.s. VIII 3,4 (November 1958)
M has dropped out of the second line of the stemma. The first
two lines of the stemma should read:



THEAETETUS AND THE HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF NUMBERS

*Περὶ δυνάμεων τι ἡμῖν Θεόδωρος ὁδε ἔγραφε, τῆς τε τρίποδος πέρι καὶ πεντέποδος [ἀποφαίνων] ὅτι μήκει οὐ σύμμετροι τῇ ποδιαίᾳ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ μίαν ἑκάστην προαρούμενος μέχρι τῆς ἑπτακαδεκάποδος· ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ πως ἐνέσχετο. (Plato, *Theaetetus*, 147 d.)*

This famous passage has given rise to much discussion and some perplexity. Theodorus the mathematician is represented by Theaetetus as proving the irrationality of the square roots of the (non-square) numbers from 3 to 17:

‘He took the separate cases up to the root of 17 square feet; and there, for some reason, he stopped.’ (Transl. Cornford.)

The passage is of great importance in the history of Greek mathematics for more than one reason. Theaetetus is said to have generalized the proof of the irrationality of square roots of non-square integers; and thus his connexion with this passage is important because Plato here obviously implies that Theodorus was not giving a generalized proof—otherwise, why should he go up to 17? If Theodorus did not know the generalized proof, he clearly had to proceed by enumeration and proof of particular cases. But, if so, why stop at 17? The simplest explanation seems to be that he had to stop somewhere, and 17 was as good a place as any.¹ However, more interesting questions remain: what was Theodorus’ proof? And how was this generalized by Theaetetus? And, perhaps most interesting of all, why did the generalization have to wait for Theaetetus? Did the Pythagoreans, who seem to have been very excited² about the discovery of the irrationality of the square root of 2, never try to extend their inquiries into a field of such great interest to them? Did Theodorus, who knew proofs applicable to particular cases, never try to formulate the proof in a general way?

Theodorus (in Plato’s dialogue) started from $\sqrt{3}$, not from $\sqrt{2}$. Why? Obviously, because that case had been dealt with before, by Pythagoras or the Pythagoreans.³ By the time of Theodorus it was known. There is indeed no

¹ See Hardy and Wright, *Introduction to the Theory of Numbers* (3rd ed.), p. 43. See also Appendix below.

² Their excitement was probably caused not so much by joy at the great discovery, as by its disturbing implications for their metaphysical doctrine: here was a case where no number relationship could be established. The legend invented by the Pythagoreans to the effect that the man who first divulged the discovery died in a shipwreck is a sufficient indication of the disturbance that the ‘irrational’ caused in the Pythagorean school. See Schol. in Eucl. *Elem.* 10, p. 417 Heiberg: τῶν γὰρ Πυθαγορείων λόγος τὸν πρῶτον τὴν περὶ τούτων θεωρίαν εἰς τοῦμαφάνες ἐξαγαγόντα ναυαγίῳ περιπνεῖν. The Scholiast’s suggestion concerning the meaning of this story is not without interest: ἴσως ἡγίνοντο ὅτι πᾶν

τὸ ἄλογον . . . καὶ ἀνείδεον κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ καὶ εἰ τις ἀν ψυχῇ ἐπιδράμοι τῷ τοιούτῳ εἶδει τῆς ζωῆς πρόχειρον καὶ φανερόν τοῦτο ποιήσεται εἰς τὸν τῆς γενέσεως ὑποφέρεται πόντον καὶ τοῖς δασάτοις ταύτης κλύζεται βέμβασιν. (Instead of εἰ . . . ἐπιδράμοι read perhaps εἰάν τις τύχη ἐπιδραμόν . . .) See also Iamblichus, *de Vit. Pythag.* 34. 246–7, p. 132 Deub.

³ See Cantor, *Vorlesungen z. Gesch. d. Mathem.* i. 154–5. The claim made by K. von Fritz (‘The Discovery of Incommensurability by Hippasus of Metapontum’, *Annals of Mathematics*, xlii [1945], 245) that ‘the tradition is unanimous in attributing the discovery to a Pythagorean philosopher by the name of Hippasus of Metapontum’ seems to me to be devoid of all foundation. So far from being unanimous, the tradition is, I believe, non-existent. I know of no single ancient author

need to insist that this was all that was known. It could be argued (see, e.g., Allman, *Greek Geometry from Thales to Euclid*, pp. 213-14, and Zeuthen, *Oversigt over det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskabs Forhandling*, 1910, p. 418, and 1915, p. 339) that the Pythagoreans knew more than the irrationality of $\sqrt{2}$; that if they knew the case of $\sqrt{2}$ they must have seen or at least suspected that there were other cases of irrational square roots; that perhaps even the proofs given by Theodorus of the particular instances up to $\sqrt{17}$ may have been Pythagorean doctrines rather than his own personal contributions. On the other hand (as is pointed out by Zeuthen, loc. cit.), the Pythagoreans were perhaps content with $\sqrt{2}$: it was enough to establish the existence of irrationals. Or perhaps we should rather say that they were shocked; and that that shock may have inhibited further inquiry. However that may be, we need not decide this question. For, as I shall try to show, the originality of Theodorus may have consisted not in the extension of the theory of irrationality from $\sqrt{2}$ to other particular cases (even if that is to be ascribed to him), but in the realization that the traditional method did not lend itself to automatic generalization, and in the determination of the preconditions for a generalized proof on the basis of the traditional method.

It is, then, tolerably certain that at least $\sqrt{2}$ and the proof of its irrationality was known. And if the Pythagoreans knew or suspected the existence of more than that single case, such extensions may not have been so well known outside the Pythagorean school. There is this further point to be noted: scholars¹ have argued as if Plato represented Theodorus as having made a new and very exciting discovery; but an unprejudiced reader of the dialogue will not, I think, be immediately convinced of the truth of that impression. It is at least conceivable that Plato means no more than that Theodorus was demonstrating not a new discovery of his own, but something which though known to professional mathematicians might be new and interesting to his young hearers.

From a passage in Aristotle we know what the traditional proof was (*Prior Analytics* I. 23. 41²³-30) πάντες γὰρ οἱ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου περαίνοντες τὸ μὲν

attributing the discovery to Hippasus. We have indeed the legend mentioned by Iamblichus (*Vit. Pyth.* 18. 88, p. 52 Deubner; cf. *De comm. math. sc.* 25, p. 77 Festa) to the effect that Hippasus was drowned at sea as a punishment for divulging the Pythagorean secret of how to inscribe a dodecahedron in a sphere; and this legend is obviously confused with the similar legend connected with the divulgence of the discovery of irrationality (see preceding note). But that confusion does not afford any reason for suggesting that Hippasus, because he is said to have suffered the same fate as the man who published the secret of irrational numbers, must have been identical with that man. And, of course, there is even less justification for identifying Hippasus not only with the divulger but also with the discoverer of irrationals. It may be of interest that this confusion is one of which Iamblichus already knew: see *Vit. Pyth.* 34. 247, p. 132 Deubner, where we are told the story of the punishment of the man who had divulged the secret of the dodecahedron in-

scribed in the sphere. It is followed by the remark that 'some say that it was the man who divulged the secret of irrationality and incommensurability who suffered this (punishment)'. It may perhaps be useful to mention here that what v. Fritz calls an 'obviously . . . corrupt reading in some manuscripts', namely ἀλόγων in the Eudemean Summary, in Proclus, in *Eucl.*, p. 65, seems in fact to be not only the right reading but also the unanimous tradition of all manuscripts. There does not seem to be any manuscript evidence at all for ἀναλόγων or ἀναλογίων which are apparently based on no more than a note in August's *Euclid* (i. 290): 'alii ἀναλόγων'. See Heath, *The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements*, i. 351.

¹ e.g. Zeuthen, 'Sur la constitution des livres arithmétiques des *Éléments* d'Euclide et leur rapport à la question de l'irrationalité', in *Oversigt over det Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskabs Forhandling*, 1915. See also Heath, *Greek Mathematics*, i. 206.

ψεύδος συλλογίζονται, τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως δεικνύουσιν, ὅταν ἀδύνατόν τι συμβαίῃ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως τεθείσης, ὅλον ὅτι ἀσύμμετρος ἡ διάμετρος διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι τὰ περιττὰ ἴσα τοῖς ἀρτίοις συμμέτρον τεθείσης. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἴσα γίνεσθαι τὰ περιττὰ τοῖς ἀρτίοις συλλογίζεται, τὸ δ' ἀσύμμετρον εἶναι τὴν διάμετρον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως δεικνυσιν, ἐπεὶ ψεύδος συμβαίνει διὰ τὴν ἀντίφασιν. See also 50^a37 ὅλον τεθείσης τῆς διαμέτρου συμμέτρον τὸ τὰ περιττὰ ἴσα εἶναι τοῖς ἀρτίοις. The proof here alluded to is given in Euclid 10. 117 (which may be an interpolation). See Heiberg, *Euclid*. iii. 408, app. 27.¹ It may be represented as follows:

Theorem: $\sqrt{2}$ is not a rational number.

Proof: Suppose $\sqrt{2}$ is rational. Then it must be of the form m/n , this fraction being in its lowest terms. Then, if $m/n = \sqrt{2}$,

$$\frac{m^2}{n^2} = 2, \text{ and so } m^2 = 2n^2.$$

Therefore m^2 is divisible by 2.

If m^2 is divisible by 2, m is also divisible by 2. Take

$$m = 2p;$$

then

$$m^2 = 4p^2;$$

but $m^2 = 2n^2$, therefore $4p^2 = 2n^2$, and $2p^2 = n^2$. Therefore n^2 is divisible by 2, and, if so, n is also divisible by 2.

But if both m and n are divisible by 2, then this contradicts our initial assumption that the fraction m/n is in its lowest terms, or, in other words, that the numerator and the denominator have no factor other than 1 in common. (It will be observed that where Aristotle speaks of odd and even, we, while using what is basically, in this case, the same criterion, call it divisibility or indivisibility by 2.)

Now, it is clear that the proof of the irrationality of the square root of 3 is practically the same as that of the irrationality of the square root of 2, and that it can be used without any change whatsoever in method for the proof of the irrationality of the square root of any prime number. It can also be used in the same way for proving the irrationality of the square root of a composite number that is not a multiple of a square number, or, in other words, that does not contain any prime factor more than once.

But it is equally obvious that the proof will have to be modified in the case of numbers that, though not square numbers themselves, are multiples of square numbers. It is easy to show, for example, that the proof employed for 2 and 3 will do for 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, and so on; that it will also do for 6, 10, 14, 15, and so on, that is to say, composite numbers not being multiples of square numbers; but that it will not do, in its unchanged form, for non-square composite numbers that are multiples of square numbers, such as, for example, the numbers 8, 12, or 18. To show that this is so one need point out only that one of the essential steps in the proof, namely the inference that if m^2 is divisible by a given number, then m must be divisible by that number too, is not a valid inference in the case of numbers that are multiples of square numbers. Thus, for instance, if m^2 is divisible by any of the numbers 2, 3, 5, 7, or for that matter, by 6, 10,

¹ See also the note by Alexander Aphrodisiensis on *An. Pr.* 1. 41^a26. (It is to be observed that Alexander in this note [p. 260,

30, of the Berlin edition] uses the verb *πλασιάζειν* = to square, a sense which is unknown to L.S.J.)

14, then it is obvious that m is also divisible by that number. But if m^2 is divisible by a number like 8 or 12 or 18, then it does not at all follow that m must also be divisible by that number. To take only one example: take $m^2 = 6^2 = 36$. This is divisible by 18 (i.e. 2×3^2) and also by 12 (i.e. 3×2^2). But $m = 6$ is not divisible by either of these two numbers.

The proof employed hitherto can of course be very easily adapted to numbers that are multiples of square numbers; but the fact that it has to be so adapted vitiates the attempt at generalization of the proof suggested by Heath (*Gk. Mathematics*, i. 205). It is there argued that Theodorus is not likely to have employed the traditional proof, because that is capable of very easy generalization, that is to say, the generality of the proof would have become apparent long before in the enumeration of cases $\sqrt{17}$ had been reached. Since he did go on to $\sqrt{17}$, that, so argues Heath, suggests that his proof was not the traditional one, but a proof that was not capable of such easy and almost self-evident generalization. Unfortunately Heath's argument is weakened not only by the obvious objection that it would be hard to believe that Theodorus was not conversant with the traditional proof,¹ but by the graver difficulty that what Heath represents as a very simple generalization is not a valid generalization at all. He writes:

'We can put the proof quite generally thus. Suppose that N is a non-square number such as 3, 5, ..., and, if possible, let $\sqrt{N} = m/n$, where m, n , are integers prime to one another. Therefore $m^2 = N \cdot n^2$; therefore m^2 is divisible by N , so that m also is a multiple of N ' (my italics).

After this the proof proceeds in the traditional way so that the matter is disposed of in a few more steps. But everything that comes after this is of no immediate interest to us. For the words italicized above represent an *invalid* step in the argument. The divisibility of a square number m^2 by a number N implies the divisibility of m by that number N only where N is not itself the multiple of a square number. Where N is e.g. 8 or 12 or 18 or any such number that contains the same prime factor more than once, the inference 'if m^2 is divisible

¹ That the traditional proof is indeed 'traditional' (i.e. known before Theaetetus) is accepted by most scholars; see, e.g., Cantor, *Vorlesungen zur Gesch. der Mathematik*, i. 155; Heiberg, 'Mathematisches zu Aristoteles', *Abhandl. Gesch. Math. Wiss.*, 1904, p. 24: 'dieser alte pythagoräische Beweis'. And the case is well argued by Zeuthen (1915, pp. 357-62). The arithmetical character of the proof and its reliance on the distinction between odd and even (in the case of the square root of 2) seem to stamp the proof as Pythagorean. A further argument in favour of its Pythagorean origin is its obvious relationship with the so-called Pythagorean theorem (Euclid 1. 47) which is attested as Pythagorean by many, though admittedly late, authorities. For reference see Heath, *The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements*, i. 351. He also quotes Heron, who ascribes to Pythagoras a general rule for the formation of right-angled triangles with rational integers as sides. And the well-known Eudemian Summary in

Proclus (ed. Friedlein, p. 65) attributes the discovery of the theory of irrationals to Pythagoras; the scholiast on Euclid 10. 1, Heiberg, vol. v, pp. 415-16, attributes the discovery of incommensurability to the Pythagoreans. See Heath, op. cit., p. 353: 'The investigation (of 1. 47) from the arithmetical point of view would ultimately lead Pythagoras to the other momentous discovery of the irrationality of the length of the diagonal of a square expressed in terms of its side.'

The use of *ἔγγραφει* in the Platonic dialogue does not, of course, refer to the geometrical character of the proof. At most it means that Theodorus drew a figure to demonstrate the existence of such lengths; that they were irrational needed a further, arithmetical, proof with which the 'Existenzbeweis' to which *ἔγγραφει* in that case refers, had nothing to do. Heath in fact gives good reasons for thinking that *ἔγγραφει* means no more than 'he was proving'. See *Gk. Math.* i. 303.

by N , then m also is divisible by N ' is invalid. Thus the possibility of generalization assumed by Heath does not really exist in that very simple form.¹ And this seriously diminishes the cogency of his conclusion that because Theodorus apparently did not hit upon the generalization he is unlikely to have used the traditional proof.

In fact the valid generalization is slightly more complicated than that assumed by Heath. It could be put as follows:

N not being a square number has no rational square root. For, suppose it has: then it must be of the form m/n , this fraction being in its lowest terms. Then, if

$$\frac{m}{n} = \sqrt{N}, \quad \frac{m^2}{n^2} = N, \quad m^2 = N \cdot n^2;$$

therefore

m^2 is divisible by N .

Now, although it does not follow that m too is divisible by N (that would follow only if N is a square-free number) we can at any rate say that if m^2 is divisible by N then m is divisible by the square-free factors of N . Call them a . Then

$$m = ar$$

and
$$\frac{m^2}{n^2} = N = \frac{a^2 r^2}{n^2}, \quad a^2 r^2 = N \cdot n^2, \quad \frac{a^2 r^2}{N} = n^2.$$

But N is either (1) $= a$ or (2) a multiple of a , say ap (where p is of course a square number).

Then either (1) where $N = a$

$$\frac{a^2 r^2}{N} = ar^2 = n^2;$$

therefore a divides n^2 and since a is square-free (by hypothesis) it must also divide n .

Or (2) where $N = ap$ (a being square-free, p being square)

$$\frac{a^2 r^2}{N} = \frac{a^2 r^2}{ap} = \frac{ar^2}{p} = n^2 = a \frac{r^2}{p} = n^2.$$

Therefore n^2 is divisible by a , and since a is square-free, n also is divisible by a . But if a divides both m and n , this contradicts the initial assumption that m/n was in its lowest terms.

It will be seen at once that this generalization of the traditional proof is somewhat more complicated than one might think at first sight and that it is necessarily more complicated than that assumed by Heath. But of course the complication would have presented no difficulty to a mathematician like Theodorus, and we must still ask ourselves why he and others before him did not hit upon the almost self-evident generality of a method that they already applied in particular cases.

We have seen that the generalization presents a few more complications than the particular cases. It is here, I think, that we must still look for an answer

¹ Zeuthen (1915, p. 341) makes the same mistake as Heath: '... l'application de la démonstration en question à ces différentes

racines ne présenterait que cette seule différence qui résulte de la substitution d'un nouveau nombre à celui dont on part.'

to our question. For while the complications would not in themselves present any great difficulty to a mathematician (though even here we must not underestimate the difficulty of reasoning that proceeds from step to step with algebraic symbols, or rather, with their equivalent verbal expressions, a procedure not as intimately familiar and easy to Greek as to modern mathematicians), yet the presence of these particular complications may have made clear to the rigorous mathematician a difficulty so fundamental and so elementary that it might remain unnoticed in the application of the method to particular cases as long as no attempt at generalization was made. I refer to the doubt that a rigorous mathematician must have felt when, or if, he tried to generalize the traditional proof in the manner indicated above, about the cogency of an argument like: if m^2 is divisible by a then m also is divisible by a . Obviously the necessity for this step in the argument would make the mathematician consider the different possible cases. And as we have done above he would find that the argument does not hold in the case where a is the multiple of a square number. But even when the possibilities are narrowed down to $a =$ any prime number, the statement though apparently true would still seem to the rigorous mathematician to require *proof*. Needless to say he would also think about cases where a is neither prime nor a multiple of square numbers, i.e. where a is a non-square, square-free, composite number. In brief the rigorous mathematician who tried to generalize the traditional proof would have thought hard about such matters as prime numbers, composite numbers of various forms, and in particular, about the cogency of the step in our argument that we have discussed above; in other words, he would see that the above proof really depends on something else that has to be proved first.

Now, such a preliminary proof does indeed exist: Euclid, 7. 30, proves that if c divides ab , and c is prime, then c must divide either a or b .

Our case, that of a square number, is no more than a special example of this; that is to say: the product ab is such that $a = b$; and thus, the prime that divides a or b in Euclid's theorem will divide both a and b ; i.e. where we are dealing with a number that is not just a product of two numbers, but a product of two equal numbers, in other words: a square number, Euclid's theorem can be read like this: if c is a prime and divides a square number it will also divide the square root of that number. And that is what is needed for the generalization above discussed.

The connexion between Theaetetus and the arithmetical books of Euclid seems well established. It is suggested by the evidence and the matter is examined by Zeuthen who comes to the conclusion that the mathematics of Book 7 of Euclid must be attributed in its essentials to Theaetetus.¹ Yet in the same article Zeuthen argues (as does Heath after him) that the particular

¹ Zeuthen, 1910, p. 421; he gives examples of terminological parallels between Euclid (7, Def. 16 and 18) and the passage in the Theaetetus. As regards Book 10 we have the statement of the scholiast of 10. 9 who expressly says that that theorem was the discovery of Theaetetus (see Heiberg, *Euclid*, v. 450). On 13. 1 the scholiast tells us (Heiberg, op. cit. v. 654) that part of the subject-matter of that book was derived from Theaetetus. Generally, we are told by Proclus (in *Eucl.*

Elem., ed. Friedlein, p. 68) that *Εὐκλείδης δὲ τὰ στοιχεῖα συναγαγὼν . . . πολλὰ . . . τῶν Θεαιτήτου τελεωσάμενος . . .*: 'Euclid put together the Elements and perfected many of the theorems of Theaetetus'. The practically certain case for pre-Euclidean provenance of part at any rate of the contents of the arithmetical books is supported by a letter of Eratosthenes given by Eutocius (Archimedes, ed. Heiberg, iii. 102 ff.).

proofs employed by Theodorus cannot have been adaptations of the traditional proof: for, he argues, these would have led to the generalization; and also there would have been no need for Plato to single out Theodorus' discovery for special praise. However, we have seen that the generalized formulation of the proof requires rather more than a mechanical substitution of algebraical symbols for particular numbers: that the attempt to generalize leads to complications which suggest a preoccupation with the fundamentals of the theory of numbers. On the other hand, contrary to what one might expect, the fundamental difficulty, namely the need first to prove what we now have in Euclid 7. 30,¹ does not necessarily enter into the proof for *particular* cases like the square roots of 2, 3, 5, 6, etc., since for each particular number we can substitute for the preliminary general proof of the critical inference ' c dividing a^2 ' implies ' c dividing a ' a special proof by enumeration of cases, without relying on Euclid 7. 30.²

I think therefore that the most economical use of the evidence will still make it possible to assume that Theodorus' proof was in fact the traditional proof; that Theodorus did not proceed to the generalization, because he was well aware of the need (in the generalization) of a more fundamental treatment of such subjects as prime and composite numbers, factorization, etc.; and that it was precisely this refusal of the rigorous mathematician to enunciate a general theory based on doubtful foundations that led his pupil Theaetetus to investigate not only the problem of irrationality but also the more fundamental arithmetical questions; thus the generalized theory of irrationality will not only depend on fundamental number-theory: it will be seen to have led directly to a preoccupation with the latter. We should in this way have (1) a logical sequence: preoccupation with irrationality leading to work on fundamental arithmetic of the kind found in Euclid 7-9; and (2) we could fix *historically* the point where this kind of arithmetic was systematized. In saying that Theodorus did not and could not generalize a proof of which he used the particular applications, one need not of course assume that he could not enunciate conjecturally the general theorem whose general proof he did not know. In fact he may have wanted by the enumeration of the cases up to 17 to suggest the general theorem; that may be the reason why he went so far as 17. But there is a limit to everything, even a mathematics lesson; and that is why he went no farther.

Thus we may disagree with Heath and Zeuthen on both counts. First, we need not account for anything particularly original in Theodorus' proof to make it worthy of Plato's mention; indeed, there is nothing in Plato's text to suggest that Theodorus had made a new discovery; and so we can, on that count at any rate, assume that his was the traditional proof. Yet though his proof was not original, we may still think of him as an original mathematician:

¹ It is of course 7. 30, not as v. Fritz (in P.W. s.v. Theodorus, c. 1821) says, 7. 27. The latter is the enunciation of the theorem that if two numbers are prime to one another, then their squares will be prime to one another; and so also with their cubes. But it is clear that what we need for our proof is 7. 30, that is to say, the theorem 'if c divides ab , and c is prime, then c divides either a or b ', with a simple substitution of a square number for ab , that is to say, taking $a = b$. Else-

where v. Fritz (s.v. Theaetetus, cc. 1356 and 1359) derives what we need here from 7. 25. But that, too, is unnecessary: for there we are told that if two numbers are prime to one another the square of one of them will be prime to the other: what we need does not follow from it. Whereas at 7. 30 the enunciation of $c|ab \rightarrow c|a$ or $c|b$ obviously includes, as a special case, $c|a^2 \rightarrow c|a$.

² See on this Hardy and Wright, *Introduction to the Theory of Numbers*, p. 41.

there must have been originality in him if he had an inkling of the insufficiency of a mechanical generalization of the traditional proof without previously proving what we now have in Euclid 7. 30.

Secondly: nor yet is the generalization of the traditional proof quite so easy as Heath and Zeuthen thought. If it is easy enough to become apparent by a mere enumeration of cases, it yet brings in its train complications that lead to the realization of fundamental difficulties without the solution of which the generalized proof, as distinct from the conjectural enunciation, of the theorem is impossible.

We conclude therefore:

1. The proof employed by Theodorus may well have been, indeed is extremely likely to have been, the traditional proof.
2. The fact that this was not generalized, so far from leading us to think that the traditional proof could not have been used, fits exactly into the picture of the rigorous mathematician who refuses to jump his fences before he has come to them.
3. The intimate connexion of Theodorus' pupil Theaetetus with the theory of irrationality and with *fundamental arithmetical theory* suggests that it was the realization of difficulties inherent in the former that led to a pre-occupation with parts at least of the latter.

APPENDIX

An ancient commentator on the *Theaetetus* (*Anonymer Kommentar zu Platons Theaetet*, ed. H. Diels and W. Schubart, *Berliner Klassikertexte*, ii, 1905) mentions some interesting suggestions concerning the two questions: (a) Why did Theodorus start with $\sqrt{3}$, not with $\sqrt{2}$? (b) Is there anything about $\sqrt{17}$ that made it appropriate for Theodorus to stop there?

On the first question he says *inter alia* that it had been suggested that Plato made Theodorus begin with $\sqrt{3}$ because he had already shown in the *Meno* that the square on the diagonal (of a square) was twice as great as the original square; see col. 28, 37 to col. 29, 1:

... ἔστιν δὲ καὶ τὸ δίπουν τετράγωνον ἀσύμμετρον τῷ ποδιείῳ (sic) κατὰ τὴν πλευράν, ἀλλὰ παρήλθεν, φασίν, αὐτὸ διότι ἐν τῷ Μένωνι ἔδειξεν ὅτι τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς διαγωνίου τετράγωνον διπλασίον ἐστὶν τοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς πλευρᾶς τετραγώνου.

On the second point we read that the question had been asked why Theodorus stopped when he reached 17. One suggested answer,¹ he says, was that

Θεόδωρος γεωμέτρης ὢν καὶ μουσικὸς ἔμειξεν γεωμετρικὸν καὶ μουσικὸν θεωρήμα· γεωμετρικὸν μὲν οὖν τὸ κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις, μουσικὸν δὲ τὸ τῆς ἑπτακαίδεκάποδος. Οὗτος γὰρ ὁ ὅρος ἐνέχει (ἐνίσχει?) ὅτι οὐ διαίρεται ὁ τόνος εἰς ἴσα ἡμιτόνια. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ τόνος ἐστὶν ἐν ἐπογδῶ λόγῳ, εἰς διπλασιάσεως τὸν ὀκτώ καὶ τὸν ἐννέα, γίνονται (sic) ἑκκαίδεκα καὶ ὀκτωκαίδεκα, ὧν μέσος ἐστὶν ὁ ἑπτακαίδεκα εἰς ἁπλοῦς διαιρῶν τοὺς ἄκρους, ὡς δέδεικται ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὸν Τίμαιον ὑπομνήμασιν.

¹ The commentator does not seem to accept this answer. He himself suggests, 35, 21-36, 35, that 17 may have been an appropriate place to stop because it is the first number after 16; and 16 is the number of the only

square in which the number denoting the sum of the sides is equal to the number denoting the area of the square, since

$$4+4+4+4 = 4 \times 4.$$

'Theodorus was both a geometer and a musician.¹ He therefore combined here a geometrical with a musical theorem. The geometrical one was concerned with the roots (or squares), the musical with the number 17. For this term . . . ?² because the tone cannot be divided into equal semitones. The tone interval has the ratio 9/8. Now if one doubles the number 8, and also the number 9, one obtains the results 16 and 18, between which the number 17 is the (arithmetic) mean dividing the extremes into (geometrically) unequal ratios, as has been shown in the commentary to the *Timaeus*.'

What does this mean? The musical interval of a full tone cannot be exactly divided into two semitones. The reason for that is that the ratio of the tone is 9/8. To find the semitone we would have to find the *geometric* mean between 9 and 8, or, what essentially comes to the same, between 9/8 and 1. The geometric mean between 9/8 and 1 would be a number such that its square = 9/8. It would therefore be $\sqrt{9/8}$. But there is no such rational number; the square root of a fraction of the form $a + 1/a$ is irrational; there are no adjacent squares in the series of integers.³ Now, since a geometric mean representing the interval-ratio of the semitone cannot be found, what is one to do? Perhaps the next best thing to do is to take the *arithmetic* mean instead, knowing that it will not give an *exact* division into *equal* semitones. That clearly is the meaning of ἐὰν διπλασιάσῃς . . . τοὺς ἄκρους. In doing so we find the number 17 (which suggests 17/16, the arithmetic mean between 1 and 9/8); and thus, the commentator reasons, the number 17 may have had a special significance for Theodorus. For if we use it once as the denominator and once as the numerator, we obtain two ratios, 18/17 and 17/16, both of which are approximations to the geometric mean; and they have the additional virtue of resulting, when multiplied with each other, exactly in 9/8, the ratio of the full tone.

But what our author gives us here is clearly a garbled, or at any rate a shortened, version of an explanation that must have been clearer and more explicit than this. And indeed he goes on to refer to an explanation to be found elsewhere: ὡς δέδεικται ἐν τοῖς εἰς τὸν Τίμαιον ὑπομνήμασιν. I can indeed not be certain that this refers to a commentary of his own (so Diels and Schubart in their Index, s.v. 'Kommentare'); one might in that case perhaps have expected the explanation here to have been a little clearer. On the other hand, two other references in this commentary, at 48. 10 and 70. 12, quite clearly refer to commentaries of his own on the *Phaedo* and the *Symposium*, so that it is at least possible that here too he means a commentary of his own. However that may be, there certainly was a fuller treatment elsewhere of the matter adumbrated in this short passage.

Now, we read the following passage in Proclus, *Comm. in Tim.* 195 a (on Plato, *Tim.* 35 b):

... περὶ . . . τοῦ λείμματος ἰστέον, ὅτι, ἐπειδήπερ οὐδεὶς ἐπιμόριος εἰς λόγους ἴσους τέμνεσθαι δύναται, τὸ ἡμιτόνιον ἐν ἀριθμοῖς οὐκ ἔστι λαβεῖν, ἀλλὰ τοὺς

¹ i.e. concerned with musical theory. Cf. Plato, *Theaet.* 145 d.

² I do not know what ἐνέχει means here. It has been suggested to me that it may perhaps mean 'comes in', 'enters into the argument'.

³ Cf. Euclid, *Sectio Canonis*, Mus. scr. gr. ed. Jan, prop. 3, p. 152; also Archytas ap. Boeth. de mus. iii. 11 = Vorsokratiker⁶, 47 A 19, p. 429. See Heath, *The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements*, ii. 295.

σύνεγγυς ἀλλήλων λαβόντες τὸν ἑφепτακαίδεκατον λόγον καὶ τὸν ἑφκακαίδεκατον καὶ δείξαντες τὸν ἑφепτακαίδεκατον μείζονα τοῦ καλουμένου λείμματος, ὅς ἦν ἐλάσσων τοῦ ἀκριβῶς ἡμιτονίου, συνάγουσιν, ὅτι καὶ τοῦ ἡμιτονίου ἐλάσσων ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ λείμματος λόγος. ὅτι δ' οὐν ἐλάσσων ἐστὶν ἡ ἑφепτακαίδεκατος, οὗτος δὲ ἐλάσσων (ἐλασσον MSS.) ἡ ἡμιτονίου, δεικνύται οὕτως. ἐκκείσθω γὰρ ὁ 15, καὶ τούτου ἐπὶ γόδοος ὁ 17· τούτων δὴ μεταξὺ τεθεῖς ὁ 17 εἰς ἀνίστους διαιρεῖ τὸν ἐπὶ γόδοον λόγους σύνεγγυς ὄντας τοῦ ἡμιτονίου διαστήματος, μονάδι διαφέρων τῶν ἄκρων. καὶ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν πρὸς τῷ ἐλάσσονι μείζω ποιήσει λόγον ἐν πάσῃ γὰρ ἀριθμητικῇ μεσότητι μείζων ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττωσιν ὅροις, ὥστε ὁ ἑφепτακαίδεκατος ἐλάσσων ἐστὶν ἡμιτονίου. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ λείμμα ἐλασσον ἐστὶν ἡ ἑφепτακαίδεκατον, ὡς ἀπὸ τῶν παρὰ Πλάτωνι κειμένων ὄρων δῆλον. ὁ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν σμγ τὸν τοῦ λείμματος ἔχων λόγον, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο δείξομεν πυθμενικὸν ἀποδείξαντες τὸν ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς τοῦ λείμματος λόγον, ἐλάσσων ἐστὶ τοῦ ἑφепτακαίδεκατου [πρὸς τὸν σμγ]· ὑπέρχει μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ 17 μονάσιν, τὸ δὲ ἑπτακαίδεκατον τοῦ σμγ πλείονων ἐστὶν ἢ 17 μονάδων. πολλῶ ἄρα μᾶλλον ὁ τοῦ λείμματος λόγος ἐλάσσων ἐστὶ τοῦ ἡμιτονίου διαστήματος, ὥστε καὶ ὁ λοιπὸς εἰς τὸν τόνον, ὅς ἐστι τῆς ἀποτομῆς λόγος, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡμιτονίου μείζων ἐστίν.

'About the *leimma* one must know this: since no superparticular ratio can be cut (divided) into equal ratios it is impossible to comprehend (i.e. to express) the semitone in numbers (i.e. as numerical ratios). Instead one takes the ratios that are proximate to each other, viz. 18/17 and 17/16 and, showing that 18/17 is greater than the so-called *leimma* (18/17 being smaller than the exact semitone) one infers that the ratio of the *leimma* is therefore also necessarily smaller than the semitone (i.e. the exact semitone). Now, that it (i.e. the ratio of the *leimma*) is smaller than 18/17, and that this (i.e. the ratio 18/17) is smaller than the semitone, is shown in the following way: take the number 16, and take the number that stands to 16 in the ratio of 9/8, namely 18. Now the number 17 if put between these divides the ratio 9/8 into unequal ratios that are near to the semitone ratio, and it differs by a unit from the extreme terms.

'Now it is clear that it will make the ratio to the smaller term greater. For in every arithmetical mean the ratio is greater in the smaller terms, so that 18/17 is smaller than the semitone. But the *leimma* is smaller than 18/17 as is clear from Plato's terms: for 256/243, the ratio of the *leimma* (that this ratio is in its lowest terms I shall demonstrate when I have shown that the *leimma*-ratio is in fact the ratio of these numbers, i.e. 256/243) is smaller than 18/17 [to 243]: for it exceeds by 13 units: while 1/17 of 243 consists of more than 13 units. All the more therefore the ratio of the *leimma* is smaller than the semitone interval, so that what is left to (make up) the full tone, i.e. the ratio of the *apotome*, is necessarily greater than the semitone.'

περὶ . . . τοῦ λείμματος:

The *leimma* is the 'residue' that is 'left' when two full tones (each of the ratio 9/8) are cut off from the fourth (διὰ τεσσάρων). For example, the ratio of the tone C (for the sake of simplicity I am assuming here the ordinary modern major scale moving upwards) to the tone F, i.e. διὰ τεσσάρων, is 4/3; the ratio C to D is 9/8; D to E is 9/8; what is the ratio of E to F? This ratio is obtained by dividing 4/3 twice by 9/8, or, what comes to the same, once by 81/64. The

result is 256/243. To make this clearer: we know

$$C:D = 9:8$$

$$D:E = 9:8$$

therefore

$$C:E = 81:64.$$

Now, if the ratio of C to E is known and likewise the ratio of C to F, then there is a ratio E to F which we must find: call it X . Then

$$81/64 \text{ multiplied by } X = 4/3,$$

$$81X = 256/3$$

and

$$X = 256/243.$$

See Plato, *Tim.* 36 b; Theon Sm. p. 86 H.; Gaudentius 12. 342. 7 ff. Jan: τὸ δὲ ἡμιτόνιον καλούμενον οὐκ ἔστιν ἀκριβῶς ἡμιτόνιον. λέγεται δὲ κοινῶς μὲν ἡμιτόνιον ἰδίως δὲ λείμμα, καὶ ἔχει λόγον ὃν τὰ σμγ πρὸς τὰ σνς. See also Ptol. *Harm.* i. 10. The name *leimma* is said by Proclus (p. 211 c) to have been used by Plato.

ἐπειδὴ περ οὐδεὶς ἐπιμόριος εἰς λόγους ἴσους τέμνεσθαι δύναται, τὸ ἡμιτόνιον ἐν ἀριθμοῖς οὐκ ἔστι λαβεῖν:

The ἐπιμόριος is a ratio of the form $\frac{a+1}{a} \left(= 1 + \frac{1}{a} \right)$. No such (superparticular)

ratio can be 'cut' into equal ratios, i.e. one cannot find a (rational) geometric mean between a and $a+1$. To find the exact semitone ratio one would have to find the length of a chord such that the length of the chord producing the lower tone has to the semitone chord the same ratio as the latter has to the length of the chord producing the higher tone. For instance, $C:D = 9:8$; what length of chord will produce the *exact* semitone between C and D? Obviously the length of C will be to its length (i.e. to the length of the chord producing C sharp) as the latter is to the length of D. But, if C equals 9, D equals 8; therefore

$$9:C \text{ sharp} = C \text{ sharp}:8,$$

i.e. C sharp is the geometric mean between 9 and 8. But there is no rational geometric mean¹ between a and $a+1$, or, in this case, between 8 and 9. For if

$$9:X = X:8$$

then $X^2 = 72$, $X = \sqrt{72} = 6\sqrt{2}$, which is irrational.

That is why it is impossible to express the exact semitone in numbers, i.e. as a numerical ratio. Though, of course, physically, and geometrically, there is no such difficulty; think only of the progression of semitones on the *tempered* pianoforte.

τοὺς σύνεγγυς . . . ἐφεκκαδέκατον:

To find a rational geometric mean between 9 and 8 is impossible. By doubling the two terms one obtains 18 and 16. The arithmetic mean between these is 17. This number is then used to obtain two new ratios viz. 18/17 and 17/16; these are rational approximations to the square root of 9/8. $18/17 < \sqrt{(9/8)}$; $17/16 > \sqrt{(9/8)}$. And multiplied by each other they produce exactly 9/8.

¹ See p. 172, n. 3.

δείξαντες τὸν ἑφепτακαίδεκατον μείζονα τοῦ καλουμένου λείμματος:

This, i.e. that $18/17$ is greater than $256/243$, will be shown below.

ὅς ἦν ἐλάσσων τοῦ ἀκριβῶς ἡμιτονίου:

The antecedent of $\delta\varsigma$ is, of course, τὸν ἑφепτακαίδεκατον. That this is smaller than the semitone will also be shown below.

συνάγουσιν . . . λόγος:

If the *leimma* is smaller than $18/17$ (δείξαντες τὸν ἑφепτακαίδεκατον μείζονα τοῦ . . . λείμματος), and if $18/17$ is smaller than the semitone ($\delta\varsigma$ ἦν ἐλάσσων τοῦ . . . ἡμιτονίου), then, *a fortiori*, the leimma is smaller than the semitone.

In what follows Proclus establishes the premisses of this conclusion one by one: (1) That $18/17$ is smaller than the semitone. (2) That the leimma is smaller than $18/17$.

ὅτι δ' οὖν ἐλάσσων ἐστὶν ἡ ἑφепτακαίδεκατος:

Scil. ὁ τοῦ λείμματος λόγος.

ἐκκείσθω γὰρ ὁ $\overline{15}$:

$16 =$ twice the denominator of the fraction $9/8$.

καὶ τοῦτου ἐπόγδοος ὁ $\overline{17}$:

$18:16 = 9:8$ ($18 =$ twice the numerator of the fraction $9/8$).

τούτων δὴ μεταξὺ τεθείς ὁ $\overline{17}$ εἰς ἀνίσους διαιρεῖ τὸν ἐπόγδοον λόγους σύνεγγυς ὄντας τοῦ ἡμιτονίου διαστήματος μονάδι διαφέρων τῶν ἄκρων:

'The number 17 if put between these (i.e. between 16 and 18) divides the ratio $9/8$ into unequal ratios that are near approximations to the semitone ratio; it differs by a unit from the extreme terms.'

The two ratios $18/17$ and $17/16$ are near approximations to the ratio of the semitone, being respectively just smaller and just larger than the geometric mean between 1 and $9/8$. On the whole procedure adopted here see also Aristid. Quintil. iii. 114 Meibom; Plut. *Moral.* Περὶ τῆς ἐν Τιμαίῳ ψυχογονίας 1021 c-c; Boethius, *de Mus.* cap. 16; Exc. Neap. § 19 (Jan, p. 416); Ptol. *Harm.* i. 10; Theon Sm. p. 69 H.; Gaud. 14. 343. 1 ff. J.

καὶ δῆλον ὅτι τὸν πρὸς τῷ ἐλάσσονι ὄρῳ μείζω ποιήσει λόγον· ἐν πάσῃ γὰρ ἀριθμητικῇ μεσότητι μείζων ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττωσιν ὄροις, ὥστε ὁ ἑφепτακαίδεκατος ἐλάσσων ἐστὶν ἡμιτονίου:

'Now it is clear that it will make the ratio to the smaller term greater. For in every arithmetical mean the ratio is greater in the smaller terms, so that $18/17$ is smaller than the semitone.'

Three terms are involved: 16, 18, and, the arithmetic mean, 17. It is clear that the ratio of 17 to the smaller term, 16, viz. $17/16$ is greater than the ratio of the larger term to the middle term, that is to say than $18/17$. Compare, for this, Archytas, Fragment 2 Diels-Kranz, pp. 435-6 (from Porph. in Ptol. *Harm.* p. 92): μέσαι δέ ἐντι τρεῖς τᾷ μουσικᾷ . . . ἀριθμητικά μὲν, ὅκκα ἔωντι τρεῖς ὄροι κατὰ τὰν τοίαν ὑπεροχὰν ἀνὰ λόγον· ὃ πρῶτος δευτέρου ὑπερέχει, τοῦτω δεύτερος τρίτου ὑπερέχει. καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τᾷ ἀναλογίᾳ συμπίπτει ἡμεν τὸ τῶν μειζόνων ὄρων διάστημα μείων, τὸ δὲ τῶν μειόνων μείζων.

ὥστε ὁ ἑφепτακαιδέκατος ἐλάσσων ἐστὶ ἡμίτονου:

'so that 18/17 is smaller than the semitone'. The ratio of the semitone is $\sqrt{(9/8)}$; multiplied by itself that gives 9/8. But 9/8 is also the product of 18/17 and 17/16. These are not equal to each other, and therefore one of them must be greater than the semitone, and one smaller. But 18/17 is smaller than 17/16. Therefore 18/17 is smaller than the semitone (and, of course, 17/16 is greater than the semitone). A simple test:

$$\left(\frac{18}{17}\right)^2 = \frac{324}{289} < \frac{9}{8}, \quad \left(\frac{17}{16}\right)^2 = \frac{289}{256} > \frac{9}{8}.$$

τὸ λείμμα ἑλασσόν ἐστὶν ἡ ἑφепτακαιδέκατον:

Having established the first premiss, viz. that 18/17 is smaller than the semitone, he now proceeds to establish the second premiss: that the leimma is smaller than 18/17.

ὁ γὰρ σνς πρὸς τὸν σμγ τὸν τοῦ λείμματος ἔχων λόγον . . . ἐλάσσων ἐστὶ τοῦ ἑφепτακαιδέκατου [πρὸς τὸν σμγ]:

'The ratio of 256 to 243, which is the ratio of the leimma, is smaller than 18/17.' (MSS. 'smaller than 18/17 to 243'). This is proved in the next sentence *ὑπερέχει*, etc.

πρὸς τὸν σμγ must be deleted. It makes no sense at all; and it is in fact omitted in one of the good manuscripts; see ed. Diehl (Teubner).

ὡς καὶ τοῦτο δείξομεν πυθμενικὸν ἀποδείξαντες τὸν ἐν τούτοις τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς τοῦ λείμματος λόγον:

'... that this ratio (i.e. 256:243) is in its lowest terms I shall demonstrate when I have shown that the leimma ratio is in fact the ratio of these numbers (i.e. 256:243)'. (The order of the words here is a little odd; I have translated as if *πυθμενικόν* came first and *δείξομεν* second.)

πυθμενικόν:

This, like the noun *πυθμήν*, is the technical term for the lowest terms of a ratio or a fraction. *Πυθμήν* is found in this sense at least as early as Plato; cf. *Rep.* 546 c.

δείξομεν . . . ἀποδείξαντες:

(a) That the leimma has the ratio 256/243 is demonstrated on pp. 195 c–196 a (pp. 181–2 Diehl).

(b) That this ratio is in its lowest terms: p. 196 a (p. 182 Diehl).

ὑπερέχει μὲν γὰρ . . .:

'(256/243 is smaller than 18/17;) for it exceeds by 13 units while 1/17 of 243 consists of more than 13 units'.

The reasoning here is as follows:

It is required to prove that $256/243 < 18/17$.

256/243 can be expressed as $1 + 13/243$ (as exceeding 1 by 13/243, *ὑπερέχει* . . . *ἢ μονάσιν*); similarly 18/17 can be expressed as $1 + 1/17$.

It is therefore now only required to prove that $13/243 < 1/17$. This is true if

$$243 \text{ times } 13/243 < 243 \text{ times } 1/17$$

N

that is, if $13 < 243/17$, or, as the Greek has it, τὸ ἑπτακαδέκατον τοῦ $\overline{\sigma\mu\gamma}$ πλειόνων ἐστὶν ἢ $\epsilon\gamma$ μονάδων.

πολλῷ ἄρα μᾶλλον ὁ τοῦ λεύματος λόγος ἐλάσσων ἐστὶ τοῦ ἡμιτονίου διαστήματος:

We have established

(a) $18/17 < \text{semitone}$.

(b) $\text{leimma} = 256/243 < 18/17$.

From this it follows that the leimma ratio is smaller than the exact ratio of the semitone.

ὥστε καὶ ὁ λοιπὸς εἰς τὸν τόνον, ὅς ἐστι τῆς ἀποτομῆς λόγος, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡμιτονίου μείζων ἐστίν:

The leimma would be the (near) semitone interval between, say, the Third and the Fourth of a (modern upward-moving) major scale, e.g. E:F = 256:243. Since this is not an exact semitone, another question now arises: what is the ratio of F to F sharp? Suppose F sharp is a full tone above E, that is, E:F sharp = 9:8. Then, if F had been the exact semitone between E and F sharp, the ratio of F to F sharp would have been the same as that of E to F. But F is not the exact semitone. And so F:F sharp is not equal to the ratio E:F. Since the leimma (E:F) is smaller than the semitone, the apotome (i.e. what is needed to make up the full tone, ὁ λοιπὸς εἰς τὸν τόνον) must be greater. It will in fact be obtained very simply by dividing 9/8 by 256/243 = 2187/2048; see Proclus, in *Tim.* p. 195 d (181 Diehl).

Clearly there is a connexion between the explanation given by the Theaetetus commentator, and referred by him to a Timaeus commentary, and the Proclus passage discussed above. The Theaetetus commentator not only explicitly says that his explanation is based on a Timaeus commentary but he obviously gives a version, though perhaps a garbled version, of something very much like the passage we have just examined. Here at once an interesting observation occurs: Proclus, of course, wrote much later than the author of the Theaetetus commentary (the latter is dated by Diels-Schubart in the second century A.D. or at any rate not later; this dating is confirmed, in a letter, by Professor E. G. Turner). Thus we can take this coincidence as valuable evidence for Proclus' practice of using older commentaries in writing his own.¹

More importantly the connexion which the Theaetetus commentator wishes to establish between musical work and work on irrational numbers leads to other interesting reflections: the coincidence of Pythagorean interest in irrational numbers and in scale formation was certainly not accidental. It is, for instance, easy to show that a first attempt at a mathematical description of the exact mid-point of the scale would result in the discovery of the irrationality of the square root of 2. For if the ratio of the octave is 2:1, then the mid-point, the geometric mean between 2 and 1, would be $\sqrt{2}$. And it would soon be discovered that no matter what lengths are originally ascribed to the two chords

¹ It is well known that Greek commentators were in the habit of literally repeating the views of their predecessors when they

agreed with them. See, e.g., L. Minio-Paluello in *J.H.S.* lxxvii (1957), 100.

producing the octave¹ there are no numbers which could express the ratio of, say, lower C:mid-scale = mid-scale:upper C. Thus musical theory, as much as geometry, may have led to the discovery of the irrationality of $\sqrt{2}$. But whether this was in fact so is not really important: the musical consideration would at any rate have provided confirmation of the geometrical and arithmetical considerations that had dealt such a shattering blow to the edifice of Pythagorean metaphysics.

But here a comforting thought may have occurred to the Pythagorean: true, the exact mid-point of the scale, or, for that matter, the exact semitone between the two extremes of a full tone interval, cannot be described mathematically in rational numerical expressions. But then there does not seem to be any need for such description. For in the natural scale the exact semitone and the exact mid-point of the scale simply do not occur. And not only do they not occur but if we introduced them that would at once destroy the basis of our scale formation. (For instance, if F were an *exact* semitone above E, the ratio C:F = 4:3 would disappear.) Thus the Pythagorean may have comforted himself by the thought that nature, in informing our ear, has shunned the irrational.

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¹ The numerical ratios of the Octave, the Fourth, the Fifth, and the full tone, i.e. the difference between the Fourth and the Fifth, were, of course known very early as being respectively 2:1; 4:3; 3:2; 9:8. The last ratio is obtained simply by taking the length of the chord producing the fundamental note

as 12; the octave will then be 6, the Fourth 9, the Fifth 8, and the ratio of the Fourth to the Fifth, 9:8; this was then defined as the typical full tone. (See on this also Aristides Quintil. iii. 113 Meibom; Nicom. *Harm.* i. 12 Meibom; Theon Smyrn. p. 66 H.; Ptol. *Harm.* i. 5.)

PALATINE APOLLO AGAIN

MR. BISHOP's article in *C.Q.* xlix (vi. 3/4). 187-92 on Palatine Apollo calls for an answer from me, since I am still alive to give it, though my own study dates from 1910 and was published in *J.R.S.* for 1914, pp. 193-226. So far away is this publication, and my offprints have for so long been exhausted, that scholars of my generation need to go to university libraries to refer to it, and recent generations do not know it at all. From Lugli's book on Rome they do not gather the details which convinced Boni that I was right, because he omitted some of the most cogent from mention.

Mr. Bishop cannot reconcile the literary evidence with the archaeological; so let me take his passages and re-examine them. Ovid's book (*Tristia* 3. 1) passes along the Forum, where it will be chiefly read (cf. *toto Cynthia lecta foro*), to the Porta Mugonia near the later arch of Titus, and turning to the right reaches a shrine of Iuppiter Stator by the 'gate of the Palatium', where 'Rome was first founded', that is, the Rome of Romulus. The supposed original wall of his Palatine city passed here, a little distance above the Forum levels. There was no '*clivus Palatinus*' at this date, but merely a narrow winding road serving the various houses of the rich, which occupied the whole hill. We know of a number of them, owned by Cicero, Clodius, Catulus in the late republican days. There was nothing of a monumental nature to be seen by one ascending by this road, till he reached the open space round the Temple of Magna Mater at the western corner of the hill. This space was more directly accessible from the Forum by the *clivus Victoriae* skirting the hill above the Velabrum; but Ovid's eye took the other route.

Singula dum miror, then, implies that there was nothing to particularize in this residential quarter. The *domus Tiberiana* did not exist; the Augustan buildings had no monumental façade towards the region of the Porta Mugonia, but were obscured by houses on that side. The only temple on the way up is not mentioned by Ovid and must have lain off the road, that of Iuppiter Victor.

The real importance of this passage of Ovid is that it indicates clearly the relation of Augustus' house to the temple of Apollo, the porticoes, and the library—the book reaches them in that order, porticoes lead from temple to library, and temple being more important than porticoes, Ovid does not mention that it must pass half of them before it reaches the temple 'in the midst'.

Mr. Bishop next refers to Propertius, from whom my own study of this problem began. Propertius views Rome from the Capitol (4. 1 in the *textus receptus*, 4. 2 in my text). Once all was 'hill and grass'; Iuppiter Tonans had no temple here; below, the Tiber visited the herds of our cattle; and, when Euander sailed up from the sea, his exiled cows lay down together on the height above them, whither he had driven them for safety. (Note. I regret that Mr. Bishop has not spared me the repetition of my stupid note on *concubere*, which I did not sufficiently repudiate in my edition. I also think *bubus* means cows; but in any case they do not propagate thus.)

I do not transpose the couplet on the Palatine, as Mr. Bishop says, but bring up the couplet on Iuppiter to precede it, and believe that verses 1 to 10 are now as the poet wrote them. 'Naval Phoebus' is seen, after Tiber, on the top of the hill opposite, the *naualia* are below instead of 'our cows'; the Actian

monuments overlook the ships. It was the utter impossibility that Propertius was here describing a region at the farthest corner of the hill, out of sight of river or Tarpeian rock, that first set me to the re-examination of Huelsen's view, which held the field in 1909.

It was when Euander first arrived that his cows were 'from exile'; *concupuere* has its *perfect* sense. Their first resting-place was on the hill. But later, of course, when a city was built there, they pastured and mooed at will on the lower ground outside. The passage continues, however, with still more explicit indications:

qua gradibus domus ista Remi se sustulit, olim
unus erat fratrum maxima regna focus.

Now the hut of Romulus was 'on the flank of the Palatine' towards the Circus, according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus writing in the Augustan age. It was by the 'Stair of Cacus'. Propertius saw the hut and the old stairway down the hill, and above it greater stairways, to the temple precinct and from it to the temple itself (*gradibus sublimia celsis*), and the Palatine house upraised above the house of Romulus and Remus. The passages which show that the temple was built 'in a part of the Palatine house' admit of no question. And even here *templa* and *casa* are brought together. There was no hut of Romulus on the south-east of the hill, nor could one have been visible from the Capitol.

So we turn, with Mr. Bishop, to Virgil's description of the arrival by water of Aeneas. Or, rather, we turn to Virgil, not to Mr. Bishop, who omits the arrival altogether.

As Aeneas sails past the Aventine he catches sight of 'walls and a citadel at a distance and scattered roofs of houses, which now the Roman power has made equal to heaven, but then were Euander's poor possession' (*Aen.* 8, 98). Euander's Pallanteum was on the Cermalus, the western corner of the Palatine hill. A site round by the north-eastern corner would be quite invisible from the river; but no one doubts the position of Pallanteum. Aeneas, on landing, finds a festival in progress 'in front of the city, in a grove'. It is in honour of Hercules and the *diui*, at the site of the *ara maxima* in the Velabrum. The city, then, faced towards the river, on the hill above. From v. 101 to v. 305 Virgil halts the action to give a legendary precedent for a man-made god at Rome and for the cleansing of the Palatine from evil influence. Antony's house was on the Palatine looking out over the Circus; until it was destroyed by fire in 29 B.C. Octavian could not begin his main works on the hill. (It was a Reichstag fire.)

These preliminaries at last over, prosy old Euander, who is too *obsitus aeuo* to climb the cliff above, takes Aeneas on a most circuitous but less exacting walk. The text of Virgil is, however, unrevised here and hardly more than a series of jottings. The Porta Carmentalis is to the north; the *asylum* was surely between the peaks of the Capitol; but in any case there is a lacuna here, since *rettulit* (343) has no construction. The Lupercal was quite near the *ara maxima*, and should have been seen first; the Argiletum led out of the Forum eastwards. Now they make for the Capitol once more, and thence at last skirt the site of the Forum to the region of the Porta Mugonia (361), with the *Carinae* across on their left, and see Euander's cattle mooing all about, but nowhere very near the citadel and city which Aeneas had espied from the Tiber.

Like Ovid, Virgil has nothing to remark between the Porta Mugonia and the *sedes* of Euander (362); but we know that this was in Pallanteum, and that

was on and about the Cermalus. The verb of approach is twice *subire* (359, 363): they went uphill and, as they rose, saw the view of the Forum and Carinae. The word *fastigia* (366) bears reference to the Augustan *fastigium* of very different proportions, already visible or designed when Virgil was first working on this early book. But the modest peaked hut of Euander, like the hut of Romulus 'on the flank of the hill towards the Circus', is a precedent for the *modicae aedes* of Octavian (unless he was already Augustus)—his own private house on the rock level, above which were rising the monuments of *Romana potentia*.

It will be seen that I reject altogether Mr. Bishop's first paragraph on p. 190 of his article; I think I have covered each point he puts forward. He follows it with his first reference to Huelsen's view, that the Apollo temple and its accessory buildings were at the south-east corner of the hill, near San Sebastiano. In 1909/10 this area was the only part of the hill which had not been excavated more or less. The argument for this view was largely *ex silentio*, while the temple by the 'house of Liuia' continued to be called that of Iuppiter Victor. But in the 20's the region behind San Sebastiano was excavated, and the results have twice been published, so that no one has any excuse for ignorance of what was found. The whole of the area was covered with colonnades of the age of Nero leading to a formal exit from the Golden House on to the Palatine. That House had crossed the valley near the Arch of Titus and the colossus of Nero. 'Huelsen's theory' went up in smoke, more than a generation ago. I was taken over the ground by Boni's lieutenant, Bonelli, in 1926.

Between this Neronian building and the *clivus Palatinus* of Claudian or Neronian date leading to the new palaces with façade towards the east, lay the house of Proculus (Martial 1. 70). And in *Silvae* 4. 2. 20-21, *uicina Tonantis regia*, presents no problem to me, in spite of Mr. Bishop's assertion: 'theories that the temple of Jupiter on the Capitol is meant are plainly absurd'. Domitian and Jove are neighbours, as Caligula and Jove had been, when he built a bridge from his own to Jove's hill. The height of the *cella* of Apollo Palatinus above sea-level is a few feet greater than the height of the *cella* of Iuppiter Capitolinus. Domitian had rebuilt and glorified the Capitol; but his own hill quite overshadowed Jove, the poor relation, but respected neighbour. Moreover, he had rebuilt the Capitoline temple of Iuppiter Tonans, which is shown on the tomb of the Haterii of Domitianic date.

When Mr. Bishop quotes Tacitus, *Histories* 1. 27, as favouring a site for Apollo at the south-east corner of the hill, I rub my eyes; for this is one of the most cogent pieces of evidence for the opposite conclusion. The sacrifice is going on at the altar of Apollo; Otho receives his signal and slips out of the crowd between the temple and the *atrium*, passes the back of the 'house of Liuia', and then has the *domus Tiberiana* between him and the temple of Saturn at the north end of the Forum. The Velabrum is the whole valley between Palatine and Capitol, with the *uicus Tuscus* threading it. Caligula's palace below the *domus Tiberiana* around the site of S. Maria Antica was standing; Otho descends through the original *domus Tiberiana*, which was the seat of administration, into the Velabrum behind the temple of Divus Augustus (S. Teodoro); then by the *uicus Tuscus* to the temple of Saturn. But if the walk had begun at the south-east angle of the hill, all he had to do was to walk down the *uia Sacra*, with the *domus Tiberiana* far out of his way on the hill to his left, and the Velabrum out of sight.

This does not exhaust the literary evidence for the Augustan buildings, for neither Seruius nor the Regionaries have been considered; and theirs is weighty evidence.

But there is one new piece of literature found since I wrote, which I take occasion to consider here. It is the fragment of the *tabula Hebana* discussed by Last in *J.R.S.* xliii (1953), 27-29. It will be necessary to give the text.

utique in Palatio in porticu quae est ad Apollinis in eo | templo in quo
senatus haberi solet *inter ima*-gines uirorum inlustris ingeni Germanici
Caesaris et | Drusi Germanici patris eius natural|is *fratrisque* | Ti. Caesaris
Aug. qui ipse quoque fecundi ingeni fuit | imagines ponantur supra capita
columna|rum eius fas|tigi quo simulacrum Apollinis tegitur.

To me this passage is one more proof that my interpretation of the remains on the Palatine was in general correct. I figured in my article the Flavian relief, now in Florence, which shows a building with an altar before it to the left of a temple, which can only be the temple of Apollo, as rebuilt by Domitian (or conceivably Nero). A shield of honour or virtue is being dedicated; the palm-tree which Augustus planted in the *compluium deorum penatium* at the back of his house is shown in its exact relation to the two buildings. That to the left is the *atrium augurato conditum*, where the Senate met when it was summoned to the Palatine. See Seruius on Virgil, *Aeneid* 7. 170-5 and on 11. 235. *hoc illis curia templum* are Virgil's words. The *tabula* now tells us that the shields of honour were dedicated in this *templum*; Tacitus, *Annals* 2. 37, speaks of portraits of orators in this *curia*. It stood 'in the portico which is by the Apollo temple'. The shields were placed above the capitals of the columns of the *fastigium* (for this is clearly a correct completion of *-tigi* in the extant text), which covers in the statue of Apollo. There was, then, a very large statue here, with a very lofty roof over it; and we are reminded of Horace's lines in the dedication of his most Augustan book of Odes (3. 1. 45):

cur inuidendis postibus et nouo
sublime ritu moliar atrium?

This dates from 23 B.C. Propertius watched the dedication of the Portico in 24 B.C., when Augustus returned from Spain. And Virgil gives Euander's hut a *fastigium*, however modest, at about the same date of writing.

It was a building in a new style; and the relief shows the Ionic porches on the façade, which would harmonize with the portico. I here reach the one detail in my old article which I should long ago have amended. The Apollo temple was *in the middle of the portico* (Propertius); Octavian had vowed 'a temple to Apollo and porticos *round it*' (Velleius Paterculus 2. 81. 3). 'He built up and dedicated the Apollo shrine on the Palatium and *the precinct round it* and the magazines of books' (Dio Cassius 53. 1. 3).

My assistant architect in 1910 computed that nine intercolumniations of the Augustan portico, substructures of which I identified beyond the temple-core, fell between the temple and the platform bearing the library, and fifteen along that platform's face at right angles to the nine. My mistake was to suppose that statues of Danaids were placed *on either side* of the portico between the columns. It is quite clear that half the fifty sons of Aegyptus on horseback, whom a later vandal, perhaps Septimius Seuerus, set beside them, would have had no brides, unless all the fifty Danaids were on the side towards the piazza. But that shows

that only $9+15+9$ (33) of the Danaids stood beyond the temple and on either side of the library; Danaus himself and seventeen more adorned that part of the portico which stood to the west of the temple. The width of the temple steps must probably be subtracted from the space to be filled; surely the view towards the *naualia* was left open, and only such a statue as *Phoebus naualis* placed on the brow of the hill on that axis. Supply, then, nine intercolumniations west of the temple axis to a corner, where still stands a very strong erection of Augustan concrete, which, cased in stone, could even have been a corner of the portico's foundations. For *the whole face of the hill fell away in the Middle Ages*, exposing the houses, which Augustus had sealed in when driving his precinct over them. Whether anything of this corner survives or no, the portico must have returned towards the *atrium augurato conditum* at right angles, with eight more Danaids to be placed in it. And this arm of the portico was interrupted by the formal entrance arch from the raised Augustan road, which passed below the temple of Magna Mater and connected with the *clivus Victoriae* to form the main approach. Up this road came the choirs of the *Carmen Saeculare* and saw first Apollo and Diana the huntress; I can imagine the bronze originals of the Belvedere Apollo and the Diana of Versailles on the entrance arch. They enter the precinct, and the boys address Sol in his *quadriga* over the temple pediment and the girls Diana of childbirth, who must have had a statue near the entrance and near the place, the *atrium*, where the *patrum decreta* (17) were promulgated. Not till v. 33 in the middle stanza of the hymn do they stand before the *cella*, and see Apollo, *condito telo*, the *citharoedus*, within and Diana as queen of the stars. Was the huge statue in the *atrium augurato conditum* Apollo as augur (v. 61)? At least it stood in *porticu*.

I hope that some readers of this paper will now look up my article in *J.R.S.* for 1914; for there I put out the archaeological evidence on the hill, which no one since has controverted.

OLIFFE RICHMOND

A NOTE ON THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF PROXENIA IN THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C.

IN his speech against Meidias Demosthenes describes the arrogant and proud behaviour of his opponent in which Meidias persists in spite of the popular vote condemning him. Whenever there is voting, Demosthenes says, Meidias is put forward as a candidate; he is the proxenos of Plutarch, he knows everything, the city is too small for his aspirations.¹ This illustration of the enormous popularity of an Athenian politician shows his predominant influence in the two spheres of domestic and foreign policy. The main line of this foreign policy—the passage is obviously intended as an accusation—is expressed by the relationship of proxenia and xenia between Meidias and Plutarch, the leading politician of Eretria² who, pro-Athenian at first, changed his attitude and almost brought disaster on the Athenian army intervening in Euboea. Two things are clearly implied by Demosthenes: (a) the foreign political programme and commitments of a politician or a political group to which he belongs can be quite concisely and yet quite clearly expressed by his proxenia; (b) these foreign connexions of a politician, as expressed by proxenia, are a means of increasing his popularity and influence at home.³

This shows not only the political importance of the institution,⁴ but also explains why proxenia is attacked or defended by the orators. The politician appeals to his public by pointing to his personal relations with states and with great influential people abroad, thus implying the benefits he has brought or is able to bring upon the state; his opponent tries, of course, to minimize the impression which might be thus created.⁵ This often turns into an accusation in which the orator tries to convey the pernicious nature of such a relationship of proxenia by implying that the interests of the foreign state are preferred by his adversary to those of his own country.⁶

It may therefore be worth while to elucidate these points raised by the orators against the background of other, especially inscriptional, evidence relating to proxenia.⁷ The aim of this note is, therefore, an examination of the importance of the award of proxenia as a diplomatic and political act expressing the trend of influences, expansion, and alliances in international Greek politics.

¹ Dem. 21. 200; cf. 110.

² Aesch. 3. 86–87.

³ Cf. Aesch. 3. 42. This applies, of course, also to cases of an award of proxenia to a foreigner on the proposal of an Athenian politician.

⁴ It is interesting to see that the literary sources—in this case from Herodotus onwards—deal mainly with the political aspects of proxenia. The scholiasts and lexicographers, on the other hand, explain the 'consular' activities and duties of the proxenos.

⁵ Dem. 18. 50–52 clearly tries to minimize the influence upon his audience of Aeschines' claim to a relationship of xenia with Philip

and Alexander. Cf. Aesch. 3. 66. Cf. also [Lys.] 6. 48 and Andoc. 1. 145; 2. 11. When the state is a kingdom the xenos of the king may also be the proxenos of the state, cf. Paus. 3. 8. 4.

⁶ Aesch. 2. 141; cf. Dem. 18. 82. In his speech 'For the freedom of the Rhodians' Demosthenes clearly tries to strengthen his argument by stressing the fact that he is not a proxenos of Rhodes: Dem. 15. 15.

⁷ See P. Monceaux, *Les Proxénies grecques*, Paris, 1885; H. Schaefer, *Staatsform und Politik*, Leipzig, 1932; A. Wilhelm, *Attische Urkunden*, v. Teil, S.B. Wien, 1942 (220), 5 Abhandlung, pp. 11–86.

And since the award of proxenia is made to an individual as a result of a proposal by a politician, the question should be examined of how far these awards and proclamations are also an expression of internal party policy based on personal internal and external contacts and alliances.

It may probably be safely suggested that men who were awarded proxenia were always prominent citizens in their native city. They are known as politicians and probably take an active part in the public life of their state.¹ Callippus of Lamptrae, the proxenos of Heraclea in Athens of whose activities we know only in connexion with the legal and economic affairs of Heracleots in Athens, is a *πολιτευόμενος*;² he received his rhetorical education in the school of Isocrates.³ Thus, whatever his tasks and duties, it is expected that the proxenos, because of his public standing and influence, will be better able to safeguard the general interests of the citizens of the awarding State.

Since the holders of proxenia are mostly politicians, it is not surprising that we sometimes find more than one proxenos of the same city in another city. It was probably often beneficial for the interests of the State—and it may also reflect inner political rivalries—to form contacts with several politicians or political factions in another State. Thus in Abydus there is already a proxenos of Cnidus when another one, Iphiades, is nominated after he had himself assumed the proxenia.⁴ This Iphiades is a leader of a hetaeria in his own city,⁵ and it may not be mistaken to suggest both that he himself—for internal reasons—was interested in the proxenia and that the Cnidians were not averse to forming contacts with another eminent politician at Abydus.⁶

The fact that a politician takes the proxenia upon himself⁷ indicates that this, like many other awards of honours, was in great demand.⁸ Hence the frequent accusations of bribery levelled at politicians in connexion with the proposal of honorary decrees.⁹ Though there were probably cases of bribery, there is no evidence that this was the general practice.¹⁰ Honours—among them proxenia—were awarded as a prize for services rendered and as an incentive both to further services and to emulation by others.¹¹ Equally unfounded is probably the accusation that the proxenos sacrifices the interests of his own city to those of the state which he represents.¹² In both cases the accusations only confirm the fact that proxenia as an expression of foreign policy is also fought out on an inner basis of party or faction politics.

¹ That proxenoi were politicians may be concluded from such expressions as *εὐεργετούντας καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ* (I.G. i³. 27) or *λέγων καὶ πράττων* (I.G. ii². 467).

² [Dem.] 52. 28; cf. 1, 25.

³ Isocr. 15. 93; cf. [Dem.] 52. 14.

⁴ S.I.G.³ 187, ll. 7 ff.: *ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὑποδέκεται τὰμ προξενίαν μετὰ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος προξένου* . . .

⁵ Arist. *Pol.* 1306^a28–33.

⁶ It is probable that awards of proxenia made by smaller states were comparatively more numerous, cf., e.g., I.G. xii. 5(1). 542.

⁷ Cf. also Thuc. 3. 70. 3.

⁸ Cf. p. 185, n. 3, and Aesch. 3. 33 et sch.

⁹ Dein. *Ag. Dem.* 42–45. *Hyper. Ag. Dem.*, col. 25. Lys. 13. 72 asserts that people pay money in order to get the title of euer-

getes. Cf. *Dem.* 20. 132–3. Cf. *Plut. Cim.* 14. 4.

¹⁰ *Dem.* 20. 105 ff., 122.

¹¹ Cf. *Dem.* 20. 57, 64, 105–6, 121; Liban. *Hypoth. Dem.* 23: . . . τὰ μὲν γεγρονότα χρῆσιμον αὐτοῖς, τὰ δὲ προσδοκῶντες ἐπὶ μάλ-
λον γενήσεσθαι. Schaefer, *op. cit.*, p. 26, quotes Thuc. 2. 29. 1 as an example of an award of proxenia aimed at securing future services in this case connected with the establishment of influence in the north in order to safeguard the corn route.

¹² Cf. p. 185, n. 6. Cf. Wilhelm, *op. cit.*, p. 42. See also *Plat. Leg.* 642 b: . . . ταύτη τις εὖνοια ἐκ νέων εὐθὺς ἀνύεται ἑκαστον ἡμῶν τῶν προξένων τῇ πόλει, ὥς δευτέρᾳ οὐσῇ πατρίδι μετὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ πόλιν.

The importance of inter-State personal contacts resulting from proxenia in the conduct of diplomacy in Greece can be well seen from the working of embassies. Neither Athens, nor for that matter any other Greek State, developed a regular diplomatic service. There were no permanent diplomatic representatives abroad: embassies were chosen *ad hoc*, and, after their return and report, disbanded. But it is a well-known fact that States usually preferred to send as ambassadors citizens who were proxenoi of the State to which the embassy was sent.¹ This seems to have been a custom so widely accepted in the Greek world that even the Persians were believed to have made use of it in order to bring the Greek States over to their side or to conduct negotiations with them.² Moreover, it was quite customary for ambassadors—those expert politicians—to form contacts through proxenia, thus building up abroad both private political connexions and semi-official alliances with influential persons, and furthering also the aims of their foreign policy for their State. These connexions could be later ratified by a formal decree awarding proxenia on the basis of the report of the ambassadors,³ the assistance to the ambassadors being generally given as a reason.

Thus, though the award of proxenia was made by official decree, it was both based on and resulted from personal or party contacts and attachments transcending State boundaries. These connexions can be traced in different States in the fifth and fourth centuries. They are often hereditary in certain families and are thus an obvious manifestation of a political line—foreign as well as domestic—taken by a political faction under the leadership of an influential family.

Cimon, a proxenos of Sparta, was well known for his pro-Spartan sentiments;⁴ so was his brother-in-law, Callias.⁵ Cimon even gave one of his sons the name Lakedaimonios.⁶ Among other proxenoi of Sparta in Athens the best known, Alcibiades and Xenophon, were certainly men whose views on internal Athenian affairs accorded well with their Spartan proxenia.⁷ The tradition of the proxenia of Xenophon is also clearly connected with the services rendered by him to that city and shows to what extent political convictions constituted

¹ Aesch. 2. 172; 3. 138–9; cf. Andoc. 3. 3; (though historically wrong it perhaps contains a grain of truth about the proxenia of Cimon, and certainly shows the popularly accepted notion of connexion between ambassadorial activities and proxenia); Dein. *Ag. Dem.* 38; cf. Thuc. 3. 32. 5; 5. 76. 3; 2. 29. 1; Xen. *Hell.* 4. 5. 6; 6. 3. 4; Conon sends a xenos to Dionysius of Sicily, *Lys.* 19. 19.

² Hdt. 8. 136; Aesch. 3. 258; cf. H. Swo-boda, *Arch.-epig. Mitt. aus Österreich*, 1893, pp. 53–54. For the date and aims of Arthemius' activities in Greece see M. Cary, *C.Q.* xxix (1935), 177–80.

³ Aesch. 2. 89. For proxeniai proposed on the advice of returning ambassadors see *I.G.* i². 82; ii². 8; Tod 135 and perhaps also Tod 132. Assistance to ambassadors given by Strato is recorded in Tod 139. Tod 182 is probably an award to a Macedonian for assistance to Athenian ambassadors at the

court of Philip. But the award of proxenia was certainly not made automatically in every case, cf., e.g., Tod 147 and Wilhelm, *op. cit.*, pp. 23 ff.

⁴ Plut. *Cim.* 14. 4; cf. n. 6.

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 6. 3. 4; cf. 5. 4. 22 (Callias, the grandson of the first).

⁶ Plut. *Cim.* 16. 1–3. The Spartans are interested in promoting or supporting Cimon's influence in Athens. His political programme is based on Atheno-Spartan partnership in the leadership of Greece: Plut. *Cim.* 16. 8–10. The name of the Thespian who becomes Athenian proxenos is Ἀθηναῖος in *I.G.* i². 36. Ἀδάων is the Spartan proxenos in Plataea, Thuc. 3. 52. 5.

⁷ Thuc. 5. 43. 2; 6. 89. 2; Plut. *Alcib.* 14; Diog. Laert. 2. 6. 51, 53. For a discussion of the proxenia held by Alcibiades' family and revived by him see G. Daux, *Alcibiade proxène de Lacédémone*, *Mélanges Desrousseaux*, Paris, 1937, pp. 117–22.

a condition and were connected with such an award; it is because of his ideological or party standing that Xenophon could be regarded as a Spartan proxenos.

Traditions of continuous service as proxenoi, with the title retained in the family, can be seen also outside Athens in the decree for Eurytio of Orchomenus.¹ Pro-Athenian groups or parties whose leader, certainly a proxenos, is a member of the democratic party in his own State, can be seen both within and outside the Athenian empire and later also in the fourth century. The Mytilenean proxenoi inform Athens of the impending revolution.² Alcibiades, who recaptured Selymbria, moved a decree in Athens,³ not only ratifying the treaty agreed to, but also awarding proxenia, probably to the leaders of the pro-Athenian party in Selymbria, and restoring it to Apollodorus, in whose family it was 'hereditary'. His name was to be deleted from the list of hostages retained in Athens.

This connexion between the proxenia as expression of international relations in the Greek world and the party constellation inside the State involving rivalry as to the line of foreign policy to be pursued can be observed in the following two examples.

About 385 B.C. a group of Thasians, under the leadership of Ecphantus, is forced to flee from their city ἐπ' ἀπικισμῷ;⁴ in conformity with Athenian treatment of other pro-Athenian refugees they are given ἀτέλεια μετοικίου. Among the Thasians who reach Athens is also Amyntor, son of Apemantus, a proxenos of Athens; he comes of a family which had probably long been among the leaders of the democratic party and the staunchest supporters of Athens.⁵ The record of Amyntor's proxenia is restored soon after 403; it had been destroyed by the Thirty.⁶ This destruction of the stele is instructive in showing the close connexion between internal party-line and foreign connexions and policy, as well as revealing the party membership of the proxenoi in their native city. The fact that proxenia is based on alinement of similar interests in internal and external affairs in different States is well documented in inscriptions of the fourth century.⁷

Another example of the same link, showing at the same time how a proposal of award of proxenia brings about a trial of strength between two opposing parties in the State trying to obtain popular sanction for a line of foreign policy,

¹ *I.G.* i². 103. Since a Delian who was given proxenia has no sons, his nephew will inherit it, *S.I.G.*³ 158.

² Thuc. 3. 2, 3. Cf. Wilhelm, *op. cit.*, p. 43; Monceaux, *op. cit.*, p. 71. For a fourth-century Mytilenean proxenos who stands at the head of the pro-Athenian party there cf. [Dem.] 40. 36.

³ Tod 88.

⁴ *I.G.* ii². 33.

⁵ Dem. 20. 59-60, cf. *I.G.* xii (8). 263. 6; Wilhelm, *op. cit.*, pp. 18 ff., 87 ff. The Athenian Cephisophon receives Thasian proxenia c. 341, cf. *I.G.* xii (5). 114. This is probably in connexion with the danger of Macedon, cf. M. Feyel, *Rev. Phil.*, 1945, p. 151.

⁶ Tod 98.

⁷ Another inscription destroyed by the

Thirty is *I.G.* ii². 52, but the name and country of the proxenos are not preserved. In ii². 9 and 66 the phrase is restored. *I.G.* ii². 448, ll. 61 ff. (318/17) shows that stelae granting honours to foreigners might be destroyed because of internal changes. *I.G.* ii². 172 is an award of proxenia to a man whose father was probably awarded it αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἐγγόνοις. The normal procedure was probably then to inscribe the son's name on the father's stele. In this case a new decree had to be passed as the original stele had disappeared; but the circumstances of its disappearance are not known. Other probable cancellations of proxenia are *S.I.G.*³ 275 and *Ael. V. Hist.* 14. 1 (Aristotle). Restorations of proxenia in Delphi, cf. *S.I.G.*³ 292, 294, 295, 300.

is provided by Demades, who in 336 moves a decree honouring a Macedonian at Philip's court for his services to Athenian envoys and for his intervention with Philip on behalf of Athens.¹ After the battle of Chaeronea Demades tried to assert his influence in Athens in matters of internal and foreign policy, by moving a great number of decrees, of which many were probably decrees awarding proxenia. Of one such decree an interesting record has survived.² In 337/6 or 336/5 Demades proposed to award proxenia to Euthycrates, the pro-Macedonian commander of the Olynthian cavalry who in 348 betrayed Olynthus to Philip.³ The decree was carried and Hyperides entered a *γραφὴ παρανόμων* against the proposer. Demades, by his proposal, tried not only to express his justification of Macedonian policy and conquests, but also to demonstrate the pro-Macedonian sentiments generally prevailing in Athens and the wide support for his policy. By his challenge Hyperides represents the opposition to the line of policy which found expression in the proposed award of proxenia. A similar, though certainly not identical, picture can be seen in connexion with Aristocrates' proposal in favour of Charidemus.

We have already seen that proxenoi were employed as envoys to foreign states and proxenia was thus a vital instrument in extending the state's influence abroad and as such its use is exemplified in the fifth and fourth centuries in the struggle for hegemony in Greece. Proxenia was in such a case of great importance in gaining influence or even the alliance of a state.

This can be seen, for example, in the region of the Hellespont and the route of the corn-supply which were certainly most important for Athens. Agis used the good offices of Clearchus, the Byzantine proxenos, in his endeavours to stop the export of corn to Athens.⁴ In the fourth century the Athenians awarded honours to rulers or their close advisers in order to maintain their connexions and influence in the north.⁵ When Thrasybulus forced Byzantium from Spartan control, he did so with the help of the democratic pro-Athenian party there.⁶ One of its leaders, Cydon, served as an ambassador to Athens in 378, when an alliance was concluded.⁷ Among the envoys was also Philinus, who either was or later became a proxenos of Athens.⁸ It may be quite safely suggested that these awards of proxenia were both a means and a result of the strengthening of the pro-Athenian party in Byzantium, thus bringing the city into closer alliance with Athens.

Another example of the same policy is provided in the fourth century by Thebes. Among the contributors to the Boeotian war-chest during the Sacred War⁹ is Athenodorus of Tenedos, the Theban proxenos. Dittenberger quite rightly points out that this is probably the contribution of the pro-Theban party in Tenedos; the proxenos, as its leader, is probably the initiator and is responsible for the transmission of the money to Thebes.¹⁰ During her hegemony

¹ Tod 181. Cf. also 180.

² Hyper. Frg. 76, 77 (Jensen) = frg. 19 (Loeb). The proposal of Philippides was also part of this all-out pro-Macedonian effort; Hyper. *Ag. Philipp.* 5, refers to the acceptance of the proposals to honour the Macedonians as *ἀγαγαί*. Cf. also M. Ostwald, *T.A.P.A.*, 1956, pp. 124-5.

³ Dem. 8. 40; 19. 341; 267; cf. Diod. 16. 53.

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 1. 1. 35; 3. 18-20; cf. p. 186, n. 11.

⁵ For the fluctuations and changes in some

of these relations see, for example, Demosthenes' speech against Aristocrates.

⁶ Dem. 20. 59-60; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 4. 8. 27.

⁷ Tod 121. For the pro-Athenian activities of Cydon cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1. 3. 18; cf. 2. 2. 1.

⁸ *I.G.* ii². 76. The date cannot be exactly established, cf. D. M. Lewis, *B.S.A.*, 1954, p. 33.

⁹ Tod 160 = *S.I.G.*³ 201.

¹⁰ Tenedos was pro-Athenian and remained all through a faithful ally, cf. Aesch. 2. 20, 126; Tod 175.

Thebes extended her connexions abroad and there are records of proxenia as far afield as Carthage and Byzantium.¹ From approximately the same time—perhaps in order to counterbalance Theban influence—comes the addition to an Athenian award of proxenia² in which Pythodorus of Delos is called *ἀνὴρ ἐπὶ ταῖς νήσοις ἀριστος*. Perhaps also awards of proxenia to Athenian strategoi and governors installed in allied cities³ should be viewed as an expression of acceptance—undoubtedly under Athenian pressure—of the new Athenian policy; they probably served at the same time as a testimonial for the politician before the Athenian public itself.⁴

The privileges which an award of proxenia brings to its recipients are certainly also of political importance. One clause is repeated quite frequently: the protection of the state is made part of the award. Like *xenia*⁵—its counterpart in private connexions—the award of proxenia is viewed as creating a high moral obligation to protect and assist the nominee.⁶ The Athenian decree regulating relations with Iulis provides also for the punishment of those who murdered the Athenian proxenos.⁷ The phrase *ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὥπως μὴ ἀδικῇται* (or a similar expression) occurs quite frequently⁸ and actually gives the same protection as citizenship.⁹ Such safeguards were undoubtedly dependent on the political and material weight which could be put behind them.¹⁰ But we have seen that Athens helped those who had to flee their own country because of their pro-Athenian leanings. In the existing conditions of the Greek states, such protection and security of political refuge were of great importance.¹¹

Proxenia was often awarded also for other than purely political services,¹² though even in such cases previous political contacts or influences must be presumed; moreover, it was only one of the awards which played an important part in the diplomatic activity and political propaganda in Greece.¹³ But it is obvious that political changes and fluctuations can be clearly observed by following the proxenia decrees in the fourth century, from the award made by Erythrae to Conon¹⁴ to the appearance of decrees in honour of Macedonians.¹⁵ In most cases they point not only to external but also to internal changes and

¹ *I.G.* vii. 2407 and 2408 both in c. 364/3.

² *S.I.G.*³ 158.

³ Tod 152; cf. *I.G.* xii (5. 2). 1000.

⁴ Aristophon though awarded proxenia by Carthaea (*I.G.* xii. 5. 542) was accused of extortion during his strategy, cf. Hyper. *ὑπὲρ Εὐξ.* 28. Cf. Aesch. 1. 107. Cf. sch. Aesch. 1. 64 in Baiter-Sauppe, *Orat. Att.* ii. 282.

⁵ Lys. frg. 78 (Thalheim); Aesch. 3. 223-4.

⁶ [Dem.] 7. 38; Dem. 20. 58-60; Aesch. 3. 258; Diod. 13. 27. 3; cf. Lys. 28. 1.

⁷ Tod 142, ll. 28 ff. esp. 39f. The proxenos is, of course, the head of the pro-Athenian party. Certain decrees of the fifth century threaten the death penalty for the murder of a proxenos: *I.G.* ii³. 71+38, and *I.G.* ii³. 32 (cf. E. Weston, *A.J.P.*, 1945, pp. 347-53). Cf. also *I.G.* i³. 28, 72; Wilhelm, op. cit., pp. 37-38, and R. Meiggs, 'A Note on Athenian Imperialism', *C.R.*, 1949, pp. 9-12.

⁸ Cf., e.g., *I.G.* i³. 118; 55, 149, 154; ii³. 110, 133, 77, 252; cf. also *I.G.* ii³. 360.

⁹ e.g. Tod 173.

¹⁰ Cf. the veiled scorn in [Dem.] 12. 10 at the impotence of Athens to protect Euagoras and Dionysius to whom she awarded citizenship. Cf. Tod 109.

¹¹ Dein. *Ag. Dem.* 43. U. Kahrstedt, *Staatsgebiet und Staatsangehörige in Athen*, i, Stuttgart, 1937, pp. 288-9, asserts that an award of proxenia by Athens automatically included a grant of metoikia, thus providing right of sojourn in Athens.

¹² For military aid or information: e.g. *I.G.* ii³. 27, 133; Tod 116, 143. Citizenship for this reason: Dem. 22. 151, 185, 188; Arist. *Rhet.* 2. 23. 1399^b1; cf. *I.G.* ii³. 17. For economic reasons: e.g. Tod 152; *I.G.* ii³. 360.

¹³ Cf. [Dem.] 12. 8-10 for the diplomatic claims and counterclaims based on an Athenian award of citizenship to Cersobleptes. For *εὐεργετίας* cf. Isocr. 5. 32-37, 76, 116, 170; and the letter of Speusippus to Philip 2-4.

¹⁴ Tod 106.

¹⁵ Tod 164 a-b; *S.I.G.*³ 266-9 (cf. Aesch. 3. 130 and p. 189, n. 1).

faction-rivalries in Greek states. Every major Athenian politician in the fourth century is known to have moved decrees awarding honours—among them undoubtedly proxenia—and to have been awarded proxenia by a foreign state. The importance of proxenia as an instrument of diplomatic and political influence both in international and internal party politics is well borne out and explained by the orators and the other available evidence.

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S. PERLMAN

THE NUMISMATIC EVIDENCE FOR THE NERONIA

J. D. P. BOLTON has argued in the *C.Q.* 1948¹ that although there is some confusion in the use of the term 'quinquennalis' in the first century A.D., the linguistic and literary evidence suggests that the Neronia (instituted by Nero in A.D. 60) was a four-yearly festival, that the celebration which Tacitus records in 65 was merely a postponement of part of the celebration due in 64, and that such a view is supported by the evidence of Nero's issues of Certamen Quinquennale semisses. Bolton divides these semisses into four main groups:

- (i) Copper. With SC on reverse. Obverse: bare head of Nero; legend NERO (CLAVDIVS) CAESAR AVGVSTVS (GERMANICVS) variously abbreviated.
- (ii) Orichalcum. With SC on reverse. Obverse: laurelled or (occasionally) bare head of Nero; legend NERO (CLAVDIVS) CAESAR AVGVSTVS (GERMANICVS) (IMPERATOR) (PONTIFEX MAXIMVS) (TRIBVNICIA POTESTATE) (PATER PATRIAE) variously abbreviated.
- (iii) Copper. Without SC on reverse. Obverse: laurelled head of Nero; legend NERO CLAVDIVS CAESAR AVGVSTVS GERMANICVS PONTIFEX MAXIMVS TRIBVNICIA POTESTATE IMPERATOR PATER PATRIAE variously abbreviated.
- (iv) Copper. With SC on reverse. Obverse: bare head of Nero; legend IMPERATOR NERO CAESAR AVGVSTVS PONTIFEX variously abbreviated.

He argues that Classes (i) and (iii) were issued by Senate and Emperor respectively in late 63 or early 64 to celebrate the festival which was due to be held in 64, that Class (ii) was a continuation by the Senate later in 64 or early in 65 to commemorate the second instalment of the Neronia in 65, and that Class (iv) was issued by the Senate at the end of 67 or the beginning of 68 to celebrate the Neronia due to take place in 68.

Bolton's interpretation of the numismatic evidence, however, rests on the cardinal assumption that 'coins which are struck to commemorate some particular event will be struck about the time of that event or if anything rather before it, should it be an event whose occurrence can be anticipated', and this is not an assumption that can readily be justified from what we know of the employment of coin types at this early and formative period. Nero's *aes* at both Rome and Lugdunum demonstrably belongs to A.D. 64-68,² but several of its types refer to events earlier in the reign. There is a congiarium type CONG I DAT POP³, although Nero's first congiarium was given in 57.⁴ Dupondii use the type of the *macellum Augusti*⁵ which was opened in 56/57.⁶ Sestertii have the type of a triumphal arch,⁷ which was being erected in 62⁸ and had been decreed as early as 58,⁹ and of the harbour at Ostia, though the improvements to the harbour were mostly the work of Claudius and had probably been

¹ *C.Q.*, 1948, pp. 82-90, 'Was the Neronia a freak festival?'

² *B.M.C.R.E.* i, introd., p. clxvi, 'the portraiture on this coinage shows close resemblance to the undated gold and silver, but has practically no point of contact with the dated'.

³ *Ibid.* i, Nero, nos. 136 and 308.

⁴ Tacitus, *Annals* 13. 31.

⁵ *B.M.C.R.E.* i, Nero, nos. 191-7 and 335-7.

⁶ Dio Cassius 61. 18.

⁷ *B.M.C.R.E.* i, Nero, nos. 183-90 and 329-34.

⁸ Tacitus, *Annals* 15. 18.

⁹ *Ibid.* 13. 41.

completed soon after Nero's accession.¹ The Temple of Ianus was closed in mid 66 when Tiridates visited Rome,² and it had almost certainly been closed before that date,³ but it is still used as a sestertius type with the date TRP XIII (December 66/67).⁴

On the Certamen Quinquennale semisses the word CON clearly looks back to the foundation of the games in A.D. 60;⁵ the portraiture shows beyond doubt that the pieces belong to a considerably later date;⁶ but this is no reason for holding that they were only struck to commemorate subsequent celebrations of the Certamen.

Nor can Bolton's classification and attribution of the four main types of Certamen semisses be accepted as it stands. We can no longer accept the old view that SC on the Roman *aes* marks a senatorial, and its absence an imperial issue. Numismatists are now generally agreed that SC on the *aes* marks the sanctioning by senatorial decree of proposals put forward by the Emperor, and that

Finds of Nero's Copper and Orichalcum Semisses

		Britain and France		The Rhine		Italy		The North-east	
		Kirkham (Lancs.) ⁷ Richborough ⁸ Wroxeter ⁹ Colchester ¹⁰ Leicester ¹¹ St. Albans ¹² La Mayenne ¹³	Totals	Nijmegen ¹⁴ Vetera ¹⁵ Xanten ¹⁶ Neuss ¹⁷ Ziegeleien bei Neuss ¹⁷ Ponslerum ¹⁸ Vindonissa ¹⁹	Totals	Pompeii ²⁰ Tiber ²¹ Capitol ²² Milan (a) ²³ Milan (b) ²⁴	Totals	Aquileia ²⁵ Carnuntum ²⁶	Totals
COPPER	Roma	- 1 - - 1 - 4	6	2 2 - 3 1 1 2	11	- - - - -	-	-	-
	Certamen	1 - 1 4 - 2 3	11	3 1 1 - - - 1	6	- - - - -	-	-	-
ORICHALCUM	Roma	- - - - -	-	- - - - 1 -	1	- 2 - 1 1	4	1 -	1
	Certamen	- - 1 - 1 -	2	- - - - -	-	4 - 1 2 3	10	2 2	4

¹ Suetonius, *Divus Claudius* 20.

² Suetonius, *Nero* 13.

³ Cf. *B.M.C.R.E.* i, introd., p. clxxiv.

⁴ *B.M.C.R.E.* i, Nero, no. 113.

⁵ As Sydenham pointed out in *The Coinage of Nero*, p. 71.

⁶ Cf. p. 192, n. 2 above.

⁷ *N.C.*, 1908, p. 316.

⁸ *Reports of the Research Committee of the Society of Antiquaries*, nos. vi, vii, x, and xvi.

⁹ Now in Rowley's House Museum, Shrewsbury.

¹⁰ In Colchester and Essex Museum, Colchester.

¹¹ *Report of the Research Committee of the Society of Antiquaries*, xv.

¹² *Idem*, xi.

¹³ *Bulletin de la Société d'archéologie, sciences, arts et belles-lettres de la Mayenne*, 1865, pp. 9 ff.

¹⁴ In Rijksmuseum J. G. Kam, Nijmegen, Netherlands.

¹⁵ In Rheinisches Landesmuseum, Bonn; information kindly supplied by Dr. Wilhelm

mina Hagen.

¹⁶ In Xanten Museum.

¹⁷ *Bonner Jahrbücher*, 111/12.

¹⁸ Information kindly supplied by Dr. Wilhelm Hagen.

¹⁹ Information kindly supplied by Dr. C. M. Kraay.

²⁰ From a group of coins in Pompeii Antiquarium.

²¹ From a group of coins in the Museo Nazionale Delle Terme, Rome.

²² In Capitol Museum, Rome, believed to have been found in the city.

²³ Brera Collection, Milan.

²⁴ Commune Collection, Milan. The pieces in both the Commune and Brera collections in Milan are unprovenanced, but it is undoubtedly significant that only orichalcum semisses of Nero occur.

²⁵ In Aquileia Museum.

²⁶ In Museum Carnuntinum, Bad Deutsch Altenburg.

there was no coinage of the Senate in its own right under the Empire.¹ Class (iii), the copper semisses without *sc*, are very rare indeed.² They are thoroughly Roman in style and seem to precede the main orichalcum series with *sc* at the mint of Rome (Class ii) as a sort of pattern issue.³ Classes (i) and (iv), the normal copper semisses with *sc*, are all from the Lugdunum mint.⁴ The heads are in Lugdunum style and have the characteristic Lugdunum truncation of the bust, to which the Lugdunum globe is invariably appended.

Mattingly's stylistic attribution of the main series of Nero's semisses in copper to Lugdunum and in orichalcum to Rome is fully borne out by the available evidence of their distribution.⁵

Bolton's class (ii) in orichalcum is the only normal issue of Certamen Quinquennale semisses at the mint of Rome. These orichalcum semisses never have 'imperator' as a *praenomen* in Nero's titles, and there are no semisses in orichalcum or copper that can be attributed to the mint of Rome after Nero assumed the *praenomen* in mid 66.⁶ The only Certamen semisses struck later than mid 66 are the Lugdunum copper pieces with the *praenomen* 'imperator', but even these can hardly be placed as late as 68. There is no strong break between them and the other Lugdunum group which we should expect to see had class (i) been issued in 64 or 65 and class (iv) in 68. In fact the semisses show the same steady development in portraiture as do the other *aes* denominations at Lugdunum.

Thus apart from the inherent improbability in Bolton's assumption that the Certamen Quinquennale semisses were merely struck to commemorate subsequent celebrations of the Certamen, it can be shown that the semisses were in fact issued at Rome between 64 and 65 and at Lugdunum between 65 and 67:

Mint of Rome:

Early 64. Copper without *sc* on reverse.

Mid 64/65 Orichalcum with *sc* and the mark of value *s* on reverse.

Mint of Lugdunum:

Mid 65/66. Copper with *sc* on reverse.

Mid 66/67. Copper with *sc* on reverse and *IMP* in praenominal position among obverse titles.

British Museum, London

D. W. MacDOWALL

¹ *B.M.C.R.E.* v, introd., p. xxiii.

² *Ibid.* i, Nero, no. 259.

³ *Ibid.*, introd., p. cxxx.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Nero, nos. 392-6.

⁵ I am deeply indebted to the keepers of

the museums mentioned in these footnotes for allowing me to examine the coins in their collections and for providing information from their records about find-spots.

⁶ Suetonius, *Nero* 13.

PERSIUS 1. 107-10

sed quid opus teneras mordaci radere vero
auriculas? vide sis ne maiorum tibi forte
limina frigescent; sonat hic de nare canina
littera.

PERSIUS places these words in the mouth of his interlocutor, who states one of the traditional arguments against satire in the contrived manner typical of our poet. The passage may be translated: 'What need is there to rasp upon tender little ears with biting truth? Be careful that the thresholds of the great do not perhaps grow cold towards you; here there is the nasal sound of the canine letter.'

The question of the speaker causes no particular difficulty, once we are familiar with Persius' sensuous imagery. The interlocutor poses the problem: why does the satirist need to hurt people's feelings? He then continues with a clause which again arouses no disagreement: he warns Persius that the satirist loses friends, that important people close their doors to him. Here we can observe Persius patently using traditional themes, for the clause closely follows the idea, if not the expression, of Horace, *S. 2. 1. 61-62: maiorum ne quis amicus / frigore te feriat*. It is, however, with the interpretation of the next clause that I shall concern myself, for there, I believe, scholarly agreement depends too much upon the shaky authority of the scholiast.

As I have translated the clause and as the grammatical structure of the Latin reveals, Persius has not made clear to his readers where the sound occurs or exactly what form it takes. We can translate *hic*, of course, and we can understand the normal significance of *canina littera*, but we cannot be immediately certain of their particular usage here. The Romans called the letter R *canina*, because its pronunciation resembled the sound of a snarling dog. Persius, then, seems to refer to snarling, presumably in a metaphorical sense.¹ But who is snarling and what setting should be inferred from *hic*? In my opinion the grammar justifies two interpretations. I shall first state the interpretation of all commentators since the scholiast. Then, I shall propose a second explanation, which seems to satisfy the grammar and to fit the poetic purpose of Persius more adequately.

According to the scholiast we should gloss *hic*: *in domo divitum*. We should think of these great ones (the *maiores*) as *canes lacessiti* who snarl at the satirist after he has lashed them with his criticisms. Every commentator, from the great Casaubon down to the present, has accepted and repeated this plausible exegesis. A few have admitted that the usage of *hic* is odd, but, with a poet as odd as Persius, the shift of viewpoint after *frigescent* stirs no deep doubts. After mentioning the homes of the great as though appealing to our imagination, the interlocutor suddenly changes his approach and, instead of *illic*, employs

¹ T. Ciresola, *La Formazione del linguaggio poetico di Persio* (Rovereto, 1953), p. 40, cites this clause as an example of 'compenetrazione delle immagini' and expands it as fol-

lows: '*hic sonat latratus caninus tam acer ut videatur littera r, quae dicitur canina*'. See also Austin's note on Quintilian 12. 9. 9.

hic in order to force the reality, the very presence, of popular disapproval upon Persius. This interpretation possesses an added merit, too, it would seem, for it serves to explain Persius' alteration of Horace's phrase. Horace said that a friend would grow cold; Persius says that the thresholds might grow cold. Why does he change the subject to *limina*? Because, it is suggested, the threshold is the place for watchdogs, and he plans to describe the rich as dogs barring the way to an unwelcome visitor, the satirist.

It is obvious, I think, that everything in the above gloss depends upon the explanation of *hic*. Undoubtedly *hic* can refer to the home of the wealthy. On the other hand, it would refer more naturally to something present throughout the conversation of Persius and his companion. We would, in fact, need to resort to no assumed shift of viewpoint if we applied *hic* to the very subject of discussion throughout the poem, namely, the nature of satire. In this case the interlocutor would be comparing the satirist, not the great, to a dog; he would be saying that the biting truth of Persius' criticism would offend many people because it would smack of the bestial savagery of a dog, not of a fellow human being. In the context of these lines, two points recommend our glossing *hic* as in *satura*: (1) We thus give *hic* a conventional meaning. (2) The metaphorical picture of the satirist as a dog coheres with the phrase *mordaci vero*, for *mordax* frequently connotes the biting dog.

As I have said, no scholar has entertained this latter interpretation. Therefore, if we challenge the considerable authority and plausibility of the first explanation, we shall be constrained to show that ours more adequately represents the true meaning of Persius. This can be done, I believe, if we remember that Persius here writes a Programme Satire, analogous to those of his predecessors, Horace and Lucilius. Fiske has demonstrated the themes common to all three satirists in their Programme poems.¹ In developing their common themes, though, both Lucilius and Horace employ a canine metaphor. Lucilius compares himself in regard to his satiric manner to a dog (*canino ritu* 1095); in the same Satire, we meet the metaphorical use of *mordet* (1025) which, as I interpret the line, is spoken by one of Lucilius' enemies and applies to the satirist's savage criticisms of people. Similarly, Horace defends himself against the charge of being a backbiter (*mordax*)² and playfully alludes to the dog-like characteristics associated with the satirist (*latraverit*).³ We cannot here go into the significance of the metaphor, except to say briefly that it represents part of the attack upon the satirist. His personal criticisms can be regarded as totally unprincipled and irresponsible,⁴ designed to hurt⁵ and therefore comparable, in their bestial purpose, to a dog's attacking of everyone at random. If, then, we infer that the interlocutor speaks of Persius, we shall be interpreting *mordax* and the canine metaphor according to the tradition founded by his predecessors. We can go beyond this, however; for two lines of Lucilius are closely associated with the very expression, canine letter. Almost every commentator

¹ G. C. Fiske, 'Lucilius: the Ars Poetica of Horace and Persius', *H.S.C.P.* xxiv (1913), 1-36. Cf. also L. R. Shero, 'The Satirist's Apologia', *Wisconsin Cl. St.* ii (1922), 148-67.

² Hor. *Serm.* 1. 4. 93.

³ Ibid. 2. 1. 85.

⁴ The irresponsibility is conveyed by the

charge that the satirist slanders others (*male dicere*). Cf. Lucilius 1016 and 1034, also Horace, *Serm.* 2. 1. 82.

⁵ In addition to the canine metaphor the satirists use the verb *laedere* to express this point. Cf. Lucilius 1035 and Horace, *Serm.* 1. 4. 78; 2. 1. 21 and 67.

on Lucilius 2 or 377¹ cites Persius 1. 109-10 as the *locus classicus* for the proper interpretation. Both lines allude to the *canina littera*, and in such a way as to bring up the familiar charge that the satirist, while telling the truth, bites and snarls at his victims like a dog.²

We know that the reading of Lucilius inspired Persius to write, and we are told that Persius actually imitates Lucilius.³ It would, therefore, seem likely that in ll. 109-10 he does not fortuitously take the same phrase as Lucilius and use it in an entirely different manner. Rather, I suggest, Persius introduces the canine letter and the canine metaphor in the same way as his predecessors, as part of the argument against satire which he, about to embark upon satire, must take into consideration. If so, we must abandon the scholiast's gloss and provide our own for *hic: in satira*.

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¹ Lucilius 2:

irritata canes quam homo quam planius
dicit.

377 r: non multum est, hoc cacosyntheton
atque canina

si lingua dico: nihil ad me, nomen hoc
illi est.

² Donatus, on Ter. *Ad.* 282, removes all possible doubts about the allusion in 2 when he says: 'irritari proprie canes dicuntur. Lucilius de littera R...' However, the exact context of 2 remains a matter of opinion. Marx argued from Persius that, if Persius imitated Lucilius at this point, it would be necessary to assume a prologue to Book 1 in the form of a dialogue. But he also assumed that the fragment, under these conditions,

would refer to the wrath of the powerful, in accordance with the scholiast of Persius: 'ea ad iram potentium hominum pertinent'. It seems to me that the scholiast has unduly influenced Marx and others, for the dog is traditionally associated with the satirist and his techniques in other passages of Lucilius and Horace. Therefore I accept the interpretation of Shero, *op. cit.*, p. 165, and of E. H. Warmington in the Loeb edition of Lucilius (cf. his lines 3-4), namely, that Lucilius designates 'the snarl of satire'.

³ Cf. the citations from the life of Persius and his scholia in Lucilius 165 and 383. Cf. also G. C. Fiske, 'Lucilius and Persius', *T.A.P.A.* xl (1909), 121-50.

THE ORIGINS OF PLATO'S PHILOSOPHER-STATESMAN¹

THE idea of the philosopher-statesman finds its first literary expression in Plato's *Republic*, where Socrates, facing the 'third wave' of criticism of his ideal State, how it can be realized in practice, declares² that it will be sufficient 'to indicate the least change that would affect a transformation into this type of government. There is one change,' he claims, 'not a small change certainly, nor an easy one, but possible.' 'Unless either philosophers become kings in their countries, or those who are now called kings and rulers come to be sufficiently inspired with a genuine desire for wisdom; unless, that is to say, political power and philosophy meet together, . . . there can be no rest from troubles for states.' In the *Republic* the idea becomes the basis of liberal 'university' studies, the pursuit of truth undertaken in the belief that though its practical application is negligible it will nevertheless provide the necessary training for those who are to occupy leading positions in the life of a society. The history of this idea, the inquiry how Plato came by it, may then claim some importance in itself, but we shall also see that it has a bearing on quite a number of the central problems of Platonic scholarship.

When Plato was an old man he wrote, in the seventh Letter, an account of the political developments that took place in Athens when he was in his twenties, how they involved his friend Socrates, and how he himself became increasingly disillusioned with the aristocratic kinsmen with whom he would naturally have been associated if he had entered politics. 'When I considered all this,' he proceeds,³ 'the more closely I studied the politicians and the constitution and practice of the city, and the older I grew, the more difficult it seemed to me to govern rightly. Nothing could be done without trustworthy friends and supporters, and these were not easy to find ready to hand—for the city was no longer organized according to the customs and institutions of our ancestors—and it was impossible to find new friends at all easily . . . with the result that though I had been full of eagerness for a political career, the sight of all this chaos made me giddy, and though I never stopped thinking how things might be improved and the constitution reformed, I postponed action, waiting for a favourable opportunity. Finally I came to the conclusion that all existing States were badly governed, and that their constitutions were incapable of reform without drastic action and a great deal of good luck. I was forced, in fact, to the conclusion that the only hope of finding justice for society or for the individual lay in true philosophy, and that mankind will have no respite from trouble until either real philosophers gain political power or politicians become by some miracle true philosophers. It was in this frame of mind that I made my first visit to Italy and Sicily.' Plato thus outlines with a singular vividness the course of his political thought, and marks its stages: the study of νόμοι and ἥθη, the eagerness for a political career, the sense of isolation attributable to the breakdown of those institutions of primitive society on which the individual could formerly have relied, the disillusionment, the

¹ The substance of this article was delivered in the form of a paper at a meeting of the Classical Association in Durham in April 1957.

² 473 b ff.

³ 325 c ff.

conviction that drastic remedies were necessary, and the final conclusion that salvation lay in the union of philosophy and practical politics. He tells us further that this conclusion was reached before his first visit to Magna Graecia at the age of forty.¹ This same process of development is, I believe, discernible in the early writings, complicated, however, there by an element omitted in the account of the seventh Letter, the personality and teaching of Socrates. The belief that philosophy and politics must be united is expressed in the Letter in terms that recall the *Republic*, but its influence is already visible in the *Gorgias*. The *Republic*, however, develops the idea in all its details and implications, being, so to speak, a sort of *catalogue raisonnée* of the studies to be followed in Plato's newly founded school of practical statesmanship, the Academy.

In what follows I shall try to trace the course of Plato's thought on the relation of philosophy to politics in the period leading up to, and immediately following, the journey to the West in 388/7. Sections I and II argue that Plato exhibits in the *Gorgias* new ideas upon the relationship of philosophy and politics, that these new ideas were Pythagorean, and that they indicate the motive for Plato's journey to Magna Graecia in 388/7. Section III explores the tradition that Pythagoras first called himself *philosophos*, and the possibility of its genuineness. In section IV I set out the course of Plato's thought on the relations of philosophy and politics, starting with the *Apology* and *Euthydemus* where he is still under strong Socratic influence, proceeding to the *Gorgias* where he is beginning to feel the compulsion of Pythagorean ideas, and concluding with the *Republic* where the full effects of direct contact with the surviving Pythagoreans in Magna Graecia are displayed. I add three appendixes which contain disconnected observations which in various ways concern the scheme of development set out in section IV. The first (A) argues that the *Phaedo*, if it is to fit the scheme, must belong to the period before the first journey. The second (B) points out, in support of the scheme, two modifications in detail between the *Gorgias* and the *Republic* which are attributable to the influence of Archytas. The last (C) attempts to show how the rivalry of the Platonic and Isocratean conceptions of the proper education for public life repeats the fifth-century debate between the Pythagoreans on the one hand and public teachers like Protagoras and Gorgias on the other.

I

Socrates says in the *Apology*:² 'Someone will wonder why I go about in private giving advice and busying myself with the concerns of others, but do not venture to come forward in public and advise the state. I will tell you why. You have heard me speak often and in many places of a divine sign from God which comes to me. . . . This is what deters me from being a politician. And rightly, as I think, for I am certain, men of Athens, that if I had engaged in politics, I should have perished long ago, and done no good either to you or to myself. And do not be offended at my telling you the truth: for the truth is that no man who opposes you or any other crowd and tries to prevent the many unjust and illegal acts which are done in the State, will save his life: he who fights for the right, if he would live even for a brief space, must have a private station not a public one.'

¹ Ibid. 324 a.

² 31 c.

These views, admittedly, are presented as the peculiar views of Socrates, but although the writer's main preoccupation is certainly to present a portrait of the individual, nevertheless, as Hackforth says,¹ 'it remains true that the work has an element of *philosophos theoria*. . . . To show what Socrates was is to show what the true philosopher ought to be.' Plato, at any rate, seems at the outset of his career as a writer to be in agreement with Socrates in separating the activities of philosopher and statesman.

At a crucial point in the argument of the *Gorgias*, which belongs to the early group of dialogues, the question at issue between Socrates and Callicles is declared to be:² 'which life is best, the one to which you invite me with all those manly pursuits of speaking in the assembly and practising rhetoric and going in for politics after the manner of you modern politicians, or this life of philosophy'. The latter had been scathingly described a few pages earlier by Callicles. Philosophy, he says, is all very well for a schoolboy, but 'when I see an elderly man still going on with philosophy and not getting rid of it, that is the person, Socrates, whom I think in need of a whipping. For, as I said just now, however well endowed he may be, he is bound to become unmanly, through shunning the centres and marts of the city, in which, as the poet said "men get them renown and glory"; he must duck down and spend the rest of his life whispering in a corner with three or four lads, and never utter anything free or high-spirited.' The idea of Socrates passing his time in unmanly seclusion is that which, with a good deal of further elaboration, produces the *phrontisterion* of the *Clouds*, and, regarded more objectively, corresponds to Xenophon's picture of Socrates occupied in discussions with his companions (*συνουσιασται*) and 'unrolling and perusing in his friends' company the treasures of the wise men of old which they have written down and bequeathed to us, and excerpting anything good they come upon'.³ Such unworldly people, Callicles adds, are at the mercy of anyone who chooses to take them to law or give them a box on the ear. *Not even* a private station will, in fact, ensure the philosopher's safety.

Socrates replies with a paradox, the motive of which would seem to be the feeling that the activities of the philosopher and the statesman should not be separate. The secluded philosopher, he claims, the man who is occupied with the task of implanting justice and removing injustice from his friends' souls, is the true *politikos*. Further, he pursues this vocation because he is aware of a transcendent order to which all human actions must conform. 'This, in my opinion, is the mark on which a man should fix his eyes through life: he should concentrate all his own or his city's efforts on this one business of providing a man who would be blessed with the needful justice and temperance, not letting one's desires go unrestrained and in one's attempts to satisfy them—an interminable trouble—leading the life of a robber' (as Callicles had recommended). 'For neither to any one of his fellow creatures can such a one be dear, nor to God; since he cannot commune with any, and where there is no communion there is no friendship. And wise men tell us, Callicles, that heaven and earth and gods and men are held together by communion and friendship, by orderliness, temperance, and justice (φασι δ' οἱ σοφοί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην); and that is the reason, my friend,

¹ *The Composition of Plato's Apology*, 1933, p. 46, n. 1.

² 500 c.

³ *Mem.* 1. 6. 14.

why they call the whole of this world by the name of order (*κόσμον*) not of disorder or dissoluteness. Now you, it seems, do not give proper attention to this, for all your cleverness, but have failed to observe the great power of geometrical equality among gods and men: you hold that self-advantage is what you ought to practise, because you neglect geometry.¹

The influx of new ideas is apparent in this passage. The Socrates of the *Apology* would not, one feels, have felt it necessary to claim to be the true statesman, and would certainly have disclaimed an interest in geometry, as he did in *meteorologia*. Geometry is indeed associated with meteorology and problems of physics by Xenophon² as a subject which Socrates thought should be pursued as far as is useful but no farther, since such speculation is vain and keeps people from more important occupations.³ The *Gorgias* too, in the passage just quoted, hints at beliefs in the reward of justice and the punishment of injustice after death; and, in the myth which concludes the dialogue, gives a detailed account of a Judgement in Hades. These beliefs, again, go beyond the agnostic position taken up by Socrates in the *Apology*. Our knowledge of the Pythagorean society⁴ and of its preoccupation with the soul, with geometry, and with politics suggests that the source of these new ideas is Pythagoras. Cicero, in the first book of the *de Republica*,⁵ faces the same problem, and gives a definite answer which we can hardly disregard. However far we may be carried by the fashion of discrediting Cicero, we must recognize that he was in a much better position for knowing the truth in this respect than we are. Tubero asks Scipio's opinion on the phenomenon of the *parhelion*. Scipio sighs for Panaetius, who has such a passion for astronomy, but declares that Socrates was even wiser than Panaetius in turning away from problems of natural philosophy. To this Tubero objects that the Platonic Socrates, even when he is discussing ethics and politics, is 'eager to introduce arithmetic, geometry, and harmony, after the manner of Pythagoras'. Scipio replies: 'what you say is quite true, but I expect you have heard, Tubero, that after the death of Socrates Plato went first to Egypt for the purpose of study, and after that to Italy and Sicily to make a thorough study of the discoveries of Pythagoras. Also, that he spent much time with Archytas of Tarentum and with Timaeus of Locri, and that he acquired the commentaries of Philolaus. Also, that since the name of Pythagoras was still well known in those regions he gave his attention to the Pythagoreans (*hominibus Pythagoreis*) and their peculiar studies. The result of this was that being devoted heart and soul to Socrates and wishing to attribute everything to him, he wove together into one fabric the charm and conversational dexterity of Socrates with the Pythagorean *mystique* and the metaphysical importance they attached to certain arts.'⁶

The dominant influence of Pythagorean ideas in Plato's developed philosophy is attested by Aristotle,⁷ and it would accordingly be natural to accept Cicero's explanation and apply it to Socrates' invocation of geometry in the *Gorgias*. The three Pythagorean 'contacts' whom Cicero names were all men

¹ 507 d-508 a.

² *Mem.* 4. 7. 2 ff.

³ i.e. moral questions, cf. Aristotle, *Met.* 1. 987^b1: 'S. disregarding the physical universe and concentrating on τὰ ἠθικά . . .'

⁴ I have tried to make a summary of this in *C.Q.*, n.s. vi. 135 ff.

⁵ 1. 10.

⁶ 'Itaque cum Socratem unice dilexisset eique omnia tribuere voluisset; leporem Socraticum subtilitatemque sermonis cum obscuritate Pythagorae et cum plurimarum artium gravitate contextuit.' For geometry and other branches of mathematics as arts, *τέχναι*, cf. Plato, *Protagoras* 318 d.

⁷ e.g. *Met.* 1. 987^a29.

eminent in studies that had their roots in Pythagorean soil, while two at least of them seem also to have played important parts in the political life of their cities. Archytas was a mathematician who was for many years ruler of Tarentum and whom Plato mentions in the seventh Letter as a friend at the time of his second journey to Magna Graecia in 367 B.C.¹ Timaeus of Locri is the Timaeus of Plato's dialogue, described there as a leading astronomer and a natural philosopher who is also a statesman.² Philolaus seems to have been a Crotoniate, probably a member of the original Pythagorean society since he is said to have fled to Thebes after the burning of the meeting house. Plato says that he there discoursed to Simmias and Cebes on the subject of suicide. Later he appears to have returned to Magna Graecia, since Cicero says that he taught Archytas and he is spoken of sometimes as a Tarentine.³ When Cicero says that Plato 'acquired the commentaries of Philolaus', it seems likely that these commentaries were records of the Pythagorean society in Philolaus' possession, since Diogenes says that 'Plato writes to Dion that he bought the Pythagorean books from Philolaus'. It would be reasonable to suppose that Plato met Philolaus at Tarentum. In general it may be said that Plato would naturally have had recourse to these three men if he was concerned to get to know more about Pythagoras and Pythagorean studies. We may now consider what information about them Plato is likely to have had before his journey; what, in short, whetted his curiosity.

II

Pythagoras appears to have been an Ionian *sophos*, with a certain reputation for teaching the immortality of the soul, who was called in, like Epimenides at Athens, to reform the religious and moral life of Croton at a critical moment in its history. He recalled the Crotoniates to simplicity of life, purified their religious observances, and finally founded, on the basis of the Ionian *andreion*, a *synedrion* of three hundred young men organized on the lines of a cult society with a code of rules, ceremonies of initiation, and an ascetic way of life, holding certain definite beliefs on the immortality of the soul and devoting themselves to the study of mathematics, in particular, geometry. Ultimately these young men became politically influential and 'brought the city under their control'.⁴

As Plato grew up at Athens in the last quarter of the fifth century it is difficult to believe that he heard nothing of this *synedrion* founded in Croton a century before, of the proliferation of such *synedria* throughout Magna Graecia, and the final reaction against their political influence which resulted in the destruction by fire of the meeting place at Croton about twenty-five to thirty years before he was born, and the flight of some members of the society to Thebes. The mention in the *Phaedo* of Philolaus' lectures at Thebes which two

¹ There is no confirmatory evidence that Plato met Archytas on his first visit, but we only know that he visited Syracuse (*Ep.* 7. 326 d), and that by chance. Some primary destination must be supposed, and there is none more likely than Tarentum. For Archytas see Diels-Kranz, I, pp. 421 ff.

² *Tim.* 20 a, 27 a. I see no good reason for following Cornford and rejecting him as an

historical character (*Plato's Cosmology*, pp. 2 f.).

³ *Crotoniate*: Diog. 8. 84. 85. *At Thebes*: Plato, *Phaedo* 61 d, e, and schol. ad loc., also Plut. *de gen. Socr.* 13, p. 583a. *Tarentine*: Vitruv. 1. 1. 16, D.L. 8. 46. Taught Archytas: Cic. *de orat.* 3. 34. 139.

⁴ The basis for these statements is argued in *C.Q.*, N.S. vi. 135 ff.

of the interlocutors, Simmias and Cebes, had attended suggests some connexion between the Pythagoreans at Thebes and Athens. Aristophanes certainly seems to have heard of the society at Croton. When, in the *Clouds*, produced when Plato was five years old, he calls the students of Socrates' *phrontisterion* 'souls',¹ makes them live and eat together,² and shows the entrant submitting to an initiation ceremony on classical lines,³ when their studies appear to embrace measurement and natural philosophy on the one hand⁴ and public speaking on the other,⁵ when statues of astronomy and geometry are found at the entrance,⁶ and when the play ends with the burning down of the house,⁷ it seems sufficiently obvious that the poet is suggesting that Socrates' circle of friends was really a Pythagorean *synedrion*. Our recognition that this was Aristophanes' aim does not, of course, lead to the conclusion that Socrates' circle of friends actually *was* a Pythagorean *synedrion*, indeed it leads to the reverse conclusion. The suggestion is one of those outrageous, explosive ideas⁸ which Aristophanes detonates, usually in the prologue, and the comic consequences of which supply material for the remainder, of his plays. The conclusion it does lead to is that the history of the Pythagorean society was common knowledge in Athens when Plato was growing up.

During this period there seem also to have been teachers at Athens who based a general training for affairs, like the Pythagoreans, on mathematical subjects. In Plato's *Protagoras* the dramatic setting of which is just before the beginning of the Peloponnesian war,⁹ Protagoras speaks (318 d) of 'those who maltreat the young, for when they have escaped from the "arts", they bring them back against their will and force them into such "arts", teaching them arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, and music—here he glanced at Hippias—but if they come to me they will learn what they have come for and nothing else, good judgement in their own affairs and in the affairs of the city, how they may have most influence on public affairs both in speech and action'. Protagoras appears to be claiming that whereas these other teachers, Hippias among them, did not teach the young men only what they had come to learn (i.e. economics and politics), but other subjects as well, he cut out these useless subjects and got straight down to practical matters—an attitude to education which must have appealed strongly to typical Athenians like Strepsiades. It is not, of course, necessary to regard Hippias as 'a Pythagorean'. He may have been one of those who, like Theodorus of Cyrene, brought Pythagorean mathematics to Athens.¹⁰ The important thing to notice is that Hippias had accepted one of the

¹ 94.² 175.⁵ e.g. 260.⁶ 201 f.³ 254 ff. See Dietrich, *Rh. Mus.* xlviii. 275 ff.⁷ 1484 ff.⁴ Measurement: 148; geometry = γῆν ἀναμετρήσαι 202 f., cf. Horace's characterization of Archytas as *maris et terrae numeroque carentis harenas mensor* in *Odes* 1. 28. 1 f.⁸ The separate peace in the *Acharnians*, Demus and his servants in the *Knights*, the imprisonment of the juryman by his son in the *Wasps*, the *Himmelfahrt* of the *Peace*, cloud-cuckooland in the *Birds*, the women's strike to end the war in the *Lysistrata*.

Natural philosophy: the things above the earth 194, 225 ff., 368 ff.; the things below the earth 188; for the form these theories could take and their connexion with τὰ μετὰ τὰ cf., e.g., Parmenides' system of *strophai*. How an account of τὰ κατὰ γῆς is connected again with an interest in the soul's fate is shown by the myth of Er. See my 'Parmenides and Er', *J.H.S.* lxxv. 59 ff.

⁹ See *C.Q.* xxxv. 7.¹⁰ It is to be observed that the four arts attributed to teachers like Hippias are the four divisions of mathematics said by Archytas (frg. 1) to be ἀδελφαί and that Plato in the *Republic* (530 d) says that the Pythagoreans regarded astronomy and music as 'brother' sciences.

original ideas of the Pythagorean society, that mathematics is the basis of a liberal education.

Hippias' principal interests are described more specifically in the *Hippias Maior*.¹ There Plato gives them as: astronomy, geometry, calculation, the meaning of letters and syllables, rhythms and harmonies. The last pair regarded as the basis of education remind us at once of the theories of Damon as they appear in the account of the primary education of the 'guardians' in Books 2 and 3 of the *Republic*. Damon must then claim our attention in this connexion.

The primary education of the guardians is 'that which long experience has worked out',² and seems to be basically that of contemporary Athenian boys. Literature is first examined, then dramatic representation; and in both cases those types are defined that are suitable for the development of a good character. Finally music comes under scrutiny, and the Dorian and Phrygian ἀρμονίαι are selected as those which 'will best express the accents of courage in the face of stern necessity and misfortune, and of temperance in prosperity won by peaceful pursuits'. Thus, Socrates points out, 'we have, without noticing it, been purging our commonwealth of that luxurious excess we said it suffered from'.³ Next after the ἀρμονίαι will come the principles governing rhythm, which will be not to aim at a great variety of metres but to discover the rhythms appropriate to a life of courage and self-control.' Glaucon confesses his inability to say 'what kind of life each rhythm is suited to express' (ποία . . . ὁποῖον βίου μὲνῆματα). Socrates replies: 'Well, we shall consult Damon on this question, which metres are expressive of meanness, insolence, frenzy, and other such evils, and which rhythms we must retain to express their opposites.'⁴

Damon, then, is the expert in the theory of the connexion of rhythms, and probably also of ἀρμονίαι, with character; and in the sections that follow there is much that must derive from him both in ideas and terminology. Later, when the question of the preservation of the good commonwealth is discussed in Book 4, and the importance is emphasized of keeping intact the system of education, there is a further reference to Damon: 'in short, then, those who keep watch over our commonwealth must take the greatest care not to overlook the least infraction of the rule against any innovation upon the established system of education either of the body or of the mind. . . . The introduction of novel fashions in music is a thing to beware of as endangering the whole fabric of society, whose most important conventions are unsettled by any revolution in that quarter. So Damon declares, and I believe him.'⁵ How this process is effected is shown a few lines later: 'the lawless spirit gains a lodgement, and spreads imperceptibly to manners and pursuits (ἡθῆ καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα); and from these with gathering force invades men's dealings with one another (τὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους συμβόλαια), and next goes on to attack the laws and the constitutions (τοὺς νόμους καὶ πολιτείας) with wanton recklessness, until it ends by overthrowing the whole structure of public and private life'. Damon's theory seems not to be confined to ἡθῆ, but to have been extended to become a theory of politics as well.

Damon is mentioned in two other dialogues of Plato. At the beginning of the *Laches*, as proof that Socrates is interested in the education of the young, Nicias mentions that Socrates recently introduced to him a music teacher for his son, 'a pupil of Agathocles, Damon, who is not only a most attractive

¹ 285 b.

² 376 e.

⁴ 400 b; cf. *ibid.* c.

³ 399 e. See below p. 205, n. 8.

⁵ 424 c.

musician but also in other respects as well as worthy a master as you could wish for young men of that age to go to school with'.¹ In the light of what we know of Damon from the *Republic* it seems clear that it was his theory of the connexion of music with character-building that makes him such an admirable teacher. That, no doubt, was the reason why Socrates recommended him. And later in the *Laches*, when Nicias equates courage and wisdom, Socrates remarks to Laches that Nicias 'has acquired this wisdom from our companion Damon, and Damon constantly associates with Prodicus, who is supposed to be the cleverest of the sophists at distinguishing terms like these'. It is interesting to observe that Damon associated with Prodicus, and that Socrates calls Damon here, as he calls Prodicus in the *Hippias Maior*,² his companion; but there is no need to suppose that they had identical interests and that Damon shared Prodicus' interest in synonyms any more than that he shared Socrates' preoccupation with 'moral definitions'. Plato does, however, definitely attribute to Damon a belief in the identity of courage and wisdom, and that is interesting as an example of the educational doctrine that learning is the true basis of moral education.

The final reference to Damon in Plato comes in the *Alcibiades*.³ 'You rush off to politics,' Socrates says to Alcibiades, 'before you have finished your education. You are not the only one: every politician does it with a few exceptions, among them perhaps your guardian Pericles.' 'Yes,' replies Alcibiades, 'he is said to have acquired his wisdom not by the light of nature but as the result of attendance with many wise men, for example, Pythocleides and Anaxagoras. And still at his present age he associates with Damon for this very purpose.' The scholiast at this point says that Pythocleides was a teacher of divine⁴ music and a Pythagorean, and that his pupil was Agathocles; that Agathocles' pupil was Lamprocles, and Lamprocles' pupil Damon. These connexions are all quite plausible. If Pericles was born soon after 500 B.C., his music teacher Pythocleides, who like Simonides and Bacchylides came from the island of Ceos, might well have been in contact with the Pythagorean society at Croton, and its theories of *mousike*. Agathocles is said elsewhere to have been Pindar's master,⁵ as well as Damon's.⁶ Lamprocles is interesting as the author of the famous hymn to Athena which is quoted by the Just Argument in the *Clouds* as the sort of thing boys sang under the good old system of education which led to sound morals.⁷ The general character of Damon's 'set' seems plain.

In his *Pericles* Plutarch writes:⁸ 'most authorities say that Pericles' teacher in music was Damon . . . but Aristotle says that he had a thorough musical training at the hands of Pythocleides.⁹ Now Damon seems to have been a first-class sophist, but to have taken cover behind the name of music, concealing his cleverness from the multitude, but he actually associated with Pericles like a masseur and trainer with an athlete in the political arena.¹⁰ He was not, however, successful in hiding behind his lyre, but was ostracized as an ambitious friend of tyranny, supplying the comic poets with a butt. At any rate Plato represented someone as inquiring of him thus: "first tell me, pray, they say you are the Cheiron who brought up Pericles?"' If Plutarch either himself had access to a comedy by a contemporary of Aristophanes which featured

¹ 180 d.² 282 c.⁷ *Clouds* 967.⁸ 4. 1.³ 118 b.⁴ σέμνης.⁹ The *Alcibiades* shows that there is no contradiction.⁵ For ref. see Schmid-Stählin, *Gesch. Gr.**Lit.* i. 1, p. 555, n. 5.⁶ *Laches* 180 d.¹⁰ τῷ δὲ Περικλεῖ συνὴν καθάπερ ἀθλητῇ τῶν πολεμικῶν ἀλείπτῃ καὶ διδάσκαλος.

Damon or used a source which had access to it, his account is valuable. The picture of Damon as Pericles' trainer is exactly in the manner of the old comedy. It is rather puzzling that Plato makes Protagoras¹ say about Agathocles and Pythocleides just what is said about Damon in Plutarch's account. Protagoras claims that the ancient art of sophistry employed various disguises, poetry, *teletai*, gymnastics, while Agathocles the Athenian² being a great sophist employed the disguise of music, and so did Pythocleides of Ceos and many others. Protagoras declares that these people do not really deceive the authorities as to their real purpose, to educate men. He has no hesitation in declaring quite openly what he is doing, educating people, and a little later he defines this education as specific training in estate management and city government. It is possible that Plutarch is just imitating the *Protagoras*³ or that the charge of 'hiding behind their music' was made in comedy against these music teachers who claimed also to be moral and political instructors, and that it is Protagoras who borrows it. In any case it seems plain that his contemporaries recognized that Damon and his associates were more than mere musicians.

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said to have been ostracized after this. The movement against the Pythagoreans in Magna Graecia took place about 450. It is possible that Anaxagoras' persecution belongs to this same period but I am inclined (see *C.Q.* xxxv [1941], p. 5, n. 2) to regard it as later and as a result of the decree of Diopithes (430).

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Pythagoreans at Athens during the first forty years of Plato's life, the sort of common knowledge which might have suggested to him that a more intimate acquaintance with them might release him from the impasse of frustration which he describes in the seventh Letter as preceding his journey to Magna Graecia. The account may be completed by two further items. Alcidas writing about Thebes at the beginning of the fourth century says: 'the chief men became philosophers and immediately the city prospered'.¹ It seems highly probable that he is referring to the effects of the arrival of the Pythagorean refugees, Philolaus and Lysis, since the latter became Epaminondas' tutor. The remark shows an awareness of the political effects of their teaching. In the second place there is a passage from Isocrates' *Busiris*. This Jebb dated to 391-390, but it is probably a little later.² The speaker gives an account of the Egyptians who 'by the priests' aid had excellent health through the practice of medicine, and in their souls exhibited the practice of philosophy which is able to lay down laws and also to investigate physical reality. And while the elders were employed on the most important affairs they persuaded the younger men to pay no attention to pleasures but to spend their time on astronomy, calculations, and geometry, which some people praise as utilitarian while others try to show that they contribute most to a good moral character.' The writer then proceeds to dilate upon the Egyptians' reverence for the gods. 'I am not the first to notice this trait. Many in present and past times have done so, including Pythagoras of Samos who came to Egypt and became a disciple of the Egyptians and was the first to introduce philosophy to the Greeks and also paid particular attention to sacrificial and purificatory matters of ritual.' The *Busiris* is a perfunctory piece of epideictic invention. Isocrates clearly has only the most superficial knowledge of either *Busiris* or Egypt. When he says that the Egyptians 'exhibited in their souls the practice of philosophy which is able both to lay down laws and to investigate the nature of physical reality' we begin to scent the quarry. When he describes the young men as being persuaded to give up pleasures and 'spend their time on astrology, calculations, and geometry', the scent is strong. But when he tells us that Pythagoras brought philosophy to Greece from Egypt, the quarry comes into full view. Isocrates has gratuitously given Egypt Pythagorean institutions, and then said that Pythagoras brought them to Greece.³ We must infer that Isocrates knew the main lines of the Pythagorean achievement, in particular their belief in the value of mathematical training for the development of political *arete*. If Plato knew at least as much as this when he wrote the *Gorgias*, and his mind was turning to an educational solution to his political frustrations, it is understandable that Socrates should be presented to us in that dialogue as the true *politikos*, and that Callicles' political immorality should be put down to his lack of a knowledge of geometry.

III

Isocrates states that Pythagoras first brought philosophy to Greece from Egypt. If we remove the part of this statement which depends on the fiction

¹ Aristotle, *Rhet.* 2. 23. 1398^b9.

² Hackforth (*The Composition of Plato's Apology*, p. 8) dates the *Busiris* in or about 388, Jebb (*The Attic Orators*, ii. 91) in 390 or

391. It certainly antedates the *Republic*.

³ The references in later literature to Pythagoras' journey to Egypt may well rest on this thinly disguised fabrication.

of the *Busiris*, we are left with the assertion that Pythagoras was the first *philosophos* in Greece. Now this is the burden of a story which Cicero quotes in the *Tusculans* from Heraclides Ponticus, and which was also vouched for by Sosicrates as we are told by Diogenes Laertius.¹ Heraclides says that Pythagoras was the first to introduce the word *philosophia*, and was the first to call himself *philosophos*. He adds that he explained to Leon, tyrant of Phlius, whom he met in that city on his way from Samos to Croton, what a *philosophos* was by the simile of the three classes of people to be found at the Games, the performers, the traders, and the spectators. Jaeger's² rejection of the story as a fabrication of the later Academy is quite unwarranted. He thinks that in the *Protrepticus* Aristotle drew a parallel between the philosopher's contemplation of reality and the sacred spectacle at Olympia; but it does not follow that Heraclides' story was a fabrication, merely that Aristotle knew the story of Pythagoras and Leon. There is no ground for Jaeger's sweeping statement: 'the Academy's cult of Pythagoras . . . was a projection of the Academy itself and its number metaphysics into the half-mythical personality of Pythagoras, whom the Platonists venerated as the founder of the theoretic life, and whom they soon freely credited with the views of their own time and school'. Pythagoras was very far from being a half-mythical personality and Isocrates at any rate knew that he was the first *philosophos*.

There are further considerations which suggest that Heraclides' story may be genuine. The characteristic of the philosopher-spectators which is emphasized proves on examination to be their superiority, not their aloofness, to the money-makers and the athletes.³ At the time of the visit to Phlius Pythagoras was an itinerant Ionian *sophos* like Xenophanes, and his claim resembles Xenophanes' assertion that his *sophia* was 'better than the strength of men and horses'.⁴ If, on the other hand, the story was fabricated in the Academy to set up Pythagoras as the founder of the theoretic life, it would have been not so much the superiority as the aloofness which the fabricator would have wanted to emphasize. He might just have done his job badly, but it must also be observed that the history of the Pythagorean society did not illustrate the aloofness of the philosopher from mundane affairs, it showed just the reverse.

If Pythagoras introduced the term *philosophos* and its cognates, one might expect that they would at the outset carry Pythagorean overtones. In fact, there are four occurrences of these words before Plato, and in none is any special sense more than a possibility. If in Heraclitus fr. 35 φιλοσόφους ἀνδρας means Pythagoreans, the remark gains point and its sense can be paralleled in two other fragments (81 and 129) where Heraclitus castigates Pythagorean *polymathia*. In Herodotus⁵ Croesus speaks of Solon's wisdom and travels, 'how thou hast traversed much ground to see the world in the pursuit of philosophy' (φιλοσοφῆων), but the word appears to mean little more than Ionian geographical inquiry. Later Solon's *philosophia* takes on a more Pythagorean tinge when Xenophon speaks of the *philosophia* which enabled him to lay down the best laws for his country,⁶ so that it is just possible that Herodotus uses the word anachronistically in a Pythagorean sense. The writer of the fifth-century

¹ Cic. *Tusc.* 5. 3. 8, Her. Pont. fr. 88 Wehrli; Diog. Laert. 8. 8.

² Aristotle, Eng. tr., pp. 97 f.

³ The spectators are 'genus . . . maxime ingenium'. Again 'ut illic liberalissimum

esset spectare nihil sibi adquirentem, sic in vita longe omnibus studiis contemplationem rerum cognitionemque praestare'.

⁴ D.-K. B 2. 11-12.

⁵ 1. 30. 2.

⁶ *Symp.* 8. 39.

Hippocratic tract the *Ancient Medicine*¹ says that certain doctors and *sophistai* assert that you cannot understand medicine until you know what man is, *τείνει δὲ αὐτοῖσιν ὁ λόγος εἰς φιλοσοφίην*. The word here certainly seems to mean, not the mere pursuit of *ιστορία περὶ φύσεως* but its pursuit as the background to something else. The philosopher-doctor is analogous to the philosopher-politician. With the last of this series, Pericles' famous claim *φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας*,² we are plunged into the middle of the great Athenian debate about the new higher education. The argument starts for us with the *Daitaleis* of Aristophanes,³ and continues with the *agon* between the Just and the Unjust Logos in the *Clouds*. The students of the *phrontisterion* are certainly presented as *μαλακοί*,⁴ and Callicles in the *Gorgias* rebukes Socrates for the unmanliness of his life of philosophy,⁵ while Plato and Xenophon both leap to Socrates' defence on this charge.⁶ The debate seems a domestic Athenian one, and in it *philosophia* means the pursuit of any of the various forms of higher education.

IV

If, as seems unlikely, any Pythagorean colour still attached to the word *philosophia* and its cognates by the last quarter of the fifth century, it is clear that for Plato it would have been obliterated by the vivid personal experience he had of Socrates, whom he makes declare in the *Apology*⁷ that God had enjoined him to live a life of philosophy, examining himself and others, and that he could not disobey. It seems probable that Socrates called himself a *philosophos*, though we cannot be certain. At first sight it seems odd that neither he nor his disciples are called *philosophoi* in the *Clouds*, but the word has probably been displaced by jokes like *ψυχαί* and *μεριμνοσοφισταί*. The *Apology* and the early and middle dialogues of Plato, supported by a careful use of comedy and Xenophon, leave us in no real doubt about Socrates' character, methods, and beliefs. He is exhibited discussing the various aspects of *arete*, and employing a technique of conversation which could be described as verbal midwifery; he used everyday images, and was directed to 'the care of the soul'. We can well believe with Aristotle⁸ that *ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι* and general definitions are all that can properly be attributed to him. If, when he adopted the name *philosophia* for his own vocation, it implied anything specific, this must have been quickly dissipated for himself and his associates, though not necessarily for his contemporaries,⁹ by the highly idiomatic style he developed. Xenophon is no doubt right to describe him as discussing political subjects,¹⁰ but the *Euthydemus*, which was probably written about 390, shows how far Socrates was from the idea of the philosopher-statesman.¹¹ Crito mentions an anonymous critic of the Socratic *philosophia* as it has been displayed in the preceding debate between the two experts Euthydemus and Dionysodorus on the one hand and Socrates on the other. This critic is described as one who was not a speaker and had never appeared in a law-court, but was said to be a real expert in the business (i.e. presumably, public affairs) and a clever man, and to compose clever *logoi*.

¹ 20. See below, p. 216.

² Thuc. 2. 40. 1.

³ e.g. fr. 237 *ἐφύχρουντ' ἑσάμεν*.

⁴ They are pale creatures whom Pheidipides could never join if he is to look his fellow knights in the face again (119-20).

⁵ 485 d.

⁶ e.g. Plato, *Symp.* 219 e; Xen. *Mem.* 1. 2.

⁷ 28 c.

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⁹ Met. M 1078^b27.

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said to have been ostracized after this. The movement against the Pythagoreans in Magna Graecia took place about 450. It is possible that Anaxagoras' persecution belongs to this same period but I am inclined (see *C.Q.* xxxv [1941], p. 5, n. 2) to regard it as later and as a result of the decree of Dio-pithes (430).

⁸ The application of Damon's theories in the *Republic* leads to reform of the unregenerate primitive society. It has always seemed to me strange that Plato should go through the process of reforming a society which he had only just, so to speak, created. The explanation may be that Damon, like Pythagoras, presented his theories as methods of reform.

Pythagoreans at Athens during the first forty years of Plato's life, the sort of common knowledge which might have suggested to him that a more intimate acquaintance with them might release him from the impasse of frustration which he describes in the seventh Letter as preceding his journey to Magna Graecia. The account may be completed by two further items. Alcidas writing about Thebes at the beginning of the fourth century says: 'the chief men became philosophers and immediately the city prospered'.¹ It seems highly probable that he is referring to the effects of the arrival of the Pythagorean refugees, Philolaus and Lysis, since the latter became Epaminondas' tutor. The remark shows an awareness of the political effects of their teaching. In the second place there is a passage from Isocrates' *Busiris*. This Jebb dated to 391-390, but it is probably a little later.² The speaker gives an account of the Egyptians who 'by the priests' aid had excellent health through the practice of medicine, and in their souls exhibited the practice of philosophy which is able to lay down laws and also to investigate physical reality. And while the elders were employed on the most important affairs they persuaded the younger men to pay no attention to pleasures but to spend their time on astronomy, calculations, and geometry, which some people praise as utilitarian while others try to show that they contribute most to a good moral character.' The writer then proceeds to dilate upon the Egyptians' reverence for the gods. 'I am not the first to notice this trait. Many in present and past times have done so, including Pythagoras of Samos who came to Egypt and became a disciple of the Egyptians and was the first to introduce philosophy to the Greeks and also paid particular attention to sacrificial and purificatory matters of ritual.' The *Busiris* is a perfunctory piece of epideictic invention. Isocrates clearly has only the most superficial knowledge of either *Busiris* or Egypt. When he says that the Egyptians 'exhibited in their souls the practice of philosophy which is able both to lay down laws and to investigate the nature of physical reality' we begin to scent the quarry. When he describes the young men as being persuaded to give up pleasures and 'spend their time on astrology, calculations, and geometry', the scent is strong. But when he tells us that Pythagoras brought philosophy to Greece from Egypt, the quarry comes into full view. Isocrates has gratuitously given Egypt Pythagorean institutions, and then said that Pythagoras brought them to Greece.³ We must infer that Isocrates knew the main lines of the Pythagorean achievement, in particular their belief in the value of mathematical training for the development of political *arete*. If Plato knew at least as much as this when he wrote the *Gorgias*, and his mind was turning to an educational solution to his political frustrations, it is understandable that Socrates should be presented to us in that dialogue as the true *politikos*, and that Callicles' political immorality should be put down to his lack of a knowledge of geometry.

III

Isocrates states that Pythagoras first brought philosophy to Greece from Egypt. If we remove the part of this statement which depends on the fiction

¹ Aristotle, *Rhet.* 2. 23. 1398^b9.

² Hackforth (*The Composition of Plato's Apology*, p. 8) dates the *Busiris* in or about 388, Jebb (*The Attic Orators*, ii. 91) in 390 or

391. It certainly antedates the *Republic*.

³ The references in later literature to Pythagoras' journey to Egypt may well rest on this thinly disguised fabrication.

of the *Busiris*, we are left with the assertion that Pythagoras was the first *philosophos* in Greece. Now this is the burden of a story which Cicero quotes in the *Tusculans* from Heraclides Ponticus, and which was also vouched for by Sosicrates as we are told by Diogenes Laertius.¹ Heraclides says that Pythagoras was the first to introduce the word *philosophia*, and was the first to call himself *philosophos*. He adds that he explained to Leon, tyrant of Phlius, whom he met in that city on his way from Samos to Croton, what a *philosophos* was by the simile of the three classes of people to be found at the Games, the performers, the traders, and the spectators. Jaeger's² rejection of the story as a fabrication of the later Academy is quite unwarranted. He thinks that in the *Protrepticus* Aristotle drew a parallel between the philosopher's contemplation of reality and the sacred spectacle at Olympia; but it does not follow that Heraclides' story was a fabrication, merely that Aristotle knew the story of Pythagoras and Leon. There is no ground for Jaeger's sweeping statement: 'the Academy's cult of Pythagoras . . . was a projection of the Academy itself and its number metaphysics into the half-mythical personality of Pythagoras, whom the Platonists venerated as the founder of the theoretic life, and whom they soon freely credited with the views of their own time and school'. Pythagoras was very far from being a half-mythical personality and Isocrates at any rate knew that he was the first *philosophos*.

There are further considerations which suggest that Heraclides' story may be genuine. The characteristic of the philosopher-spectators which is emphasized proves on examination to be their superiority, not their aloofness, to the money-makers and the athletes.³ At the time of the visit to Phlius Pythagoras was an itinerant Ionian *sophos* like Xenophanes, and his claim resembles Xenophanes' assertion that his *sophia* was 'better than the strength of men and horses'.⁴ If, on the other hand, the story was fabricated in the Academy to set up Pythagoras as the founder of the theoretic life, it would have been not so much the superiority as the aloofness which the fabricator would have wanted to emphasize. He might just have done his job badly, but it must also be observed that the history of the Pythagorean society did not illustrate the aloofness of the philosopher from mundane affairs, it showed just the reverse.

If Pythagoras introduced the term *philosophos* and its cognates, one might expect that they would at the outset carry Pythagorean overtones. In fact, there are four occurrences of these words before Plato, and in none is any special sense more than a possibility. If in Heraclitus fr. 35 *φιλοσόφους ἀνδρας* means Pythagoreans, the remark gains point and its sense can be paralleled in two other fragments (81 and 129) where Heraclitus castigates Pythagorean *polymathia*. In Herodotus⁵ Croesus speaks of Solon's wisdom and travels, 'how thou hast traversed much ground to see the world in the pursuit of philosophy' (*φιλοσοφείων*), but the word appears to mean little more than Ionian geographical inquiry. Later Solon's *philosophia* takes on a more Pythagorean tinge when Xenophon speaks of the *philosophia* which enabled him to lay down the best laws for his country,⁶ so that it is just possible that Herodotus uses the word anachronistically in a Pythagorean sense. The writer of the fifth-century

¹ Cic. *Tusc.* 5. 3. 8, Her. Pont. fr. 88 Wehrli; Diog. Laert. 8. 8.

² Aristotle, Eng. tr., pp. 97 f.

³ The spectators are 'genus . . . maxime ingenuum'. Again 'ut illic liberalissimum

esset spectare nihil sibi adquirentem, sic in vita longe omnibus studiis contemplationem rerum cognitionemque praestare'.

⁴ D.-K. B 2. 11-12.

⁵ 1. 30. 2.

⁶ *Symp.* 8. 39.

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Hippocratic tract the *Ancient Medicine*¹ says that certain doctors and *sophistai* assert that you cannot understand medicine until you know what man is, *τείνει δὲ αὐτοῖσιν ὁ λόγος εἰς φιλοσοφίην*. The word here certainly seems to mean, not the mere pursuit of *ιστορία περὶ φύσεως* but its pursuit as the background to something else. The philosopher-doctor is analogous to the philosopher-politician. With the last of this series, Pericles' famous claim *φιλοσοφοῦμεν ὦνεν μαλακίας*,² we are plunged into the middle of the great Athenian debate about the new higher education. The argument starts for us with the *Daitaleis* of Aristophanes,³ and continues with the *agon* between the Just and the Unjust Logos in the *Clouds*. The students of the *phrontisterion* are certainly presented as *μαλακοί*,⁴ and Callicles in the *Gorgias* rebukes Socrates for the unmanliness of his life of philosophy,⁵ while Plato and Xenophon both leap to Socrates' defence on this charge.⁶ The debate seems a domestic Athenian one, and in it *philosophia* means the pursuit of any of the various forms of higher education.

IV

If, as seems unlikely, any Pythagorean colour still attached to the word *philosophia* and its cognates by the last quarter of the fifth century, it is clear that for Plato it would have been obliterated by the vivid personal experience he had of Socrates, whom he makes declare in the *Apology*⁷ that God had enjoined him to live a life of philosophy, examining himself and others, and that he could not disobey. It seems probable that Socrates called himself a *philosophos*, though we cannot be certain. At first sight it seems odd that neither he nor his disciples are called *philosophoi* in the *Clouds*, but the word has probably been displaced by jokes like *ψυχαί* and *μεριμνοσοφισταί*. The *Apology* and the early and middle dialogues of Plato, supported by a careful use of comedy and Xenophon, leave us in no real doubt about Socrates' character, methods, and beliefs. He is exhibited discussing the various aspects of *arete*, and employing a technique of conversation which could be described as verbal midwifery; he used everyday images, and was directed to 'the care of the soul'. We can well believe with Aristotle⁸ that *ἐπακτικοὶ λόγοι* and general definitions are all that can properly be attributed to him. If, when he adopted the name *philosophia* for his own vocation, it implied anything specific, this must have been quickly dissipated for himself and his associates, though not necessarily for his contemporaries,⁹ by the highly idiomatic style he developed. Xenophon is no doubt right to describe him as discussing political subjects,¹⁰ but the *Euthydemus*, which was probably written about 390, shows how far Socrates was from the idea of the philosopher-statesman.¹¹ Crito mentions an anonymous critic of the Socratic *philosophia* as it has been displayed in the preceding debate between the two experts Euthydemus and Dionysodorus on the one hand and Socrates on the other. This critic is described as one who was not a speaker and had never appeared in a law-court, but was said to be a real expert in the business (i.e. presumably, public affairs) and a clever man, and to compose clever *logoi*.

¹ 20. See below, p. 216.

² Thuc. 2. 40. 1.

³ e.g. fr. 237 *ἐψυχρολουτήσαμεν*.

⁴ They are pale creatures whom Pheidipides could never join if he is to look his fellow knights in the face again (119-20).

⁵ 485 d.

⁶ e.g. Plato, *Symp.* 219 c; Xen. *Mem.* 1. 2.

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⁷ 28 c.

⁸ *Met.* M 1078^b27.

⁹ e.g. the *Clouds*.

¹⁰ *Mem.* 1. 1. 16.

¹¹ 304 d ff.

'Now I understand', says Socrates, 'it was of these people that I was just going to speak myself. They are the people whom Prodicus described as the border-ground between philosopher and politician, yet they fancy that they are the wisest of mankind, and that they not merely are but are thought so by a great many people; and accordingly they feel that it is only the followers of philosophy (alone) who stand in the way of their universal renown. . . . For they consider themselves to be in very truth the wisest, but find that caught in private conversation they are cut off short by Euthydemus and his like. This concern of theirs is very natural, since they regard themselves as moderately versed in philosophy, moderately too in politics, on quite reasonable grounds: for they have dipped in to both as far as they needed, and, evading all the risk and struggle, are content to gather the fruits of wisdom.'¹ Taylor is certainly right in rejecting the simple identification of this critic with Isocrates.² It is quite likely, as many have thought, that Plato has Isocrates and his brand of *philosophia* at the back of his mind, but since Isocrates would have been only 17 years old at the dramatic date of the dialogue I find it hard to believe that when he takes so much pains to make the reference to Isocrates in the *Phaedrus*³ chronologically acceptable he should have no such scruples here. Admittedly he names no one, but I do not believe that he would have made the reference at all unless he knew that there were people in Athens at the time of the Archidamian war who satisfied the description. It is not clear what kind of higher education is covered by 'philosophy': it might have been eristic, or Prodicus' own preoccupations, or Hippias' and Antiphon's scientific and mathematical interests; the last-named also composed political *logoi*,⁴ and may have been the person under reference.

The implied conclusion of the *Euthydemus* is an unresolved paradox, which reflects Plato's frustration. The only way to become a statesman is not to become a statesman, or even to mix philosophy with statesmanship, but to devote one's life to the discovery of true moral values through the Socratic *philosophia*. At the climax of the *Gorgias* the paradox is stated. Socrates claims that he is the true *politikos*, spending his life as he does in the tendance of his own and his friends' souls, so that justice may be implanted in them and injustice removed. In the *Gorgias*, however, as I have suggested, the influence of Pythagorean ideas on Plato begins to be felt. To use Cicero's words, he was beginning to combine the charm and conversational dexterity of Socrates with the Pythagorean *mystique* and their emphasis on geometry and other 'arts'. Socrates appeals to the wise men who 'say that heaven and earth and gods and men are held together by communion and friendship'. It transpires that this bond is a numerical one, the progression known as the geometric (2:4:8:16:32). Callicles is selfish, anti-social, because he 'neglects geometry'.⁵ This is indeed the Pythagorean *mystique* and an unusual degree of importance to be attached to geometry.

We shall never know the exact circumstances which caused Plato's thoughts

¹ Tr. W. R. M. Lamb; Loeb ed.

² *Plato the Man and His Work*, p. 101. He suggests Antiphon.

³ *Phaedrus* 278 e.

⁴ See Thucydides 8. 68. 1: in particular the phrase *κράτιστος ἐνθυμηθῆναι γενόμενος* καὶ ἂ γνώη εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐς μὲν δῆμον οὐ παριών

οὐδ' ἐς ἄλλον ἀγῶνα ἐκούσιος οὐδένα, which seems to find an echo in Euthydemus: ἡκιστα νῆ τὸν Δία ῥήτωρ, οὐδὲ οἶμαι πόποτ' αὐτὸν ἐπὶ δικαστήριον ἀναβεβηκέναι· ἀλλ' ἐπαίειν αὐτὸν φασὶ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος νῆ τὸν Δία καὶ δεινὸν εἶναι καὶ δεινούς λόγους συντιθεῖναι.

⁵ 508 a.

to turn to Pythagoreanism. There may have been some contact with the Pythagorean centres at Phlius and Thebes. Or it may have been that the thwarted political ambitions which he speaks of in the seventh Letter, temporarily set at rest by the powerful impact of the Socratic *philosophia*, had begun to stir again. We may perhaps guess that he had heard of the successful philosopher-statesman Archytas. At any rate we can see that by the time he wrote the *Gorgias* he knew enough about the Pythagoreans for it to be reasonable for us to accept the motive Cicero gives for his journey to Italy 'to make a thorough study of the discoveries of Pythagoras'. When he arrived in Italy, Cicero tells us, he met Archytas and Timaeus, acquired from Philolaus, who was probably then at Tarentum, certain records of the Pythagorean society, 'and gave his attention to the remaining companions of Pythagoras and to their peculiar studies'.

In the seventh Letter Plato recalls that he had been held back from political life by the feeling that nothing could be done without trustworthy friends and supporters. The social institutions of archaic Greek society would, Plato seems to have realized, have provided him with a natural *hetaireia*, his age-group (*ὁμηλικίη*), just as they provided Telemachus with oarsmen in his time of need.¹ In Croton it appears that Pythagoras had brought in the institutions of the old world to reform the new, and formed his society of young men on just these ancient foundations recreated with a conscious archaism. The old Ionian common meals of the *neoi* had been the occasion for poets to exercise their *sophia* as the educators of adult men. In Croton the new *sophos* developed a new *paideia* based largely on mathematics and issuing in political action. In this institution Plato clearly found the solution to his problem. It was a drastic solution indeed, more drastic than the Socratic *politike*, in which the individual 'cared for' the souls of his pupils, one or two at a time. The drawback to the Socratic *politike* had been its ineffectiveness, the fatal isolation and vulnerability of the *politikos*. It is true that the Pythagorean *synedria* had run into trouble in the end, but they had achieved much and enjoyed a long period of ascendancy, and Archytas remained as a surviving example of a successful Pythagorean statesman. Plato's contact with the surviving Pythagoreans seems to have convinced him that something like the Crotonian *synedrion* would provide 'the trustworthy friends and supporters' necessary for successful political reform.

It is at any rate certain that shortly after his return from Italy he founded the Academy, an institution which took the form of a *thiasos* devoted to the worship of the Muses, as the Crotonian *synedrion* may have been,² and 'designed primarily as a training school for practical statesmen'. At about the same time he wrote the *Republic*, to expound a theory of justice as the bond which under ideal conditions holds together the three parts of the soul in the individual man, and the three classes in the city, in such a way that the rational part rules. The bond which holds together the *cosmos* of soul and state is, however, no longer the geometric progression as in the *Gorgias*, but a numerical bond of the same general kind, the harmonic progression. The change is significant, and I shall revert to it in an appendix.

¹ *Od.* 3. 363-4.

² There is much to connect Pythagoras at Croton with the worship of the Muses (see C.Q. N.S. vi. 145 f.). There is no direct evidence that the *synedrion* met in the *Mou-*

seion but it is not unlikely. Boyancé, *La Culte des Muses chez les Philosophes Grecs*, pp. 237 f., argues that it did. For the Muses in the Academy see Boyancé, *op. cit.*, pp. 248 ff.

The central part of the *Republic* is concerned with the higher education of the philosophic guardians, the rational part of the ideal city. The subjects which are to produce the true philosophic rulers are: arithmetic, plane and solid geometry, astronomy, and harmonics—just those subjects in fact which we associate with the Pythagorean *paideia*—and finally dialectic, the coping-stone of the rest, which is not Pythagorean at all but inserted as recognition of the pre-eminence of the Socratic discipline.¹ The table displays the reconciliation which Plato was able to effect, at any rate in the sphere of metaphysics, between his two masters. In the sphere of politics, however, it was not a case of reconciliation. The Socratic doctrine of the *Apology* that 'he who would fight for the right must have a private station, not a public one'² has been replaced by the conclusion that 'there is one change, not a small one certainly, nor an easy one, but possible, that philosophers become kings in their countries, or kings philosophers'.³ Immediately before the passage in Book 6 in which the possibility of philosophic rule is set out, Plato gives us a passage in which the two attitudes, the old and the new, are put side by side:⁴

'One who has joined the small company of philosophers and tasted the happiness that is their portion; who has watched the frenzy of the multitude and seen that there is no soundness in the conduct of public life, nowhere an ally at whose side a champion of justice could hope to escape destruction; but that like a man fallen among wild beasts, if he should refuse to take part in their misdeeds and could not hold out alone against the fury of all, he would be destined, before he could be of any service to his country or his friends, to perish, having done no good to himself or to anyone else—one who has weighed all this keeps quiet and goes his own way, like the traveller who takes shelter under a wall from a driving storm of dust and hail; and seeing lawlessness spreading on all sides, is content if he can keep his hands clean from iniquity while this life lasts, and when the end comes take his departure, with good hopes, in serenity and peace.'⁵

'Surely, said Adeimantus, that would be no small achievement.

'Yes; but far less than he might achieve, if his lot were cast in a society congenial to his nature, where he could grow to his full height and save his country as well as himself.'

The last sentence looks like the outcome of his journey to Italy, and the experience he had there found of societies directed by philosophic statesmen. By drastic treatment, and good luck, society could after all be reformed.

APPENDIX A

The date of the Phaedo

The conclusion that the founding of the Academy and the writing of the *Republic* are the direct outcome of the visit to Italy has a certain bearing on the date of the composition of the *Phaedo*.

¹ 522 c-531 d.

² 31 c ff.

³ 473 b.

⁴ Trs. by Cornford.

⁵ Cornford notes (in his translation): 'this last sentence alludes to the position of Plato himself, after he had renounced his early

hopes of a political career and withdrawn to his task of training philosopher-statesmen in the Academy.' I do not agree. The position described is that of Plato before he was brought to feel that he could realize his political ambitions through the Academy.

The dialogue is related by Phaedo of Elis to the Pythagorean Echecrates of Phlius, and Socrates' chief interlocutors are Simmias and Cebes, who have listened to lectures by Philolaus at Thebes on the subject of suicide. After the *Gorgias* it marks a further state in the permeation of Plato's thought by Pythagorean ideas. While earlier, in contrast to the agnosticism of the *Apology*,¹ Socrates in the *Meno*² has accepted the immortality of the soul as 'the doctrine of certain priests and priestesses who are concerned with such matters' and argues for it on the basis of the theory of *anamnesis*, in the *Phaedo* he is represented as spending his last hours in trying to impart to his friends his faith that 'after death a man will, as in life, be under the care of good and wise gods, and, perhaps, in the company of the best men of the past'.³ The main subject of the dialogue is, then, the most famous of the Pythagorean doctrines, and one for which Pythagoras seems to have been famous before he reached Italy.⁴

In the introduction to his recent translation and commentary, Hackforth suggests that 'it is not unreasonable to believe that the *Phaedo* was written after Plato's return from Magna Graecia but before he founded the Academy, in the interval when Plato was still repelled from active participation in politics, and had not yet thought of a solution of his personal problem in which his personal and political interests might be fruitfully combined'. He places the *Phaedo* after the journey to Italy because he feels that the development of the theory of Forms in the *Phaedo* was due to his direct acquaintance with the Pythagorean mathematicians, in particular Archytas. This latter argument does not seem to carry much weight. Higher mathematics, astronomy, geometry, and the theory of numbers were all the subject of lectures at Athens at the close of the fifth century. If Plato was to be drawn 'to the fixity of mathematical objects and mathematical truths as against the impermanence of sensibles and of propositions about them', this experience could as well have been his in the lecture rooms of Hippias and Theodorus at Athens as in the company of Archytas at Tarentum. The *Phaedo* may well have been completed before the journey. The Pythagorean connexions in the dialogue are all mainland ones, with Phlius and Thebes. If he had written it after his journey, is he not likely to have given it a west Greek setting, or at any rate to have given it west Greek connexions? I find it difficult to believe that if he came back from Italy with his mind full of the ideas which produced the *Republic* he should have sat down to write the *Phaedo*. If the arguments I have been putting forward are accepted, it follows that the *Phaedo* must be placed with the *Gorgias* in a period before the journey when Plato had begun to be influenced by Pythagorean ideas introduced to Athens by teachers like Damon and Hippias, and also emanating from the Pythagoreans at Phlius and Thebes.

APPENDIX B

Archytas and Plato

I noticed, when the theory of justice or social order put forward in the *Republic* was being considered, that it differed from the theory mentioned briefly in the *Gorgias*. In the latter dialogue the formula which is the basis of the social and physical order is the geometric⁵ proportion, progression or mean, 2:4:8.

¹ 40 c f.

² 63 b.

³ 81 a.

⁴ See C.Q. N.S. vi. 137.

⁵ It may have been called geometric be-

cause the simplest example of it, 2:4:8:16, exhibits the series of line, square, cube, double-cube.

The series is called in Greek an *ισότης* or equality because it represents a fair system of what we should call differentials between powers which are not in fact equal. In the geometric proportion the difference between one power and the next is similar, four is twice two, eight is twice four, and so on. Such an equitable system of differentials is regarded as a bond, because it does hold together the different powers in a numerical system or framework. In the case of the simple arithmetical progression 2:4:6 the difference between one power and the next is also the same, four is two more than two, six is two more than four. The superiority of the geometrical progression as a basis for social order lies in its greater fairness. Whereas in the arithmetical progression the differential was the same (i.e. in our example two) whatever the power of the terms might be, in the case of the geometrical progression the differential ('twice') although in one sense the same is nevertheless absolutely greater in proportion to the power of the terms (i.e. four is twice two, and eight is twice four, but the differential is two in the case of the lower pair of terms and four in the case of the higher pair). This application of a mathematical formula to politics is exactly in the Pythagorean manner, and in view of the early society's preoccupation with geometry we can have little hesitation in regarding it as part of the doctrine of the first Pythagoreans which had found its way to Athens.

The bond of unity in the *Republic* is the harmonic *isotes*. As *sophrosyne*, 'the agreement of the better and the worse parts as to which must rule both in the city and in the individual' it is described in terms of a musical harmony.¹ As *dikaiosyne*, the bond of unity of the soul, which is the pattern of the larger unity of the city,² is described as follows: the just man 'sets his house in order, by self-mastery and discipline coming to be at peace with himself, and bringing into tune those three parts like the terms in the proportion of a musical scale, the highest and the lowest notes, and the mean between them, with all the intermediate intervals'. The numerical relationship of the highest (*hypate*), middle (*mesē*), and lowest (*nete*) notes in the scale may be set out as the progression 6:8:12. Eight is the harmonic mean between six and twelve, i.e. eight exceeds the first term, six, by two, and eight is exceeded by the last term, twelve, by four: the similarity of the differential lying in the fact that two (by which the first term is exceeded by the second) is the same proportion of the first term, as four (by which the last term exceeds the second) is a proportion of the last term, the proportion being in both cases a third ($2/6$, $4/12$). From the Pythagorean point of view this bond of unity was even more desirable than the geometric proportion, since it recognizes merit to an even greater degree, i.e. the bigger the term the absolute interval between it and the next beneath it is even larger than in the geometric, and its connexion with music no doubt recommended it as well. Now we are told that Pythagoras discovered the theory of means,³ and knew of three, the arithmetic, geometric, and sub-contrary, but that the third was named harmonic by Archytas and Hippasus.⁴ In a fragment of Archytas' work on music the three proportions are defined and the third is described as 'the sub-contrary which we call harmonic'. These facts

¹ 431 d ff.

² In Cicero's *Commonwealth* the only duty of the philosophic *rector* is to produce harmony in the state through imitation of himself. The whole passage *De Rep.* 2. 42 is an excellent commentary on the ideas we

have been considering.

³ Heath, *Greek Mathematics*, pp. 84 f. The accepted text of Proclus (on Eucl. 1. 65. 19) is now *τὴν τῶν ἀνὰ λόγον πραγματείαν*.

⁴ Iamblichus in *Nicom.* 100. 19 ff.

suggest very strongly that Plato's acquaintance with Archytas was the cause of his adoption of the harmonic proportion as the bond of unity in soul and state in the *Republic*. Not only did he employ the name harmonic among the first, but in a work on mathematics he gives an interesting account of the social application of such *logismoi*, or systems of differentials: 'a formula once found stops party strife and increases concord. For when the formula is accepted there is no aggression but a state of equality (*isotes*).¹ We may compare this with what Plato says of *sophrosyne* in the *Republic*:² 'extending throughout the whole gamut of the State it produces a consonance of all its elements from the weakest to the strongest as measured by any standard you like to take—wisdom, bodily strength, numbers, or wealth'.

It may be possible to identify a further debt which Plato owes to his meeting with Archytas on his first visit to Italy. In the *Gorgias* Plato gives a traditional account of 'the things beneath the earth' and the soul's fate there³, the sort of story he is likely to have learnt from 'the priests and priestesses who are concerned with such matters' whom he mentioned in the *Meno*.⁴ In the *Phaedo* a traditional underworld is combined rather incongruously with a virtually spherical earth.⁵ But in the Myth of Er we have a number of new elements. The route to the Isles of the Blest is replaced by the *chasmata* in the heavens, through one of which the souls go up soiled from their earthly life, and through the other they come down from the heavens 'clean and purified' and 'having seen sights of inexpressible beauty'.⁶ Plato seems to have in mind here the procession of souls which he subsequently describes so vividly in the *Phaedrus*.⁷ It is the route *ἀνω διὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ*, in the words of the *Republic*, or *ἀκρὰν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπουράνιον ἀψίδα . . . πρὸς ἄναγες*, as the *Phaedrus* puts it. On the route the souls have the purifying vision of *τὰ ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ*, the 'sights of inexpressible beauty' in 'the place above the heavens'.

It seems possible that the innovation of the heavenly journey is due to Archytas. In the first book of the *Odes* (28) Horace addresses Archytas and says: 'nec quidquam tibi prodest aeras tentasse domos animoque rotundum percurrisse polum morituro'. 'You are going to die, Archytas, and it is no help to you that you tried to reach the mansions of the sky, and in soul traversed the dome of heaven.' It is usual to translate *animo* as 'mind' and suppose that Horace is presenting a vivid picture of Archytas, like Newton, 'voyaging o'er strange seas of thought' in astronomy. But the context is against this interpretation. Astronomy imparts no hopes of immortality, whereas accounts of the soul's fate after death have this purpose. The three lines or so before the passage quoted, in which Archytas is described as 'measurer of the sea and earth and of the infinite sand', have their own point. Although he is this, yet 'a small tribute of a little dust near the shore at Matinum confines' him. The argument is not: 'in spite of being a great mathematician and astronomer he is nevertheless dead', but rather: 'in spite of his measurements of the immensely great and infinitely numerous his mortal remains take up little space and require a small amount of dust to cover them; in spite of his theories of the journey

the other to Tartarus'.

¹ D-K. 47 B 3.

² 431 d.

⁴ 81 a.

⁵ Cf. 110 b and 112 c.

³ The three judges, Minos, Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus, 'will give judgement in the meadow at the cross-roads from which lead the two roads, one to the isles of the Blest,

⁶ 614 c-615 a. See my 'Parmenides and Er', *J.H.S.* lxxv (1955), 65 f.

⁷ 246 e, f.

of the soul over the vault of heaven and its vision of mansions of the sky he was doomed to die and enjoy no immortality'. As he says in lines 15-16, 'but a common night awaiteth every man, and death's path must be trodden once and for all (*semel*, i.e. there is no reincarnation)'.

APPENDIX C

The Platonic and Isocratean philosophia

In the *Phaedrus*,¹ writing after the foundation of the *Academy*, Plato contrasts his conception of *philosophia* with the training for public life given by the schools of rhetoric. We have already noticed the passage in the *Ancient Medicine*² which contains one of the pre-Platonic usages of the word *philosophia*. Some people, the author says, insist that the study of medicine must be preceded by the knowledge *ὅ τι ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος*, but such treatment *τείνει εἰς φιλοσοφίην*. Plato seems to refer to this passage in the *Phaedrus*, when, answering Phaedrus' question how can one attain the art of the true rhetorician, Socrates declares that he is not surprised that Pericles became the most finished exponent of rhetoric there ever was: *πάσαι ὅσαι μεγάλαι τῶν τεχνῶν προσδέονται ἀδολεσχίας καὶ μετεωρολογίας φύσεως πέρι*. From the study of *physis* alone can come mental elevation (*τὸ ὑψηλονοῦν τοῦτο*) and a thoroughly finished execution. Pericles came across the right man in Anaxagoras, and 'enriching himself with *meteorologia* and coming to recognize the nature of wisdom and folly—on which topics of course Anaxagoras was always discoursing—he drew from that source and applied to the art of rhetoric what was suitable thereto'. Socrates then proceeds to compare rhetoric and medicine, the one concerned with the soul, the other with the body, and notes that if we are to believe Hippocrates we cannot understand the nature of the body without understanding the nature of body in general (that is to say, in the words of the *Ancient Medicine*, *ὅ τι ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος*). And that treatment (*logos*) *τείνει εἰς φιλοσοφίην*. What Socrates is saying is that the philosopher-statesman is like the philosopher-doctor, in so far as both base their *technē* upon *physis*. This is the veritable Pythagorean idea, and is remote from the true Socratic attitude of the *Euthydemus*³ that the philosopher and the statesman must keep each to his own job, and also from the true Socratic attitude of the *Phaedo*⁴ that the philosopher must turn away from inquiry into physical nature and devote himself to the care of the soul.

The *Phaedrus* ends with the famous message to Isocrates:⁵ 'Isocrates is still young, Phaedrus, but I do not mind telling you the future I prophesy for him. . . . It seems to me that his natural powers give him a superiority over anything that Lysias has achieved in literature, and also that in point of character he is of nobler composition; hence it would not surprise me if with advancing years he made all his literary predecessors look like small fry; that is, supposing him to persist in the actual type of writing in which he engages at present; still more so if he should become dissatisfied with such work, and sublimer impulse lead him to do greater things. For that mind of his contains an innate tincture of philosophy.'

Socrates has just said that speech-writers like Lysias, poets like Homer, and 'authors of political compositions under the name of laws' like Solon, can be

¹ 269 c-272 b.

² 20: see W. H. S. Jones, *Philosophy and Medicine in Ancient Greece*, pp. 16-20.

³ 304 d ff.

⁴ 96 a.

⁵ 278 c.

called philosophic if they 'do their work with a knowledge of the truth' and can defend and criticize their own writings. This knowledge of the truth is pre-eminently the knowledge of the moral *eide*, since by means of the theory of Forms Plato has been able to elevate Socrates' pursuit of moral definitions, his *πραγματεία περί τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς*, to the level of a science of truth on an equality at least with the older sciences, physics and mathematics.¹ Indeed in the *Republic* dialectic as the 'coping stone' of the higher education of the guardians occupies a position superior to arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy.

By the time the *Phaedrus* was written, Isocrates was in the full tide of his career. His philosophy, as he called it, was very different from Plato's, and the difference was just this, that there was no place in training of practical statesmen for any but practical subjects.

At the outset of his career, in the speech *Against the Sophists*,² he outlines his theory of the proper training of the *rhetor*, and although the pursuit is given the name of *philosophia*, there is nothing in it beyond the exercise of the art of speaking. Later, in the *Antidosis*, written towards the end of his life, he explains himself more fully.³ He is prepared to say that the study of astronomy and geometry is profitable, not as much as the professors of those subjects claim, but more than some others think. He admits that they are of no use to us in after-life; but he regards them as useful for mind-training and mind-sharpening. He is unwilling to give these subjects the name of philosophy, calling them rather a gymnastic of the mind and a preparation for philosophy. 'I would therefore advise young men to spend some time on these studies, but not allow their minds to be dried up by these barren subtleties, nor to be stranded on the speculations of the ancient sophists.' And, making it clear that he means physical philosophers by this term, he proceeds to quote the physical doctrines of Empedocles, Ion, Alcmaeon, Parmenides, Melissus, and Gorgias. 'I hold that men who want to do some good in the world must banish utterly from their interests all vain speculations and all activities that have no bearing on our lives.' His *philosophia* is, he claims, very simple. 'I hold him to be wise who is able by his power of conjecture to arrive generally at the right course, and I hold that man to be a philosopher who occupies himself with the studies from which he will most quickly gain that kind of insight.' His *paideia* is based on an ambition to speak well, the desire to persuade his hearers and a concentration on 'seizing the advantage'. The up-and-coming orator will choose honourable cases to plead, he will consider such great and edifying examples as have a bearing on his case, and he will be moulded by them in character not only while getting up his brief but also for the rest of his life. He will do his best to gain a good reputation among his fellows, and to gain their goodwill. He will 'seize the advantage in the good rather than in the bad things of life'. In conclusion, Isocrates complains that common opinion gives the appellation of philosopher to men who ignore our practical needs and delight in the *teratologia* (hocus-pocus or mumbo-jumbo) of the ancient physical philosophers, but refuse this name to 'those who pursue and practise those studies which will enable us to govern wisely both our own households and the commonwealth—which should be the objects of our toil, of our study, and of our every act'.

¹ *Met.* 1078^b17. Cf. T. B. L. Webster, *Art and Literature in Fourth Century Athens*, p. 45: 'Plato passionately desired to give ethical universals the same kind of permanent reality

as mathematical universals. This was his interpretation of Socrates' message.'

² 17-18.

³ 261 ff.

This is the voice of Protagoras, scoffing at Hippias' mathematics, and claiming to teach just what the young men come to learn, practical economics and politics. It is fascinating to observe how Isocrates has exactly reversed Plato's terminology, so that while the former's practical, purely professional training becomes philosophy, those who are concerned with *physis* are left with the name of sophist. 'Philosopher' and 'sophist' are labels now attached respectively to those teachers who do and those who do not subscribe to the speaker's views of the proper subjects for higher education. Socrates appears to have taken a position in between the two extreme views. While he shared the Protagorean view that 'the arts' were rather a waste of time, he regarded the purely professional exercises in rhetoric and estate management as dangerously trivial. Instead he evolved his own dialectical investigation of *arete*. Plato recognizes the supremacy of dialectic, but 'brings' Socrates 'back against his will and forces' him 'into the arts, teaching him arithmetic and astronomy and geometry and music'.

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A HELLISH NOTE

pastorale canit signum cornuque recuruo
Tartaream intendit uocem. . . .

Aeneid 7. 513-14.

Vocem in v. 514 is generally taken to mean 'voice';¹ on this basis there are two possible interpretations—(a) that Allecto shouted through the *bucina*, or (b) that two actions are implied, an alarm call on the *bucina* followed by a shout. (a) is, owing to the structure of this type of instrument, physically impossible; this may or may not be regarded as an objection. (b) presents less difficulty, but it seems strange that, if two actions are involved, Vergil should have joined *cornuque recuruo* syntactically with the wrong one of the two; in sense it would belong with *pastorale canit signum*.²

Seruius takes *uocem* in v. 519 to mean the sound of the instrument.³ If it is so interpreted in v. 514, the difficulty of *cornuque recuruo* is removed: 'She sounds the rustic alarm signal, emitting (?) a hellish note from her curved horn.' But at the same time another difficulty arises; *intendere* used with a part of the body usually seems to mean 'exert' or 'strain':⁴ with 'voice', then, it would mean 'shout loudly', but if *uocem* means 'note', what does *intendere uocem* mean?⁵

Vergil may simply be imitating a Greek idiom, the meaning of which is not altogether certain;⁶ but it is possible that he has developed his own idiomatic usage of *intendere* by extension from an older Latin usage. It is used of a *ballista* by Plautus⁷ and of a bow and arrow elsewhere in Vergil;⁸ in most cases it is difficult to determine whether the meaning is 'wind up, draw' (*tendere*, applying strictly to the projector) or 'aim' (*dirigere*, strictly of the missile) or whether a fusion of the two meanings is intended. This vagueness makes it easier for Vergil to use *tendere* with a missile.⁹ Furthermore, in 7. 497 (shortly before l.c.) we find *curuo dextit spicula cornu*; having used *cornu recuruo* with a different meaning (*bucina*) in v. 513, Vergil may have likened the sound 'shot' from a bugle to an arrow shot from a bow. If so, the sense would be, roughly, *emittere*. The passage would then be a *callida iunctura*: *intendere*, with its ballistic sense, is used in a musical context. Moreover, with Vergilian thoroughness it is juxtaposed with *uocem*, and thus, by its sound though not by its sense, adumbrates the meaning of 'effort' by recalling another, more regular, usage.

¹ So Conington (iii. 50, though not in his prose translation) and W. F. J. Knight (Penguin translation, p. 191).

² This difficulty could be removed by supposing that the endings of vv. 512 and 513 (*et de culmine summo. cornuque recuruo*) had been interchanged, perhaps by Vergil himself; there is no manuscript evidence to suggest miscopying.

³ *ad uocem bucinæ, nam quicunque sonus dici ox potest.*

⁴ Cf. *Aen.* 5. 136, *intentaque braccia remis.*

⁵ The v. l. *incendit* (M¹, R) is not generally accepted: uses quoted by Conington (x. 895, i. 147) are not really parallel, as they de-

scribe the effect, not the production, of the sound.

⁶ Cf. Aeschines (*Fals. Leg.*) 2. 157 ἐντεταμένους . . . φωνῇ, Aeschylus, *Pers.* 574-5 τεῖνε . . . αὐδάν, Eur. *Medea* 201, and the derived adj. ἐνέπρονον in *Eumenides* 569 and Ar. *Clouds* 1154. The suggested meanings are (a) 'shout loudly', or 'intensify', (b) 'prolong', and (c) 'raise to a high pitch'. On (b) cf. an article by E. K. Borthwick, to appear in the near future in *C.Q.*

⁷ *Bacchides* 709, *Poenulus* 201.

⁸ *Aen.* 8. 704, 9. 590, 665.

⁹ *Aen.* 9. 606 *spicula tendere cornu.*

A brief corollary note: a scholium on Euripides, *Phoen.* 1377 says: *πρὸ γὰρ τῆς εὐρέσεως τῆς σάλπιγγος ἐν ταῖς μάχαις . . . ἐν μέσῳ τις λαμπάδα καιομένην ἔρριπτε σημεῖον τοῦ κατάρξασθαι τῆς μάχης*. Another on the same passage ascribes the 'invention' to the Tyrrhenians, after the Trojan war and the migration of Aeneas to Italy.¹ It is possible that Vergil was acquainted with this piece of musical archaeology; the passage in the *Phoenissae* suggests that Euripides knew of it, though neither he nor Vergil avoids introducing the trumpet (*σάλπιγξ*, *tuba*) in 'Trojan' times.² If so, it may have influenced the latter's choice of imagery in *Aen.* 7. 456 ff., where Allecto throws a burning torch at Turnus to summon him to battle.

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¹ On the dating cf. Sch. on *Iliad* 18. 219, and on the use of a torch to start races, Sch. on *Frogs* 133.

² In Homer, as the Alexandrians observed, it is mentioned only in similes, and never depicted in actual use, as it is (e.g.) in Eur.

Troades 1267. The 'invention' seems to have been a technological advance in the working of bronze, by which the older *bucina* or *κέρας* could be reproduced in metal. Vergil's Misenus uses a bronze instrument—yet another 'felicitous anachronism'.

CRETAN EILEITHYIA

THE links between Eileithyia, an earlier Minoan goddess, and a still earlier neolithic prototype are, relatively, firm. The explanation is as simple as it is important. The continuity of her cult depends upon the unchanging concept of her function. Eileithyia was the goddess of childbirth; and the divine helper of women in labour has an obvious origin in the human midwife. To Homer she is *μογοστόκος*, 'goddess of the pains of birth'.¹ When Leto gave birth to Apollo in Delos, *μογοστόκος* *Ελειθνια* was in attendance, and so were a number of other goddesses who bathed the god-child and wrapped him in his swaddling-clothes.² Leto adopted the kneeling position to deliver the child. She must have been supported by midwives—Eileithyia and her companion goddesses. Such is the practice among many primitive peoples; and Greek statuettes of kneeling women have thus been interpreted as goddesses of childbirth, *Eileithyiai*.³

Mention of the cave of Eileithyia at Amnisos in the *Odyssey*⁴ indicates that the Homeric tradition derives from the Minoan age.⁵ Exploration of the cave has established the continuity of the cult from neolithic times and even points to a revival in the Roman period.⁶ The name Eileithyia is not Indo-European, which strengthens the possibility of direct descent from a Minoan goddess of childbirth.⁷ The cult of the goddess was widespread,⁸ the forms of her name various;⁹ but in Crete, where her cult was more prominent than anywhere else, the common form was *Ἐλεύθνια*.¹⁰

Other forms of the name can be explained from the Cretan.¹¹ On etymological grounds it is possible to suppose a connexion between the Cretan goddess *Ἐλεύθνια* and the Cretan city of *Ἐλευθέρινα*,¹² though there are no traces of her cult here. Of more importance, however, is the occurrence of the name

¹ *Il.* 11. 270, 16. 187, 19. 103.

² *H. Ap.* 115–22.

³ Allen–Halliday, *Homeric Hymns* (2nd ed.), p. 219; Baur, *Philol.* viii, *Sup.*, pp. 481 f.; Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States*, ii. 613–14; Thomson, *Studies in Ancient Greek Society*, i (2nd ed.), 245. For the plural *Ελειθνιαι* see *Il.* 11. 270, 19. 119. On the votive terracottas to Eileithyia at Lato in Crete see Demargne in *B.C.H.* liii. 382.

⁴ 19. 188.

⁵ Nilsson, *Minoan-Mycenaean Religion* (2nd ed.), p. 73.

⁶ Hazzidakis in *Παρνασσός* 10. 349; Halbherr, *Antiquary*, xxvii. 112; Marinatos, *Πρακτικά Ακ. Αθ.* (1929), 94, (1930), 91, cf. *B.C.H.* liii. 520 n. 5; *Arch. Anz.* (1930), p. 156; Hirschfeld in *R.E.* s.v. Amnisos; Nilsson, op. cit., p. 58; Guarducci, *Inscr. Cret.* i. 2.

⁷ Malten, *Jahrb.*, pp. 28–39; Wilamowitz, *Berl. Sitz.* (1908), p. 331; Wackernagel, cited by Nilsson, op. cit., p. 521.

⁸ It is attested at Athens, Megara, Corinth, Achaia, Arcadia, Messenia, Sparta, Delos, Tenos, Paros, Naxos, Thera, and Astypalaia.

Jessen in *R.E.* v. 2101; Nilsson, op. cit., p. 518.

⁹ *Ἐλειθνια*: *Pi. P.* 3. 9, *N.* 7. 1, *S.I.G.* 602 (Delph.), *I.G.* iii. 1320; *Ἐλειθνια* *I.G.* xii (3). 192 (Astypalaia); *Ελειθνια* *I.G.* xii (5). 197 (Paros prob.), *Call. Del.* 132, *A.P.* 6. 200 (Leon.), *Paus.* 2. 5. 4; *Ἐλευθία* (Ion.—*ιη*) *G.D.I.* 4584 (Hippola), *I.G.* xii (5). 187 (Paros); *Lacon. Ἐλευσία* *I.G.* v (1). 236; Boeot. *Ελειθια(-ια)* *I.G.* vii. 2228, 3410. For other variations cf. Nilsson, op. cit., p. 519 n. 43.

¹⁰ *Inscr. Cret.* 1. xvi (Lato), 2. 31, 3. 18, 4A 13, 5. 48, 75, 15. 35, 26. 8 (cf. 27. 3 *Ἐλουθία* explained by the common Cretan change of *ευ* to *ου*: Bechtel, *Griech. Dial.* ii. 661); *ibid.* 2. 3 (Aptera), 22; *ibid.* 4 (Gortyna), 174. 60, 76.

¹¹ Wackernagel, cited by Nilsson, op. cit., p. 521.

¹² Nilsson, op. cit., pp. 519, 521. The termination *-ρινα* occurs in other pre-Greek place-names: Kretschmer, *Einl. in die Gesch. der griech. Sprache*, p. 405; Fick, *Vorgriech. Ortsnamen*, p. 87.

of the month 'Ελευσίνιος or 'Ελουσίνιος at Olous,¹ or 'Ελευσίνιος at Biannos.² The same month-name (in the form 'Ελευσίνιος) occurs in Thera.³ 'Ελευσίνιος is the regular epithet meaning 'of Eleusis'.⁴ An epithet of Zeus in Ionia, of Artemis in Sicily and Antioch,⁵ it is most commonly used, as we might expect, of Demeter. Similarly 'Ελευσεῖναι is used of Demeter and Kore,⁶ 'Ελευσίνιον of their temple at Eleusis,⁷ and 'Ελευσίνια of their festivals.⁸

Apart from Crete and the islands, Eileithyia also had a flourishing cult in Laconia. She had two temples in Sparta, according to Pausanias, who also mentions the sanctuary of Demeter Eleusinia, the Eleusinion, near Taygetos.⁹ Votive inscriptions to Demeter and Kore have been found at a village near Sparta;¹⁰ and in one inscription of the Roman age they are called 'Ελευσίναι.¹¹ We also know that there was a Laconian festival called the 'Ελευθύνια in the fifth century B.C.¹² Because the month-name occurs in Crete this same festival was presumably celebrated there.¹³ If this Cretan month Eleusiniος coincided with Boedromion, the month in which the Eleusinian mysteries were celebrated,¹⁴ we have a further indication, in addition to the philological evidence,¹⁵ of close connexion between the Cretan goddess 'Ελεύθυια, a Cretan, Theran, and Laconian festival of the 'Ελευσίνια, the place-name 'Ελευσίς, and also for the Cretan origin of the Eleusinian mysteries.¹⁶

With one exception the Cretan cities linked with Eileithyia either by the testimony of inscriptions or by evidence of other kinds belong to the centre of the island, between Eleutherna to the west (where the assumed connexion is based on purely philological grounds) and Lato to the east. The exception is Aptera, in the western part of the island, where a single votive inscription, offered by a woman to the goddess, was reported by Wescher in 1864 (but not found again by Haussoullier in 1878).¹⁷ At Olous and at Biannos, though no mention is made of the goddess by name, a strong connexion is established by the occurrence of the month-name, twice at Olous, in inscriptions of the second century B.C., once at Biannos in an inscription of the late third century B.C.¹⁸

Though it can only be assumed that the city of Eleutherna drew its name from Cretan 'Ελεύθυια, the city of Lato is certainly named after the goddess Leto (Doric Λατώ),¹⁹ to whose assistance came the goddess of childbirth when Apollo was born. By coincidence the cult of Apollo enjoyed some distinction

¹ *Inscr. Cret.* 1. xvi, 4A 8, 5. 3. On the change from *eu* to *ou* see p. 221, n. 10.

² *Inscr. Cret.* 1. vi (Biannos), 2. 39, and Guarducci, ad loc.: 'Ελε[υσίνιον] vel 'Ελε[υσίνιον] supplendum est, cum Eleusinius mensis etiam Olunte occurrat.'

³ *Test. Epict.* 2. 7, 3. 3.

⁴ *H. Cer.* 266, Hdt. 9. 57.

⁵ Hsch., Lib. Or. 11. 109.

⁶ *I.G.* iv. 955. 14 (Epid.).

⁷ And. 1. 110, *I.G.* i². 6. 129.

⁸ *I.G.* i². 5, ii². 847. 24, Hyp. fr. 112, Paus. 4. 33. 5.

⁹ 3. 14. 6, 17. 1, 20. 5.

¹⁰ The village (Kalyvia Sochas) is therefore presumably the site of the sanctuary mentioned by Pausanias: Von Prott, *Ath. Mitt.* xxix. 8; *B.S.A.* xvi. 12; Nilsson, *Griech. Feste*, p. 334, *Min.-Myc. Rel.*, p. 520, n. 50.

¹¹ *I.G.* v (1). 607. 28.

¹² *I.G.* v (1). 213. 11. On the assimilation of *ε* to *υ* in 'Ελευθύνια = 'Ελευσίνια (cf. also the month 'Ελευσίνιος) and the change of intervocalic *s* to spiritus asper see Buck, *Greek Dialects*, pp. 26, 55.

¹³ Nilsson, *Min.-Myc. Rel.*, p. 523.

¹⁴ See Guarducci, *Epigraphica*, vii. 72.

¹⁵ This evidence is considerable, but not accepted as conclusive by Wackernagel: Nilsson, *Min.-Myc. Rel.*, p. 522.

¹⁶ D.S. 5. 77. 3-5. See further Persson in *Arch. f. Religionswiss.* (1922), p. 287; *Religion of Greece in Prehistoric Times*, pp. 149-50.

¹⁷ *Inscr. Cret.* 2. iii (Aptera), 22 and Guarducci, ad loc.

¹⁸ See p. 222, notes 1 and 2 above.

¹⁹ *Inscr. Cret.* 1. xvi praef. Nomen.

at Eleutherna,¹ and Lato provides most of the inscriptional evidence in Crete for Eileithyia.

Decrees of 201 B.C. concerning Teos have to be published in the temple of Eileithyia.² So do the joint decrees of Lato and Olous concerning negotiations, with Knossos as arbitrator, of about the time 120–116/15 B.C.,³ and the treaty between Lato and Olous in the second half of the second century B.C.⁴ In this same treaty Eileithyia is among the deities invoked in the oath by which the treaty-makers bind themselves.⁵ In or about the year 116/15 B.C., either a new temple was built to the goddess or an old one rebuilt.⁶ Coins of the period 200–67 B.C. confirm the evidence supplied by these inscriptions that Eileithyia was the principal deity worshipped at Lato.⁷

In the treaty which the Gortynians and Hierapytnians made with the Priansians at the beginning of the second century B.C., among the deities invoked in the binding oath is listed 'Ελεῦθνια Βωρία (= 'Ivaria),⁸ that is to say Eileithyia of Inatos. This reference confirms other indications that the city of Inatos was under the power of Priansos and probably served as its port.⁹ We know from other sources that the epithet 'Ivaria was associated with Eileithyia.¹⁰ A hill and a stream were especially sacred to Eileithyia Inatia¹¹ and traces of a shrine probably belonging to the goddess have been found on high ground near a stream on the site of Inatos.¹²

Near Knossos was a stream known as Amnisos.¹³ At its mouth was the town of the same name which served as the harbour of Knossos. This association between Amnisos and Eileithyia is indicated by Strabo, Pausanias, and Hesychios.¹⁴ The importance of the cult in Homeric times is clear from the mention of the cave in the *Odyssey*. Continuity of the cult from early times is confirmed by inscriptional evidence and traditional associations. For the hill shrine and the stream at Inatos, the cave and the stream of Amnisos (with its nymphs, the Amnisiades¹⁵), remind us that this continuity implies the retention of simple, primitive elements in the cult of historical Eileithyia.¹⁶

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¹ *Inscr. Cret.* 2. xii *praef.* Nomen, Res Sacrae.

² *Ibid.* 1. xvi. 2. 31, 15. 35.

³ *Ibid.* 3. 18, 4A 13.

⁴ *Ibid.* 5. 48.

⁵ *Ibid.* 5. 75.

⁶ *Ibid.* 26. 8. Cf. 27. 3.

⁷ *Ibid.* *praef.* Nummi; Head, *Hist. Num.* (2nd ed.), p. 470.

⁸ *Inscr. Cret.* 4. 174. 61, 76.

⁹ *Ibid.* 1, pp. 98, 280, *ibid.* 4, p. 244.

¹⁰ *E.M.* s.v. *Eivaria*; Call. *fr.* 168.

¹¹ St. Byz., s.v. *Eiváros*.

¹² *Inscr. Cret.* 1, p. 98.

¹³ A.R. 3. 876, Nonn. *D.* 8. 115, 13. 251.

¹⁴ Str. 10. 476; Paus. 1. 18. 5; Hsch. s.v. *Ἀμνησία ἢ Εἰλεῖθνια*. Also, as an epithet of Eileithyia, *Ἀμνίας* (Ruf. *Onom.* 229), with which cf. *ἄμνιος* or *ἄμνιος*, *ἄμνειον* or *ἄμνιον* = inner membrane surrounding the foetus: Sor. 1. 58, Gal. *U.P.* 15. 4, *Hippiatr.* 14, Emp. 71. In *Od.* 3. 444 *ἄμνιον* = a bowl in which the blood of victims was caught.

¹⁵ St. Byz., s.v. *Ἀμνισός*.

¹⁶ Even at Paros, where Eileithyia was not a goddess of childbirth, but a healing goddess, she had a sacred well: *I.G.* xii. 5. 185 ff.

A brief corollary note: a scholium on Euripides, *Phoen.* 1377 says: *πρὸ γὰρ τῆς εὐρέσεως τῆς σάλπιγγος ἐν ταῖς μάχαις . . . ἐν μέσῳ τις λαμπάδα καιομένην ἔρριπτε σημεῖον τοῦ κατάρξασθαι τῆς μάχης*. Another on the same passage ascribes the 'invention' to the Tyrrhenians, after the Trojan war and the migration of Aeneas to Italy.¹ It is possible that Vergil was acquainted with this piece of musical archaeology; the passage in the *Phoenissae* suggests that Euripides knew of it, though neither he nor Vergil avoids introducing the trumpet (*σάλπιγξ*, *tuba*) in 'Trojan' times.² If so, it may have influenced the latter's choice of imagery in *Aen.* 7. 456 ff., where Allecto throws a burning torch at Turnus to summon him to battle.

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¹ On the dating cf. Sch. on *Iliad* 18. 219, and on the use of a torch to start races, Sch. on *Frogs* 133.

² In Homer, as the Alexandrians observed, it is mentioned only in similes, and never depicted in actual use, as it is (e.g.) in Eur.

Troades 1267. The 'invention' seems to have been a technological advance in the working of bronze, by which the older *bucina* or *κέρας* could be reproduced in metal. Vergil's Misenus uses a bronze instrument—yet another 'felicitous anachronism'.

CRETAN EILEITHYIA

THE links between Eileithyia, an earlier Minoan goddess, and a still earlier neolithic prototype are, relatively, firm. The explanation is as simple as it is important. The continuity of her cult depends upon the unchanging concept of her function. Eileithyia was the goddess of childbirth; and the divine helper of women in labour has an obvious origin in the human midwife. To Homer she is *μοῖροστόκος*, 'goddess of the pains of birth'.¹ When Leto gave birth to Apollo in Delos, *μοῖροστόκος* *Εἰλείθυια* was in attendance, and so were a number of other goddesses who bathed the god-child and wrapped him in his swaddling-clothes.² Leto adopted the kneeling position to deliver the child. She must have been supported by midwives—Eileithyia and her companion goddesses. Such is the practice among many primitive peoples; and Greek statuettes of kneeling women have thus been interpreted as goddesses of childbirth, Eileithyiai.³

Mention of the cave of Eileithyia at Amnisos in the *Odyssey*⁴ indicates that the Homeric tradition derives from the Minoan age.⁵ Exploration of the cave has established the continuity of the cult from neolithic times and even points to a revival in the Roman period.⁶ The name Eileithyia is not Indo-European, which strengthens the possibility of direct descent from a Minoan goddess of childbirth.⁷ The cult of the goddess was widespread,⁸ the forms of her name various;⁹ but in Crete, where her cult was more prominent than anywhere else, the common form was *Ἐλεύθυια*.¹⁰

Other forms of the name can be explained from the Cretan.¹¹ On etymological grounds it is possible to suppose a connexion between the Cretan goddess *Ἐλεύθυια* and the Cretan city of *Ἐλευθέρνα*,¹² though there are no traces of her cult here. Of more importance, however, is the occurrence of the name

¹ *Il.* 11. 270, 16. 187, 19. 103.

² *H. Ap.* 115-22.

³ Allen-Halliday, *Homeric Hymns* (2nd ed.), p. 219; Baur, *Philol.* viii, *Sup.*, pp. 481 f.; Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States*, ii. 613-14; Thomson, *Studies in Ancient Greek Society*, i (2nd ed.), 245. For the plural *Εἰλείθυιαι* see *Il.* 11. 270, 19. 119. On the votive terracottas to Eileithyia at Lato in Crete see Demargne in *B.C.H.* liii. 382.

⁴ 19. 188.

⁵ Nilsson, *Minoan-Mycenaean Religion* (2nd ed.), p. 73.

⁶ Hazzidakis in *Παρουσία* 10. 349; Halbherr, *Antiquary*, xxvii. 112; Marinatos, *Πρακτικά Ακ. Αθ.* (1929), 94, (1930), 91, cf. *B.C.H.* liii. 520 n. 5; *Arch. Anz.* (1930), p. 156; Hirschfeld in *R.E.* s.v. Amnisos; Nilsson, *op. cit.*, p. 58; Guarducci, *Inscr. Cret.* i. 2.

⁷ Malten, *Jahrb.*, pp. 28-39; Wilamowitz, *Berl. Sitz.* (1908), p. 331; Wackernagel, cited by Nilsson, *op. cit.*, p. 521.

⁸ It is attested at Athens, Megara, Corinth, Achaia, Arcadia, Messenia, Sparta, Delos, Tenos, Paros, Naxos, Thera, and Astypalaia.

Jessen in *R.E.* v. 2101; Nilsson, *op. cit.*, p. 518.

⁹ *Ἐλείθυια*: *Pi. P.* 3. 9, *N.* 7. 1, *S.I.G.* 602 (Delph.), *I.G.* iii. 1320; *Ἐλείθυια* *I.G.* xii (3). 192 (Astypalaia); *Εἰλήθυια* *I.G.* xii (5), 197 (Paros prob.), *Call. Del.* 132, *A.P.* 6. 200 (Leon.), *Paus.* 2. 5. 4; *Ἐλευθία* (Ion.—*ἴν*) *G.D.I.* 4584 (Hippola), *I.G.* xii (5). 187 (Paros); *Lacon. Ἐλευσία* *I.G.* v (1). 236; *Boeot. Εἰλείθεια(-ια)* *I.G.* vii. 2228, 3410. For other variations cf. Nilsson, *op. cit.*, p. 519 n. 43.

¹⁰ *Inscr. Cret.* 1. xvi (Lato), 2. 31, 3. 18, 4A 13, 5. 48, 75, 15. 35, 26. 8 (cf. 27. 3 *Ἐλουθία* explained by the common Cretan change of *ev* to *ov*: Bechtel, *Griech. Dial.* ii. 661); *ibid.* 2. 3 (Aptera), 22; *ibid.* 4 (Gortyna), 174. 60, 76.

¹¹ Wackernagel, cited by Nilsson, *op. cit.*, p. 521.

¹² Nilsson, *op. cit.*, pp. 519, 521. The termination *-ρνα* occurs in other pre-Greek place-names: Kretschmer, *Einkl. in die Gesch. der griech. Sprache*, p. 405; Fick, *Vorgriech. Ortsnamen*, p. 87.

of the month 'Ελευσίνιος or 'Ελουσίνιος at Olous,¹ or 'Ελευσίνιος at Biannos.² The same month-name (in the form 'Ελευσίνιος) occurs in Thera.³ 'Ελευσίνιος is the regular epithet meaning 'of Eleusis'.⁴ An epithet of Zeus in Ionia, of Artemis in Sicily and Antioch,⁵ it is most commonly used, as we might expect, of Demeter. Similarly 'Ελευσείναι is used of Demeter and Kore,⁶ 'Ελευσίνιον of their temple at Eleusis,⁷ and 'Ελευσίνια of their festivals.⁸

Apart from Crete and the islands, Eileithyia also had a flourishing cult in Laconia. She had two temples in Sparta, according to Pausanias, who also mentions the sanctuary of Demeter Eleusinia, the Eleusinion, near Taygetos.⁹ Votive inscriptions to Demeter and Kore have been found at a village near Sparta;¹⁰ and in one inscription of the Roman age they are called 'Ελευσίναι.¹¹ We also know that there was a Laconian festival called the 'Ελευθύνια in the fifth century B.C.¹² Because the month-name occurs in Crete this same festival was presumably celebrated there.¹³ If this Cretan month Eleusinius coincided with Boedromion, the month in which the Eleusinian mysteries were celebrated,¹⁴ we have a further indication, in addition to the philological evidence,¹⁵ of close connexion between the Cretan goddess 'Ελειθύνια, a Cretan, Thera, and Laconian festival of the 'Ελευσίνια, the place-name 'Ελευσίς, and also for the Cretan origin of the Eleusinian mysteries.¹⁶

With one exception the Cretan cities linked with Eileithyia either by the testimony of inscriptions or by evidence of other kinds belong to the centre of the island, between Eleutherna to the west (where the assumed connexion is based on purely philological grounds) and Lato to the east. The exception is Aptera, in the western part of the island, where a single votive inscription, offered by a woman to the goddess, was reported by Wescher in 1864 (but not found again by Haussoullier in 1878).¹⁷ At Olous and at Biannos, though no mention is made of the goddess by name, a strong connexion is established by the occurrence of the month-name, twice at Olous, in inscriptions of the second century B.C., once at Biannos in an inscription of the late third century B.C.¹⁸

Though it can only be assumed that the city of Eleutherna drew its name from Cretan 'Ελειθύνια, the city of Lato is certainly named after the goddess Leto (Doric Λατώ),¹⁹ to whose assistance came the goddess of childbirth when Apollo was born. By coincidence the cult of Apollo enjoyed some distinction

¹ *Inscr. Cret.* 1. xvi, 4A 8, 5. 3. On the change from *eu* to *ou* see p. 221, n. 10.

² *Inscr. Cret.* 1. vi (Biannos), 2. 39, and Guarducci, ad loc.: 'Ελε[υσίνου] vel 'Ελε[υσίνου] supplendum est, cum Eleusinius mensis etiam Olunte occurat.'

³ *Test. Epict.* 2. 7, 3. 3.

⁴ *H. Cer.* 266, Hdt. 9. 57.

⁵ *Hsch.*, Lib. Or. 11. 109.

⁶ *I.G.* iv. 955. 14 (Epid.).

⁷ *And.* 1. 110, *I.G.* i². 6. 129.

⁸ *I.G.* i². 5, ii². 847. 24, *Hyp. fr.* 112, *Paus.* 4. 33. 5.

⁹ 3. 14. 6, 17. 1, 20. 5.

¹⁰ The village (Kalyvia Sochas) is therefore presumably the site of the sanctuary mentioned by Pausanias: Von Prott, *Ath. Mitt.* xxix. 8; *B.S.A.* xvi. 12; Nilsson, *Griech. Feste*, p. 334, *Min.-Myc. Rel.*, p. 520, n. 50.

¹¹ *I.G.* v (1). 607. 28.

¹² *I.G.* v (1). 213. 11. On the assimilation of *ε* to *υ* in 'Ελευθύνια = 'Ελευσίνια (cf. also the month 'Ελευσίνιος) and the change of intervocalic *s* to spiritus asper see Buck, *Greek Dialects*, pp. 26, 55.

¹³ Nilsson, *Min.-Myc. Rel.*, p. 523.

¹⁴ See Guarducci, *Epigraphica*, vii. 72.

¹⁵ This evidence is considerable, but not accepted as conclusive by Wackernagel: Nilsson, *Min.-Myc. Rel.*, p. 522.

¹⁶ *D.S.* 5. 77. 3-5. See further Persson in *Arch. f. Religionswiss.* (1922), p. 287; *Religion of Greeks in Prehistoric Times*, pp. 149-50.

¹⁷ *Inscr. Cret.* 2. iii (Aptera), 22 and Guarducci, ad loc.

¹⁸ See p. 222, notes 1 and 2 above.

¹⁹ *Inscr. Cret.* 1. xvi *praef.* Nomen.

at Eleutherna,¹ and Lato provides most of the inscriptional evidence in Crete for Eileithyia.

Decrees of 201 B.C. concerning Teos have to be published in the temple of Eileithyia.² So do the joint decrees of Lato and Olous concerning negotiations, with Knossos as arbitrator, of about the time 120–116/15 B.C.,³ and the treaty between Lato and Olous in the second half of the second century B.C.⁴ In this same treaty Eileithyia is among the deities invoked in the oath by which the treaty-makers bind themselves.⁵ In or about the year 116/15 B.C., either a new temple was built to the goddess or an old one rebuilt.⁶ Coins of the period 200–67 B.C. confirm the evidence supplied by these inscriptions that Eileithyia was the principal deity worshipped at Lato.⁷

In the treaty which the Gortynians and Hierapytnians made with the Priansians at the beginning of the second century B.C., among the deities invoked in the binding oath is listed 'Ελεῦθνια Βιῳαρία (= 'Ivaria),⁸ that is to say Eileithyia of Inatos. This reference confirms other indications that the city of Inatos was under the power of the Priansos and probably served as its port.⁹ We know from other sources that the epithet 'Ivaria was associated with Eileithyia.¹⁰ A hill and a stream were especially sacred to Eileithyia Inatia¹¹ and traces of a shrine probably belonging to the goddess have been found on high ground near a stream on the site of Inatos.¹²

Near Knossos was a stream known as Amnisos.¹³ At its mouth was the town of the same name which served as the harbour of Knossos. This association between Amnisos and Eileithyia is indicated by Strabo, Pausanias, and Hesychios.¹⁴ The importance of the cult in Homeric times is clear from the mention of the cave in the *Odyssey*. Continuity of the cult from early times is confirmed by inscriptional evidence and traditional associations. For the hill shrine and the stream at Inatos, the cave and the stream of Amnisos (with its nymphs, the Amnisiades¹⁵), remind us that this continuity implies the retention of simple, primitive elements in the cult of historical Eileithyia.¹⁶

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¹ *Inscr. Cret.* 2. xii *praef.* Nomen, Res Sacrae.

² *Ibid.* 1. xvi. 2. 31, 15–35.

³ *Ibid.* 3. 18, 4A 13.

⁴ *Ibid.* 5. 48.

⁵ *Ibid.* 5. 75.

⁶ *Ibid.* 26. 8. Cf. 27. 3.

⁷ *Ibid. praef.* Nummi; Head, *Hist. Num.* (2nd ed.), p. 470.

⁸ *Inscr. Cret.* 4. 174. 61, 76.

⁹ *Ibid.* 1, pp. 98, 280, *ibid.* 4, p. 244.

¹⁰ *E.M.* s.v. *Eivaria*; *Call. fr.* 168.

¹¹ *St. Byz.*, s.v. *Eivarios*.

¹² *Inscr. Cret.* 1, p. 98.

¹³ *A.R.* 3. 876, *Nonn. D.* 8. 115, 13. 251.

¹⁴ *Str.* 10. 476; *Paus.* 1. 18. 5; *Hsch.* s.v. *Ἀμνησία ἡ Εἰλειθνία*. Also, as an epithet of Eileithyia, *Ἀμνίας* (*Ruf. Onom.* 229), with which cf. *ἀμνείος* or *ἀμνιος*, *ἀμνείον* or *ἀμνίον* = inner membrane surrounding the foetus: *Sor.* 1. 58, *Gal. U.P.* 15. 4, *Hippiatr.* 14, *Emp.* 71. In *Od.* 3. 444 *ἀμνίον* = a bowl in which the blood of victims was caught.

¹⁵ *St. Byz.*, s.v. *Ἀμνισιάς*.

¹⁶ Even at Paros, where Eileithyia was not a goddess of childbirth, but a healing goddess, she had a sacred well: *I.G.* xii. 5. 185 ff.

ΕΦΟΔΟΣ AND INSINUATIO IN GREEK AND LATIN RHETORIC¹

THE rhetorical treatises of Aristotle and Anaximenes, in discussing the introduction (προοίμιον) of a speech, recognize that a speaker may encounter prejudice on the part of his audience for some reason or other; perhaps because of his own character or reputation, or because of the nature of the case he is pleading, or because his opponent has already won their approval. Anaximenes describes a speaker in this situation as διαβεβλημένος, and he and Aristotle give advice on countering such διαβολαί if they have arisen (Arist. *Rhet.* 3. 15; Anax. *Rhet. ad Alex.* 29 fin., 35 init., 36 init.). Rather more than two centuries later we find the early Latin rhetoricians expounding the doctrine of *insinuatio* for dealing with such a situation; they distinguish between *principium*, the ordinary direct introduction, and *insinuatio*, the 'subtle approach' (Caplan, in his Loeb translation of the *ad Herennium*, p. 13). So the *ad Her.* says: 'exordiorum duo sunt genera: principium, quod Graece prooemium appellatur, et insinuatio, quod ephodos nominatur. principium est cum statim auditoris animum nobis idoneum reddimus ad audiendum. . . . sin turpe causae genus erit, insinuatione utendum est' (1. 4. 6). Later he makes the distinction clearer: 'inter insinuationem et principium hoc interest. principium eiusmodi debet esse ut statim apertis rationibus quibus praescripsimus aut beniuolum aut adtentum aut docilem faciamus auditorem; at insinuatio eiusmodi debet esse ut occulte, per dissimulationem, eadem illa omnia conficiamus, ut ad eandem commoditatem in dicendi opere uenire possimus' (1. 7. 11). The same doctrine is found in the *de Inuentione* of Cicero: 'igitur exordium in duas partes diuiditur, principium et insinuationem. principium est oratio perspicue et protinus perficiens auditorem beniuolum aut docilem aut attentum. insinuatio est oratio quadam dissimulatione et circumfusione subiens auditoris animum' (1. 15. 20).

When later the two writers illustrate the use of *insinuatio*, they give much the same advice (*ad Her.* 1. 6. 9-10; *de In.* 1. 17. 23-25). If the *turpitude* of the case offends the hearer, we should agree with him and indeed enlarge upon the idea; then when his hostility has thus been lulled we should show that we have not been concerned in such scandalous conduct. Another approach is to deny that we intend to discuss our opponents, but then subtly to introduce the topic while seeming not to do so. If the previous speaker has convinced the audience we must promise to discuss first the argument on which our opponent most relies, and try to weaken the impression he has created by pretending that we do not know where to begin to demolish his many fallacies. If finally the audience is tired, we should promise to speak more briefly than we had intended, and perhaps enliven the proceedings by telling a story, making a joke, or creating some other appropriate diversion. The general idea, in fact, is to counter the audience's hostility by an indirect approach ('his nos rebus insinuabimus ad causam', *ad Her.* 1. 6. 10), preferably discrediting our opponent at the same time.

In these two works, and in the later Latin rhetoricians such as Quintilian

¹ I should like to thank Prof. M. J. Boyd, and Prof. M. L. Clarke, for criticisms and suggestions in connexion with this article.

and the writers in Halm's *Rhetores Latini Minores*, the doctrine of *insinuatio* is related to the *genera causarum*; i.e. the classification of cases on a moral basis, which must be distinguished from the classification of cases as forensic, deliberative, and epideictic, also known as *genera causarum*. (For the latter classification see *ad Her.* 1. 2. 2, *de In.* 1. 5. 7, and the article by Hinks, 'Tria genera causarum' in *C.Q.* xxx [1936].) The *ad Her.* treats four kinds of case, *honestum*, *turpe*, *dubium*, and *humile* (1. 3. 5); the *de In.* (1. 15. 20) substitutes *admirabile* and *anceps* for *turpe* and *dubium*, and adds a fifth kind, *obscurum*, which is also found in Quintilian and later writers. The corresponding Greek terms in Quintilian (4. 1. 40) are *ἐνδοξον*, *παράδοξον*, *ἀμφίδοξον*, *ἄδοξον*, and *δυσπαρακολούθητον*; and we can thus make the following table:

Greek	<i>ad Herennium</i>	<i>de Inuentione</i>
ἐνδοξον	honestum	honestum
παράδοξον	turpe	admirabile
ἀμφίδοξον	dubium	anceps
ἄδοξον	humile	humile
δυσπαρακολούθητον	—	obscurum

The first four Greek terms are based on the relationship of the case to *δόξα*. Thus a case which is *ἐνδοξον* is one in which the person involved is of high repute, and his actions are honourable; e.g. 'Scipio uictis Poenis petit in praemium ut spectet ludos laurea coronatus: et persona honesta est Scipionis, et quod petitur non improbum' (Augustine, *Rhet.* 9); from one point of view its opposite is *ἄδοξον*, where the person involved is obscure and his actions ignoble; e.g. 'pauper uestimenta uendebat; exstitit alius pauper qui uindicaret ea et furto ablata sibi esse diceret; ille uenditor ait se ab adultero deprehenso illa uestimenta detraxisse: inuicem accusant, ille adulterii, hic furti' (ibid.). From another point of view its opposite would be one where the person involved and his actions would both be dishonourable; but instead of calling this *αἰσχρόν* or something of the sort the Greek rhetoricians (presumably for consistency's sake) called it *παράδοξον*, implying that the case is repugnant to received opinion. Some Latin rhetoricians translated this by *admirabile*; so Cic. in *de In.* defines *admirabile genus* as 'a quo est alienatus animus eorum qui audituri sunt'¹ (loc. cit.), and Quintilian as 'quod est praeter opinionem hominum constitutum' (4. 1. 41). Cf. also Sulpitius Victor, who says of the *admirabilis causa*: 'talís facie ipsa uidetur talisque apud opinionem iudicum coepit esse ut admirentur quemquam ad defensionem eius accedere' (*Inst. Or.* 7).² The *ad Her.*, however, translates *παράδοξον* by *turpe*, thus naming the case by reference to its own inherent characteristics rather than to the reaction of the audience; but he defines *turpe genus* as: 'cum aut honesta res oppugnatur aut defenditur turpis' (1. 3. 5) and brings it into relationship with *insinuatio* (1. 4. 6, 6. 9), so that clearly *turpe genus* in *ad Her.* and *admirabile genus* in *de In.* are the same thing.³ This is put beyond doubt by a later definition of *turpis causa* in *ad Her.* (1. 6. 9): 'cum turpem causam habemus, hoc est, cum ipsa res animum auditoris a nobis alienat', which may be compared with Cicero's definition of *admirabile genus*

¹ It is worth noticing that Cicero translates the Stoic *παράδοξα* by *admirabilia*; cf. 'haec *παράδοξα* illi, nos *admirabilia* dicamus' (*de Fin.* 4. 27. 74); 'quae quia sunt *admirabilia* contraque opinionem omnium, ab ipsis etiam *παράδοξα* appellantur' (*Par. Stoic.*

proem. 4).

² In Halm, *R.L.M.*, p. 316.

³ This identification was not considered inevitable, as we see from Quintilian: 'quibusdam recte uidetur adici *turpe*, quod alii *humili*, alii *admirabili* subiciunt' (4. 1. 40).

above. We are thus justified in identifying both *turpe genus* in *ad Her.* and *admirabile genus* in *de In.* with *σχῆμα παράδοξον* in the Greek rhetoricians.¹

In this classification of the *genera causarum* on a moral basis, *insinuatio* is connected with *turpe* (*admirabile*) *genus*: cf. 'sin turpe causae genus erit, insinuatione utendum est, de qua posterius dicemus, nisi quid nacti erimus qua re aduersarios criminando beniuolentiam captare possimus' (*ad Her.* 1. 4. 6); cf. also 'in admirabili genere causae, si non omnino infesti auditores erunt, principio beniuolentiam comparare licebit. sin erunt uehementer abalienati, confugere necesse erit ad insinuationem' (*de In.* 1. 15. 21). When later the two writers go into detail, their doctrines diverge slightly. The *ad Her.* extends the use of the *insinuatio* beyond the *genus turpe*: 'deinceps de insinuatione aperiendum est. tria sunt tempora quibus principio uti non possumus . . . aut cum turpem causam habemus . . . aut cum animus auditoris persuasus esse uidetur ab iis qui contra dixerunt; aut cum defessus est eos audiendo qui ante dixerunt' (1. 6. 9). The *de In.*, on the other hand, limits *insinuatio* to the *admirabile genus causae*, but maintains that the case becomes *admirabilis* in three ways, which correspond in fact to the *tria tempora* of the *ad Her.*: 'insinuatione igitur utendum est cum admirabile genus causae est . . . id autem tribus ex causis fit maxime: si aut inest in ipsa causa quaedam turpitudine, aut ab eis qui ante dixerunt iam quiddam auditori persuasum uidetur, aut eo tempore locus dicendi datur cum iam illi quos audire oportet defessi sunt audiendo' (1. 17. 23). Clearly both writers are expounding the same doctrine here, but in different forms.

The object of this paper is to call attention to certain difficulties and peculiarities of the doctrine of the 'subtle approach' which I have not seen discussed elsewhere. It will have been noticed that the *ad Her.* identifies *insinuatio* with *ἔφοδος* (1. 4. 6, quoted in para. 1). This identification is found nowhere else in so many words, though we shall see later that it appears to be confirmed by usage. One difficulty to which I would call attention is the choice of the word *ἔφοδος* itself. In common usage it has two principal meanings: 'way towards, approach' as in Thuc. 4. 129, 7. 99; and 'approach in a hostile sense, attack', as in Thuc. 1. 93, 2. 95. It is used also of the bringing in of supplies (Xen. *Hell.* 2. 9. 3), and of the onset or attack of fever (Hipp. 44. 3). Nowhere is there any sense of indirectness, as its rhetorical use and its identification with *insinuatio* imply; cf. the first quotation from *de In.* (1. 15. 20) in para. 1 above; also: 'his nos rebus insinuabimus ad causam' (*ad Her.* 1. 6. 10); and 'insinuatio surrepat animis' (Quint. 4. 1. 42).

A further difficulty is that the usage and definitions of *ἔφοδος* among Greek rhetoricians are not consistent. We find it used, of course, in the normal sense of an approach to something; cf. *προκατάστασις ἐστὶν ἔφοδος πρὸς τὰς ἀποδείξεις ἢ κατασκευὴ τῶν ἀποδείξεων* (Apsines *τεχ. ῥήτ.* 4 in Spengel-Hammer, *Rhet. Graec.* i. 242). Elsewhere it is used as a technical term, but nowhere is it defined as an alternative to *προοίμιον*, nor is it brought into relationship with the *σχήματα ὑποθέσεων* (*ἔδοξον, παράδοξον, κ.τ.λ.*), as *insinuatio* is brought into relationship with *genera causarum*. Three senses can be distinguished:

1. A 'subtle approach' or indirect introduction, corresponding to *insinuatio*. So an anonymous rhetorician in Walz, *Rhet. Graec.* vii. 54, in discussing the *προοίμιον*, says: λαμβάνεται δὲ τὸ προοίμιον ἀπὸ τριῶν τρόπων, ὡς δὲ

¹ *Σχήματα ὑποθέσεων* is the Greek equivalent of *genera causarum*.

ἐνιοί φασιν, ἀπὸ τεσσάρων. He lists the four τρόποι as recommendation of oneself, arousing prejudice against one's opponent, attracting the attention of the judges, and fourthly ἐφόδου κατὰ τινος. He explains the procedure in each of these four cases, and of the last case he says: ἡ δὲ ἔφοδος τότε γίνεται, ἥνικα μὴ φανερώς τι βουλευόμεθα σημαίνειν, καὶ λαθραίως δι' ἑτέρων λόγων εἰσάγομεν αὐτό. Again, Aphthonius in his account of the θέσις (in Spengel's *Rhet. Graec.* ii. 50) apparently recognizes ἔφοδος as an alternative to προοίμιον, but gives no definition: διαίρεται τοῖνυν ἡ θέσις πρῶτον μὲν τῇ καλουμένῃ ἐφόδῳ, ἣν ἀντὶ προοιμίων ἐρεῖς.¹

2. In some passages ἔφοδος is mentioned as a separate section of a speech, alongside the usual four or five. So another anonymous writer in Walz, l.c., p. 63: πάσης ὑποθέσεως μέρη πέντε εἰσὶν, προοίμιον, διήγησις, ἀντίθεσις, λύσεις αἱ λεγόμεναι πίστεις, ἐπιλογος. . . . τινὲς δὲ προστιθέασιν καὶ ἕτερα τρία, ἔφοδον, παρέκβασιν, αὔξησιν· καὶ φάμεν εἶναι ταῦτα ἕτερα παρὰ τὰ εἰρήμενα. ἔφοδος γάρ ἐστιν ἡ προθεραπεία ὃ λέγεται προοίμιον. Similarly another anonymous writer (ibid., p. 20 = Rabe, *Rhet. Graec.* xiv. 206) ὅτι πέντε μέρη τοῦ λόγου, παρὰ τισι δὲ τέσσαρα, προοίμιον, διήγημα, πίστεις, ἐπιλογοί. προστιθέασιν τινες τὴν τε ἔφοδον καὶ παρέκβασιν καὶ αὔξησιν. Here ἔφοδος is not defined at all; but the first writer at least, and perhaps the second also, appears to be referring to the views of a minority with which he is not in agreement (τινὲς δὲ προστιθέασιν: cf. προστιθέασιν τινες in the second quotation, and ὡς δὲ ἐνιοί φασιν in 1 above). The first writer realizes that ἔφοδος is merely a form of introduction; we cannot say whether the second one does or not, but clearly some rhetoricians failed to recognize this, and thought of ἔφοδος as a separate section of a speech, which was independent of the προοίμιον and could presumably be used therefore alongside the προοίμιον in the same speech. How and why this misunderstanding arose it is difficult to say, but I shall try to show later that the doctrine of ἔφοδος as a 'subtle approach', alternative to προοίμιον and the equivalent of *insinuatio*, was not generally accepted among Greek rhetoricians.²
3. In one Greek writer a quite different definition is given: ἔφοδος δὲ ἐστὶν εὐλόγος αἰτία διηγήσεως; and he gives an illustration from Dem. *Mid.* (12). (Rufus τεχ. ῥήτ. 13, in Spengel-Hammer, i. 401.) The author is discussing the προοίμιον, which can come from five sources: ἀπὸ προσώπου . . . δικαστῶν . . . συνηγορουμένων . . . θεῶν . . . πραγμάτων; he discusses each of the five, and of the last he says: ἀπὸ δὲ πραγμάτων λαμβάνεται τὰ προοίμια προαγγελία, συγκρίσει, μερισμῶ, ἐφόδῳ, χρόνῳ, αἰτίᾳ, γνώμῃ. In this case ἔφοδος is part of the doctrine of the προοίμιον, but clearly is unrelated to the doctrine of ἔφοδος as the 'subtle approach', an alternative form of introduction.

If this last explanation was not simply an error, we seem to have two distinct

¹ Why use ἔφοδος in a θέσις? The case is not likely to be *typus*, nor the audience tired by the previous speaker, nor convinced by him. Probably the ordinary introduction designed to make the audience *docilis*, *attentus*, *benivolus* is regarded as unnecessary in a θέσις, and an ἔφοδος would make it more interesting. See Theon. *Progym.* 12 *Ληφόμεθα δὲ τὰ προοίμια τῶν θέσεων ἥτοι ἀπὸ γνώμης . . . ἢ ἀπὸ παροιμίας ἢ χρείας ἢ ἀποφθέγματος κ.τ.λ.*

and cf. *ad Her.* 1. 6. 10: 'si defessi erunt audiendo . . . ab apologo, fabula ueri simili, imitatione etc. . . .' (sc. *exordiemur*).

² The Latin rhetoricians, on the other hand, were in general quite clear about *insinuatio* and its relation to *principium*; cf. Fortunatianus, *Ars Rhet.* 2. 14: 'quo differt exordium a principio et insinuatione? quod exordium genus est, principium et insinuatio species sunt eius' (in Halm, *R.L.M.*, p. 109).

meanings of *ἐφοδος* as a technical term: (1) a subtle approach or indirect introduction, corresponding to *insinuatio*; this was misunderstood by some writers as a separate *μέρος τοῦ λόγου*, additional and not alternative to *προοίμιον*; (2) a reasonable excuse for a description.

I suspect the misunderstanding referred to may have arisen because the doctrine of the 'subtle approach' was not commonly accepted by Greek rhetoricians. It is very noticeable that *ἐφοδος* in sense 1 above never occurs in Greek *τέχναι* without qualification; so in three cases we have phrases like *προστιθέασθαι*, or *ὡς δὲ ἐννοί φασιν*; while in a fourth passage it is referred to as *τῇ καλουμένῃ ἐφόδῳ*. The only exception to this is in a papyrus fragment which will be noticed below; its evidence is necessarily inconclusive on this point, since it is possible that in the missing portions of the papyrus the word may have been qualified in the same way as in the later Greek rhetoricians. Among Latin authors Quintilian alone refers to *insinuatio* in the same guarded way: 'eo *quidam* exordium in duas diuidunt partes, principium et insinuationem . . . ut . . . insinuatio surrepat animis', etc. (4. 1. 42). Quintilian in fact seems to speak with some impatience about such refinements: 'quibus aduersus haec modis sit medendum *uerbosius* tradunt materiasque sibi ipsi fingunt; . . . sed hae (sc. materiae) . . . nisi generaliter comprehenduntur in infinitum sunt *extrahendae*' (43).

In *ad Her.* and *de In.*, on the other hand, and in the later Latin rhetoricians, no such qualifications appear; the doctrine of *insinuatio* is expounded in a straightforward manner, as if it were generally accepted. When and by whom was the doctrine of the 'subtle approach' first formulated? The theory of the four types of cause (on a moral basis) is attributed to Hermagoras, on the strength of a passage in Augustine (*de Rhet.* 17-21);¹ in expounding the doctrine of the four types² he mentions that Hermagoras advised dispensing with the *principium* in the *honestum* (*ἐνδοξον*) genus, on the ground that in this type the goodwill which the *principium* aimed at producing was already present. The doctrine of the four types is thus brought into connexion with Hermagoras, and we have no earlier reference; it would in any case be in harmony with what we know of Hermagoras' schematizing tendencies.

But it is noticeable that nowhere does Augustine speak of the 'subtle approach'. His word for an introduction is *principium* (or *exordium*); *ἐφοδος* and *insinuatio* are equally unknown to him; and it seems unlikely that if Hermagoras had been the author of the doctrine of the 'subtle approach' Augustine would not have mentioned the doctrine in 21 (where he gives instructions for the treatment of *paradoxo genere*) even if only to disagree with him. (We have in any case seen that no extant Greek writer brings *ἐφοδος* into relationship with the *σχήματα υποθέσεων*.) Either therefore the doctrine of the 'subtle approach' is subsequent to Hermagoras, or (if not) it was unknown to or rejected by him.

Two pieces of evidence appear to have a bearing on this. One is the occurrence of *ἐφοδος* in *Pap. Oxy.* iii. 410, a fragmentary rhetorical treatise in the Dorian dialect attributed by Grenfell and Hunt to the early fourth century B.C. The attribution is based on the similarity of the dialect to that of the fragments of Archytas of Tarentum and other Pythagoreans, and that found in the anonymous *Διαλέξεις Ἡθικαί* assigned to that date. Rhys Roberts (*C.R.* xviii. 18) is

¹ In Halm, *R.L.M.*; = Caput X in Migne, *P.L.* xxxii. 1447-8.

² Excluding *ὑποπαρακολούθητον* (*obscurum*), which must therefore have been added later.

inclined to go farther and connect the treatise directly or indirectly with the Sicilian Tisias, who came to Athens with Gorgias in 427. One hesitates to assign technical refinements to such an early period, but Rhys Roberts gives grounds for believing that they may have been commoner in early rhetorical theory than is generally assumed, and thinks that we cannot exclude the possibility that ἐφοδος may date from quite an early period. Against this, however, is the fact that Aristotle, Anaximenes, and probably Hermagoras do not mention it.

The other piece of evidence is that Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in two similar passages, tells us that Isaeus used ἐφοδοί while Lysias did not (*de Isaeo* 3, *de Lysia* 15). This would at first sight seem conclusive for the existence of the doctrine of the 'subtle approach' in the early fourth century B.C.; but it may be pointed out that Isaeus could well have been using a similar technique even before the doctrine was formulated, since rhetorical teaching was in the main based on existing practice.¹

We thus have three possibilities. Either (1) the doctrine of the 'subtle approach' was formulated early, perhaps in the first part of the fourth century, or even before that. We should then have to explain why it was not mentioned by Aristotle, Anaximenes, or (apparently) Hermagoras. Or (2) it was formulated some time between Aristotle and Hermagoras. In that case we should have expected Hermagoras to have related it to his doctrine of the σχήματα ὑποθέσεων; and the fact that (on the evidence of Augustine) he seems neither to have done so nor to have given reasons for rejecting it suggests that the doctrine was unknown to him. Or (3) it was formulated between Hermagoras and the *ad Her.* and *de In.*, i.e. some time between c. 150 and the second decade of the first century B.C. In that case the Dorian papyrus fragment would have to be assigned to a later date than Grenfell and Hunt or Rhys Roberts envisage; and one naturally thinks of the Rhodian school, one of whose members taught Cicero; while Dionysius would be applying to Isaeus and Lysias criteria which were not properly applicable at that date.

The evidence is not conclusive, but on the whole the difficulties of (1) and (2) seem greater than those of (3). The doctrine of the 'subtle approach' seems more likely (*pace* Rhys Roberts) to have been due to later Greek over-refinement than to have been a foundation-member, so to speak, of the newly evolving rhetorical theory of the late fifth and early fourth centuries. I am inclined to think, therefore, that it was a comparatively new doctrine when the *ad Her.* and *de In.* were written. Its subsequent history, as we have seen, is somewhat obscure. Apart from the two references in Dionysius, and the puzzling aberration in Rufus, the later Greek rhetoricians all speak of it with the curious obliqueness which we have noticed, either referring to it as ἡ καλονμένη ἐφοδος, or introducing it with some such phrase as προστιθέασί τις. Nowhere do they show clear understanding of its place in rhetorical theory, comparable with the familiarity of most of the Latin rhetoricians with *insinuatio*. The conclusion seems inescapable that the doctrine of the 'subtle approach' was never completely accepted by Greek rhetorical theory.

The reason for this (if it was so) is difficult to see. In one of the passages mentioned Dionysius includes ἐφοδοί with μερισμοί and προκατασκευαί among

¹ I have assumed that ἐφοδος is used in sense 1 (a 'subtle approach') in Dionysius and the papyrus fragment; but in fact neither author defines it or gives any indication in

which sense he is using it. All we can say is that in the papyrus it seems to be brought into relationship with προέμνηον.

the *παρορρησιαί* which Lysias did not use (*de Lysia* 15); the disparaging description of these devices as 'tricks of the trade' is no doubt the expression of personal feeling, but some such feeling may have been common, and may have helped to prevent the doctrine of the 'subtle approach' from gaining general acceptance. It is conceivable also that since *ἐφοδος* was used in quite a different sense in ordinary language, and apparently had more than one meaning even as a technical term, these factors may have had some influence in preventing its general acceptance.

With *insinuatio* the case is somewhat different. Mentioned by *ad Her.* and *de In.* as a normal feature of rhetorical technique, it nevertheless drops out of sight in Cicero's later works; we might, for example, have expected to find it in *Part. Or.* 28, where *principium* is discussed. It reappears in Quintilian, but here is referred to in the same guarded way as is *ἐφοδος* by the later Greek writers: 'eo quidam exordium in duas diuidunt partes, principium et insinuationem' (4. 1. 42). Later still, however, the qualification again disappears, and by the Latin rhetoricians of the fourth and fifth centuries A.D. *insinuatio* is spoken of as a regular part of rhetorical theory. (So Fortunatianus 2. 14; Victorinus commentary on *de In.* 1. 15; Sulpitius Victor, *Inst. Or.* 16; Martianus Capella, *de Rhet.* 45; Grillius comm. on *de In.* 20; all in Halm, *R.L.M.*) This discrepancy between Greek and Latin usage is also difficult to explain. They did not always keep in step; an example is the treatment of the *progymnasmata*, which (though rhetorical in origin) were in Quintilian's time all handled by the Latin *grammatici* since the Latin rhetoricians refused to handle them; Greek rhetoricians, on the other hand, treated at least some of them, if not all (Quint. 1. 9. 6; 2. 1. 1 ff.). It may be, then, that in the differing treatment of the doctrine of the 'subtle approach' by Greek and Roman rhetoricians we have no more than a casual variation, of no particular significance.

A more probable explanation has been suggested to me, however: that the influence of the *de In.* may have helped to standardize the doctrine of *insinuatio* among the Latin rhetoricians of the late Empire; the existence of commentaries by Victorinus and Grillius suggests that the *de In.* was by that time a recognized textbook. No doubt by Quintilian's time this had not yet happened; and Quintilian, familiar with the whole field of rhetorical literature, Greek and Latin, knew that the doctrine of the 'subtle approach' had not been universally accepted, and so put the matter in perspective. If this is the true explanation (as seems probable) the picture which seems to emerge is that some Greek rhetorician between c. 150 and c. 90 B.C. evolved the doctrine of the two types of introduction, calling them *προόμιον* and *ἐφοδος*: some time before the *ad Her.* and *de In.* were written these were translated into Latin as *principium* and *insinuatio*. Possibly the doctrine had a temporary vogue among both Latin and Greek rhetoricians; at any rate the *ad Her.* and *de In.* took it over as if it were a standard feature of rhetorical teaching. But it was not universally accepted, as we see from Quintilian and the later Greek rhetoricians; in the later Empire, however, the influence of Cicero, exerted through the *de In.* rather than through his later, more philosophical works on rhetoric, procured for it a late flowering, so to speak, so that the later Latin rhetoricians refer to it again as if it were standard doctrine.

A PRAYER TO THE FATES¹

IN his choice of quotations concerning fate and the good ordering of events Stobaeus (*Eccl.* 5. 10-12) gives in succession three passages which the manuscripts ascribe to the *Peleus* of Euripides and the *Phaëdra* of Sophocles, but as Wilamowitz² and Nauck³ saw, all three form a single piece, and the ascriptions to Euripides and Sophocles do not concern them. The text so recovered may be presented as follows:⁴

- Κλῦτε, Μοῖραι, Διὸς αἶ τε παρὰ θρόνον ἀγχοτάτω θεῶν
 ἐζόμεναι περιώσι' ἀφυκτά τε μῆδεα
 παντοδαπὰν βουλᾶν ἄδαμαντίναισιν ὑφαίνετε κερκίσιν,
 Αἶσα καὶ Κλωθὴ Λάχεσις τ' εὐώλενοι
- 5 Νυκτὸς κόραι,
 εὐχομένων ἐπακούσατ', οὐράναι χθονιαί τε
 δαίμονες ὧ πανδείματοι,
 πέμπετ' ἄμμιν ῥοδόκολπον
 Εὐνομίαν λιπαροθρόνους τ' ἀδελφάς, Δίκαν
- 10 καὶ στεφανηφόρον Εἰρήνην, πόλιν τε τάνδε βαρυφρόνων λελάθοιτε
 συντυχίαν.

3. ὑφαίνεται codd., corr. Wilamowitz.
 codd., corr. Wilamowitz.

4. καὶ supp. Nauck.
 7. πανδείματοι codd., corr. Wachsmuth.

5. κοῦραι Νυκτός

'Hearken, Fates, who sit nearest of the gods by the throne of Zeus, and on shuttles of adamant weave countless, inescapable devices for counsels of every kind, Aisa and Clotho and Lachesis, fine-armed daughters of Night, listen to our prayers, goddesses of heaven and earth, all-terrible; send us rose-bosomed Lawfulness and her brightly throned sisters, Right and crowned Peace, and make this city forget the misfortunes which lie heavily on her heart.'

Since the metre is relevant to the discussion of the poem it may be displayed schematically:

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      - - - | - - - - - - - - - - -
      - - - - - - - - - - - - -
      - - - - | - - - - | - - - - -
      - - - | - - - - | - -
5      - - -
      - - - - - | - - - - -
      - - - - | - -
      - - | - - - -
      - - - - - | - - | - -
10     - - - - - | - - - | - - - - | - - -
      - - -
  
```

Nobody will deny that the greater part of this is dactylo-epitrite. The only

¹ I am much indebted for advice and assistance to Professor A. Andrewes and Mr. W. G. G. Forrest.

² *Iylos von Epidauros*, pp. 16 ff.

³ *Tr. Gr. Fr.*, 2nd ed., p. xx.

⁴ Diehl, *Anth. Lyr. Gr.* ii. 159-60. There is a good, short commentary in H. W. Smyth, *Greek Metric Poets*, pp. 473-4. Cf. Bowra, *Greek Lyric Poetry*, pp. 97-98.

uncertainty of scansion is at the end of 1, where *θεῶν* can be either a disyllable as usual, or a monosyllable as less usual. The first alternative would mean that we have a scansion rather like that of *Ol.* 6 Str. 3; the second that the dactylic series ends in a spondee. In 10 the resolution of the third syllable in - - - - to produce - - - - is not common but has some sort of parallel in *Isthm.* 2 Ep. 6. These are unimportant details. What matter are more striking divergences from the usual practice of dactylo-epitrites.

The first of these, which struck Wilamowitz, is that the final syllables of the different *metra* are nearly as often short as long. Thus we find - - - - - instead of - - - - - at 6 (twice) and 9, - - - - - instead of - - - - - at 3, 8, and 10, and - - - - - instead of - - - - - twice at 10. This is not the practice of either Pindar or Bacchylides and makes it unlikely that either is the author. For this reason Wilamowitz decided that, by process of exhaustion, the lines must be the work of Simonides. He does not argue for this in detail, but the extant remains of Simonides' dactylo-epitrites support his case. In fr. 5 d - - - - - appears in 4, 6, and 7 and - - - - - in 2 (twice) and 7; while in fr. 20 - - - - - appears in 3 and - - - - - in 2 and 4. Other fragments in the same metre suggest a similar usage, and we cannot doubt that Wilamowitz's instinct was sound when he assigned the lines to Simonides because of this metrical peculiarity.

The metrical analysis reveals another abnormality of which Wilamowitz says nothing, perhaps because he did not anticipate Nauck in seeing that 1-2 are an integral part of the fragment. In 1-3 we have successions of dactyls, preceded indeed in 1 by - - - - and in 3 by - - - - - - - - , but none the less striking and unexpected in the company of dactylo-epitrites. To this Bacchylides presents no parallel, and Pindar only when he uses - - - - - - - - at *Pyth.* 4 Str. 4, *Nem.* 1 Ep. 3 and 5 Ep. 9, and *Isthm.* 5 Ep. 8, and in a catalectic form at *Pyth.* 4 Str. 5, or the longer - - - - - - - - - - at *Pyth.* 3 Str. 4. Pindar's practice varies in two important respects. First, his dactylic series always end in one or two long syllables, and secondly he never has so many as five dactyls in succession. He seems not so much to introduce dactyls for their own sake as to extend the usual dactylic *metron* which is basic to dactylo-epitrites. Nor is the free intrusion of dactyls any commoner in choral passages of tragedy or comedy. It is true that at *Ajax* 172 (182) Sophocles begins an almost purely dactylo-epitrite strophe with a dactylic series and that at *Peace* 775-95 (796-816) Aristophanes uses mainly dactylo-epitrites, but at 790-1 (814-15) he uses first a dactylic hexameter and then a dactylic tetrameter. But both these cases are mild mixtures compared with our fragment. We cannot say that it is characteristic of Simonides, whose extant fragments provide nothing like it, but it is none the less likely that the poet who introduces dactyls in this way operates with an earlier form of dactylo-epitrites than that of Pindar or Bacchylides, in both of whom practice has hardened into a more rigorous shape.

It might of course be argued that the lines come not from lyric poetry proper but from a choral ode in tragedy. It is true that their style and manner bear little relation to anything extant in the works of the three tragedians, but there remains the possibility that they come from some other tragedian whose manner is not known to us. In the last resort this is impossible to disprove, but surely most will share Nauck's conclusion that the fragment does not come from a lost play because 'a tragoedia alienum est'. What is lacking is anything that smacks of the stage or drama, not merely the individual references which keep

a play going but the air of fictitious urgency which has to be more emphatic in a play than in a theme drawn from life. It is true that some choral songs of tragedy are modelled on authentic ritual songs, and that such a piece as the Parodos of the *Oedipus Tyrannus* has many characteristics of a prayer in time of need, but our piece is simpler, more direct, and more closely related to actual events. It deals with a pressing crisis, but has no need to explain the setting, and this suggests that it comes from lyrical song.

A second argument for Simonides' authorship may perhaps be found in the style. Difficult as such matters are to prove, we know enough of his manner to see that he deserved Dionysius' appreciation of his *τὴν ἐκλογὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων* (*Vet. Script.* 420 Reiske). So here the poet picks his words with delicate precision and makes them suit the situation exactly. The abundant adjectives, for instance, do their work with unobtrusive skill, when they suggest the vast scope of the Fates' designs in *περιώσι' ἄφυκτά τε* or the irrevocable nature of their decrees in *ἀδαμαντίναισιν* or their formidable and final character in *πανδείματοι*. In contrast with these suggestions of power are the adjectives given to the Hours, which come from the traditional vocabulary of praise and worship and present images of plastic and visible appeal in *ροδόκολπον, λεπασθρόνους, στεφανηφόρον*. This is characteristic not only of Simonides' doctrine that poetry is 'painting which speaks' (*Plut. de Glor. Ath.* 3), but of his way of making unseen powers more vivid by giving them visual epithets, as when he calls the Muses *καλλικόμων* (fr. 26. 2 D) or *Maia οὐρείας ἑλικοβλεφάρου* (fr. 30. 1) or the Pleiads *ιοπλοκάμων* (*ibid.* 3). The simplicity of this art lies in preferring the single, significant word to periphrasis or allusive elaboration. Something of the kind may indeed be found in Bacchylides, but hardly on this scale or with quite this concentration of strength.

Dionysius also praises Simonides for *τῆς συνθέσεως τὴν ἀκρίβειαν*, and it is instructive to test our lines in the light of this judgement. The whole piece consists of two sentences, of which the first addresses the Fates in their awful majesty, and the second, which is, structurally, closely connected with it, beseeches them to send the Hours to the unhappy city for which the poet speaks. He begins with an exalted vision of the Fates in their glory, recites their names with hieratic solemnity, and then becomes more human and more intimate in words of actual prayer. The subtlety of his art can be illustrated by the phrase *περιώσι' ἄφυκτά τε μήδεα παντοδαπῶν βουλῶν*. The Fates weave *μήδεα*, devices, by which their decisions, *βουλαί*, are put into action, and the decisions are of every kind just as the devices are beyond counting. The phrase, which might at first sight seem a little inflated, has a precise meaning and is indeed an example of precision in arrangement in that it says in a few words just what the poet means.

This style is informed by a powerful emotion, a deep and troubled anxiety. The poet controls it and rises above it, but it makes itself felt in the outburst of *εὐχομένων ἐπακούσας*, in the appeal *πέμπετ' ἄμυν*, and in the final words with their urgent prayer that the city may forget its *βαρυφρόνων συντυχίαν*. This powerful undercurrent of feeling recalls Dionysius' comment that Simonides *βελτίων εὐρίσκεται καὶ Πινδάρου, τὸ οἰκτιζεσθαι μὴ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ὡς ἐκεῖνος ἀλλὰ παθητικῶς* (*Vet. Script.* 420 Reiske) and Quintilian's judgement that *praecipua . . . eius in commovenda miseratione virtus* (*Inst. Or.* 10. 1. 64). If we may judge by the lines on Danae (fr. 13 D), the secret of Simonides' pathos was the restraint which he exercised in its presentation. His appeals to pity are the

more powerful because they are almost statements of fact which need no elaboration or comment. So here, the poet, faced by a disastrous situation, lets it speak for itself as he prays to the gods for succour.

There are, then, good reasons for agreeing with Wilamowitz that the lines may have been written by Simonides, but of course on such a question there can be no final certainty. What looks reasonably sure is that the piece was written by a poet whose art is simpler and more straightforward than that of Pindar or even Bacchylides, and who practised the *γλαφυρά* rather than the *αὐστηρὰ ἁρμονία*. At the start it is clear that he casts his words in the form of a prayer to the Fates, and what we have is surely the beginning of his poem, since the words *κλυτε, Μοῖραι* conform to the habitual language of prayers, and such an appeal to the gods usually comes at the start, as when Glaucus prays to Apollo:

κλυθι, ἀναξ, ὃς που Λυκίης ἐν πῖονι δῆμῳ
εἰς ἧ ἐνὶ Τροίῃ . . . (Il. 16. 514-15).

So Odysseus, cast up from the sea on Phaeacia, prays to whatever god may guard the place:

κλυθι, ἀναξ, ὅτις ἐσσί· πολύλλιστον δέ σ' ἱκάνω
φεύγων ἐκ πόντοιο Ποσειδάωνος ἐνιπὰς. (Od. 5. 445-6.)

The form passed from the epic into other kinds of verse, as when Archilochus, in what looks like the beginning of a poem, says:

κλυθ', ἀναξ Ἥφαιστε, καὶ μοι σύμμαχος γουνουμένῳ
Ἰλαος γενεῦ, χαρίζευ δ' οἶά περ χαρίζεαι. (fr. 75 D.)

Or Pindar starts a Dithyramb on a note of war:

κλυθ', Ἀλαλά, Πολέμου θύγατερ . . . (fr. 61. 1 Bo.).

So our poet goes straight to work and addresses his prayer to the Fates. The actual address could be postponed till later, as Pindar does in *Ol.* 14. 4-5 to the Graces of Orchomenus, but it is more effective at the beginning and gives a greater sense of urgency in a time of crisis.

Since the lines are cast in the form of a prayer, we may ask from what kind of poem they come. It is tempting to think that this may have been a Paean. Didymus, who had a vast knowledge of Greek poetry, says that the Paean was sung to secure an end to famine and other troubles (*Et. Gud.* 446. 50 Sturz), and since among these *στάσις* is expressly mentioned (Schol. Lond. Dion. Thrac. p. 451. 13 Hilg.), it would be suitable for the situation in our poem. Indeed, the propriety of a Paean to a time of trouble may be seen from Pindar's *Paean* 4, written for the Thebans in 463 B.C., when an eclipse of the sun seemed to foretell unknown disasters. In it Pindar prays for the well-being of Thebes and hopes that the omens do not portend *στάσιν σὺλομέναν* (fr. 44. 15 Bo.). Its background has enough in common with our piece to suggest that this too was a Paean. On the other hand the Paean was normally connected with Apollo (Schol. Aristoph. *Plut.* 636; Schol. Plat. *Symp.* 177 a; Schol. Eur. *Phoen.* 1102), and it was not till the fourth century that it began to lose the connexion. Since our lines mention Zeus and not Apollo, they are more likely to come from a *ῥυμος*. The term could be applied to songs which contained more than mere ascription of praise and were akin to prayer. An anonymous author gives a

helpful definition, ὕμνος ἔστιν ὁ μετὰ προσκυνήσεως καὶ εὐχῆς κεκραμένης ἐπαίνω λόγος εἰς θεούς (*Et. Gud.* 540. 46) and among various kinds of ὕμνοι Menander mentions οἱ μὲν εὐκτικοί, αἱ δὲ ἀπενκτικοί (p. 331. 1 Spengler), which would, if combined, cover our piece, since it asks that evils may depart and that good things may come in their stead. That a Hymn in this sense should be addressed to the Fates is not surprising. If a Chorus of the *Thesmophoriazusae* 700 could pray ὦ πότνιαι Μοῖραι or a Chorus of the *Choephoroe* 305 begin a song with ἀλλ' ὦ μεγάλαι Μοῖραι, there is no great difficulty about our poet writing a ὕμνος εἰς Μοῖρας, which he begins, naturally enough, by addressing them.

A Hymn to the Fates presupposes a cult of them at which it is sung. Such cults were not uncommon, and the Fates had temples of their own at Corinth (*Paus.* 2. 4. 4)¹ and Thebes (*id.* 9. 25. 4). But we may none the less be surprised that the Fates are invoked instead of the high gods who usually watch over cities. It is true that here they are associated with Zeus, but it is to them, and not to him, that the words are addressed, and this suggests a cult more stately than any on which we have information. Nor are the Fates normally regarded as important civic deities. They have much to do with individuals but not with cities. But it would not be difficult or anomalous to extend their scope to families and even countries. So Pindar speaks of the Μοῖρα which guides the house of the Emmenidae (*Ol.* 2. 35 ff.). More strikingly, the Chorus of the *Eumenides* addresses the Fates as undeniably civic deities when it calls them

δαίμονες ὀρθονόμοι,
πάντι δόμῳ μετάκοινοι. (963-4.)

So in our poem the Fates are approached on behalf of a city which is in dire straits and suffers from internal dissensions. In this the Fates have a special duty. They are concerned with kinship and withdraw their presence when domestic sanctities are outraged, as Pindar says:

Μοῖραι δ' ἀφίσταντ', εἴ τις ἔχθρα πέλει
ὁμογόνους αἰδῶ καλύψαι. (*Pyth.* 4. 145-6.)

The same would apply to a city. If it suffers from internal discords, it means that the Fates are hostile to it, and the poet begs that they will restore their favour. Nor would he do this if they were not important divinities and honoured with more than usual respect.

The poet builds his supplication with a quiet assurance, and each step marks something new in his approach. He begins by saying that the Fates sit nearest of the gods to Zeus, and this conforms to tradition as Hesiod presents it:

Μοῖρας θ' ᾗς πλείστην τιμὴν πόρε μητιέτα Ζεὺς. (*Theog.* 903.)

Behind the tradition lay rites in which Zeus was connected with the Fates. As Μοιραγέτης he had a temple at Delphi (*Paus.* 10. 24. 4), a cult at Athens (*I.G.* i². 80. 12) and an altar at Olympia (*Paus.* 5. 15. 4), and as such he was depicted on the shrine of Despoina at Akakesion in Arcadia (*id.* 8. 37. 1) and named with the Fates at Chios.² At Halicarnassus an oracle of Apollo commanded sacrifices to be made to the Fates together with Ζεὺς πατρῷος, Apollo,

¹ Mr. W. G. G. Forrest points out to me that at Corinth they appear on the pediment of Temple E, *Corinth*, i. 2, p. 226.

² G. Zolotas, *Ἐπιγραφὴ Χίου Ἀνέκδοτος*, p. 225. I owe this reference to Mr. W. G. G. Forrest.

and the Mother of the Gods (*S.I.G.*³ 1044. 5); at Thebes their shrine was next to that of Zeus ἀγοραῖος (Paus. 9. 25. 4). Zeus and the Fates were closely connected in worship, and it is perfectly appropriate to bring them together in this supplication.

The Fates make their decisions, βουλαί, and on their adamantine shuttles spin the devices, μύθεα, which put these into effect. In this fine image the poet picks up an old idea and gives it a new force. The notion that a man's life is a thread spun at his birth is widely spread in many countries, and in Greece it was responsible for the names of two of the Fates, Clotho and Lachesis, whom popular etymology connected with κλώθειν and λαχεῖν. This notion can be seen, at an early stage, in Homer, who not only attributes the thread of life or fortune to gods (*Il.* 24. 535; *Od.* 1. 17; 8. 579; 16. 64), but more explicitly says that Αἴσα span his life for Achilles (*Il.* 20. 127-8), Μοῖρα for Hector (*Il.* 24. 209), and Αἴσα Κλώθες τε for Odysseus (*Od.* 7. 197). At this date the Fates were not necessarily three in number, nor fully differentiated from one another. They are still birth-goddesses, and Atropos, who deals only with death, has not yet taken a place among them. Our poet differs from Homer in accepting the existence of three Fates and in applying their dominion not to the life of an individual but to the existence of a city.

He had to some extent Hesiod behind him. Hesiod presents the Fates as Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos (*Theog.* 219, 905), and our poet cannot have failed to know this. When he substituted Αἴσα for Atropos, he must have done so deliberately, and we may surmise his reasons. Atropos is concerned with death, and on this occasion the poet is concerned not with death but with the fortunes of a city, to which Atropos is irrelevant. He therefore introduces Αἴσα, whose functions are less closely defined and who has Homeric authority behind her. He also picks up the Homeric notion of Κλώθες and clarifies it as Clotho and Lachesis. He thus not only rejects one of Hesiod's names for the Fates but contradicts the view of a Hesiodic poet that of the Fates Atropos was προφερής πρεσβυτάτη τε (*Scut.* 260). It is possible that our poet chooses Αἴσα because she has a special role in the relations of gods and men. Just as Aeschylus calls her Αἴσα φασγανουργός (*Cho.* 647) and gives her a task of vengeance, so here the poet may summon her to a like task in the restoration of civic order. We need feel no surprise at seeing the names of the Fates handled in this way. Hesiod's list was ancient but not obligatory or universally accepted. Even at Athens one of the Fates seems to have been Ἀφροδίτη ὑπρανία (Paus. 1. 19. 2). In general their existence was more important than their individual names, and many Greeks would probably think of them, as the painter of the François Vase suggests, simply as Μοῖραι. In such matters Greek poets took considerable liberties, and it is instructive to note that, when Pindar deals with a similar topic, he goes his own way. In his Hymn εἰς Τύχην he not only makes Τύχη one of the Fates, for which he has no precedent in Homer or Hesiod, but says that she has power over her sisters (fr. 21 Bo.). It is also relevant to our passage that he treats Τύχη as a social, rather than as a personal, power when he calls her φερέπολις (fr. 19 Bo.). The names of the Fates allow some variation, and clearly when a city's future was in question, some adaptation and adjustment of old ideas might be necessary. So our poet, well within his rights, substitutes Αἴσα for Atropos.

There were two views about the parentage of the Fates, both of which may be found in Hesiod, who at one place makes them the daughters of Night

without any father (*Theog.* 217 ff.) and at another daughters of Zeus and Themis (*ibid.* 904 ff.). So glaring a contradiction suggests that one of the passages is an interpolation, but it is almost impossible to say which. What matters is that both views existed, and each represented a different approach. The first sees the Fates as incalculable beings who belong to the world of darkness, the second as agents of divine order working for the will of the gods. Ancient poets were aware of the difficulty, and at one place Pindar reveals his embarrassment when he makes the Fates bring Themis to wed Zeus (*fr.* 10. 3 Bo.), thereby rejecting the notion that they are the daughters of this marriage. It looks as if he were trying to harmonize the two stories of their origin by giving them an independent birth but at the same time making them creatures of light and happiness. Our poet must have been aware of this problem, since he too attempts a harmony, when he sets the Fates on Olympus next to Zeus but at the same time makes them daughters of Night, as does the Orphic Hymn when it calls them

Μοῖραι ἀπειρέσιοι, Νυκτὸς φίλα τέκνα μελαίνης. (59. 1).

There must have been good reasons for keeping Night as their mother.

A clue may be found in the words οὐράναι χθόνιαι τε, which imply that the Fates have a dual character. On the one hand, they are enthroned at the side of Zeus and carry out his will; on the other hand, they belong to the underworld of darkness and death and perform very different functions. This side has to be emphasized, since the poet is concerned with the eradication of evil as well as with the establishment of good. That perhaps is why he makes the Fates daughters of that Νύξ ὀλοή, whom Hesiod supplies with so mixed and so forbidding a progeny (*Theog.* 211 ff.). The Fates are both Olympian and chthonic, and when they are addressed as daughters of Night, we are reminded that Night is also the mother of the Furies, who call her μᾶτερ at *Choephoroe* 321 ff. Our poet stresses this relation and is fully entitled to do so; for the Fates are closely connected in rite and myth with the Erinyes or Eumenides. At Sicyon in the grove of the Eumenides there was an altar of the Fates, at which yearly sacrifices were made of sheep, wine mixed with honey, and flowers (*Paus.* 2. 11. 4); at Amyclae the Fates had an altar, and at Corinth a temple, next to those of Demeter, Kore, and Pluto (*Paus.* 3. 184; 2. 7); at the Piraeus they received bloodless offerings (*C.I.A.* 2. 1622; 3. 357), like the Eumenides. This association was recognized by Epimenides, who makes

Μοῖραι τ' ἀθάνατοι καὶ Ἐρινύες αἰολόδωροι (*fr.* 9 Kinkel)

the children of Cronos and Aphrodite. The genealogy is bold, but it keeps the ancient association between the Fates and the Furies. So, too, Aeschylus makes Prometheus class the two together:

Μοῖραι τρίμορφοι μνήμονές τ' Ἐρινύες. (*P.V.* 516.)

Though he seems to have held that the Eumenides are subordinate to the Fates, who grant them power (*Eum.* 333-5, 392 ff.), yet in the end he calls them both ματροκασίγνηται (*ibid.* 961). The close association of the two is implied in Homer, who makes an Erinyes silence the horse of Achilles when it has foretold what is fated, μόρσιμον, for its master (*Il.* 19. 418). The Fates are daughters of Night and χθόνιαι because they are closely connected with the Furies and bring vengeance as well as rewards.

By making Night the mother of the Fates the poet secures an important point, but at the cost of creating a small difficulty; for it means that they cannot be sisters of the Hours, whom the Fates are asked to summon. The Hours are the daughters of Themis (Hes. *Theog.* 901; Pind. fr. 10. 6; 36. 6 Bo.), and whatever control the Fates have over them, it cannot be as sisters. But this need not cause very much trouble. The Fates and the Hours were sufficiently connected for any precision about family-ties to be superfluous. They were brought together at Megara above the statue of Zeus in his temple (Paus. 1. 40. 4), and at Amyclae on the altar of Hyacinthus (id. 3. 19. 4). The association is easily understood; for if the Furies represent the darker side of the Fates as *χθόνιαι*, the Hours represent the brighter side as *οὐράνιαι*. The Hours belong to Olympus, where Themis bore them to Zeus, and Pindar attaches them to him as his special attendants (*Ol.* 4. 2). In their high position the Fates can work either through the Furies, when they send destruction, or through the Hours, when they send prosperity.

The Hours were originally goddesses of the earth, and such they remained, even when new duties were assigned to them. In Attica they were known as Auxo, Karpo, and Thallo (Paus. 9. 35. 2), and Pindar speaks of them as *ἀγλαοκάρπους* (fr. 10. 6 Bo.) and *φαινικεάνων* (fr. 63. 15). But though this view of them persisted, it had been rationalized and made more civic and social by the time of Hesiod when he used a popular etymology of their name to connect them with political virtues:

Εὐνομίην τε Δίκην τε καὶ Εἰρήνην τεθαλυῖαν
αἱ ἔργ' ὠρεῦνται καταθητοῖσι βροτοῖσι. (*Theog.* 902-3.)

The transition from one function to another would be easy enough in a society which connected good government with the success of the harvest (Hes. *Op.* 225 ff.), and Hesiod's conception of the Hours is not at absolute variance with the popular conception. It is rather a difference of emphasis and intention. So our poet, who on this point follows Hesiod closely, still insists on the beauty of the Hours in the adjectives which he gives to them. But he is no less concerned with their power and majesty and shows his hand when he calls Right and Peace *λιπαροθρόνους* rather as Pindar acclaims Hera as *χρυσόθρονον* (*Nem.* 1. 37) or Aphrodite as *εὐθρόνου* (*Isthm.* 2. 5). The old goddesses of the earth are turned into august civic powers, Olympian presences who bestow the best things of life upon men.

In this treatment of the Fates and the Hours there is nothing which would be obviously alien to Simonides. This adaptation of a theme from Hesiod recalls his treatment of *Ἀρετή* in fr. 37 D. The sense of the vast powers of the Fates is like such a sentiment as

τὸ γεγενημένον οὐκέτ' ἄρεκτον ἔσται. (fr. 54 D.)

The dexterous handling of divine genealogies is suitable enough to the man who made *Αὔριον* a goddess (Men. *Encom. Rhet.* 9. 133 Walz). But the lines have also a more strictly political significance, which raises special problems. The Hesiodic conception of the Hours, as it is here presented, was used more than once in the first half of the fifth century. Writing for Pytheas of Aegina,

probably not after 485 B.C.,¹ Bacchylides says of the island:

Εὐνομία τε σάοφρων
ἂ θάλιας τε λέλογγεν
ἄστεά τ' εὐσεβέων
ἀνδρῶν ἐν εἰρήνῃ φυλάσσει. (13. 186-9.)

Δίκη is not mentioned, but she cannot be far from his thoughts. In another poem, of which unfortunately we know neither the occasion nor the date, he tells how Menelaus makes a speech at Troy and says:

ἀλλ' ἐν μέσῳ κείται κιχέιν
πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις Δίκαν ἰθεῖαν, ἀγνᾶς
Εὐνομίας ἀκόλουθον καὶ πινυτᾶς Θέμιτος. (15. 53-55.)

Even more relevant to our passage are the lines which Pindar wrote for Xenophon of Corinth in 464 B.C.:

ἐν τῇ γὰρ Εὐνομία ναίει κασί-
γνηταί τε, βάθρον πολίων ἀσφαλές,
Δίκη καὶ ὁμότροφος Εἰρήνη, τάμ' ἀνδράσι πλούτου,
χρυσέαι παῖδες εὐβούλου Θέμιτος. (Ol. 13. 6-9.)

We cannot assert with confidence that either Bacchylides or Pindar had our poem in mind, though it is not impossible, but it is clear that both are concerned with the Hours as political powers of order and justice, and it is possible that this was almost a *communis locus* in choral poetry when it dealt with the fortunes of cities. What is more important is that both for Bacchylides and for Pindar the mention of the Hours, and especially of *Εὐνομία*, implies an aristocratic or oligarchic background. This is obvious in the cases of Aegina and Corinth, and it is confirmed by the general use of *εὐνομία* as the catchword of those systems of government which rejected the *ἰσονομία* claimed by democracies. The question is whether our poet calls upon the Hours in this partisan spirit. It is true that in the sixth century *εὐνομία* did not have so specialized a sense. Solon uses it for his own reformed society, which is to counter the *δυσνομίη* of the existing system (fr. 3. 30 ff. D), and Xenophanes applies it to the good order which is disturbed when honours are paid to the wrong men (fr. 2. 19 D). Even Pindar is not quite precise in his use of it; for when in 462 B.C. he addresses King Arcesilas of Cyrene, he includes among the gifts of Apollo peaceful lawfulness in the heart:

ἀπόλεμον ἀγαγὼν
εἰς πραπίδας εὐνομίαν, (Pyth. 5. 66-67)

and if this has any political reference, it is rather to hereditary monarchy than to aristocracy or oligarchy. The word may have hardened and become more limited as the fifth century advanced, and we cannot be certain that our poet sees in the Hours the same political implications as Pindar did at Corinth.

None the less it is at least possible that he did, that the repetition of the names of the Hours in their Hesiodic form suggests a conservative standpoint, that two poets, ours and Pindar, would not have used them without some similarity of political intention, that after all they are not what we should

¹ A. Severyns, *Bacchylide*, pp. 41-54.

expect from a poem written for a democracy or a tyranny. On the whole we may conclude that our poet, like Pindar, invokes the Hours because of their aristocratic associations and that in the prayer which he makes for a city rent by *στάσεις*, he is acting for the nobles. The matter is relevant to the question of authorship, since, though Simonides seems to have been equally at home with tyrants and democratic leaders, there is not much evidence that he worked for aristocracies, and to Aegina at least, as the enemy of Athens, he was hostile.

The problem would be simpler if we knew for what city the lines were written. The only clue is that the Fates are given a striking prominence, and this would be possible both in Thebes and in Corinth. Now it happens that immediately after the Persian Wars Themistocles was associated with Thebes, and since Simonides was his friend, he may also have been involved in its affairs. Themistocles saved Thebes from being expelled, as the Spartans proposed, from the Delphic Amphictyony (Plut. *Them.* 20). Moreover, Thebes was rent by civil strife after Plataea, when the *δυναστεία ἀλλήλων ἀνδρῶν* was transformed into an *ἀνταρξία ἰσόνομος* (Thuc. 3. 62), or even for a time into some sort of democracy ('Xen.' *Rep. Ath.* 3. 11). But it is hard to believe that in such a struggle Simonides would take the side of the Theban aristocrats unless he was under strong compulsion to do so, and for this there is no evidence; for we do not hear that Themistocles supported the Theban nobles against their adversaries. The case for Corinth is perhaps a little stronger. For Simonides paid a handsome tribute to the Corinthians who fought at Plataea (fr. 64 D), and this was quoted in later days to correct the false impression given by Herodotus of their behaviour (Plut. *de Mal. Her.* 42). If Simonides was on good terms with the Corinthians, they may have asked him to write a Hymn for them, but we know too little of their politics in the years after 479 B.C. to say whether the situation called for such lines as ours. But all this is to carry speculation too far. Even if the poem is the work of Simonides, and we cannot be certain that it is, we do not know for whom he wrote it. It remains a striking and impressive piece of Greek poetry.

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THE *LEX SEMPRONIA NE QUIS IUDICIO CIRCUMVENIATUR*¹

ALL we know of this law is to be found in Cicero's *Pro Cluentio*. Elsewhere we have only one passing reference to it.² However, this speech seems to give us the main clause of the bill as it appeared after incorporation in the *Lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis*: 'Qui tribunus militum legionibus quattuor primis quive quaestor, tribunus plebis'—deinceps omnes magistratus nominavit—'quive in senatu sententiam dixit dixerit, qui eorum coit, coierit, convenit, convenerit quo quis iudicio publico condemnaretur de eius capite quaerito.'³

That this is the original Gracchan part of the law appears from the argument in secs. 150–2. Here Cicero explicitly ascribes the restriction on the scope of the law to Gracchus—'hanc ipsam legem G. Gracchus tulit'—and claims that later Sulla—'homo a populi causa remotissimus'—did not dare to extend its scope though he would willingly have done so. Cicero again insists on this point in sec. 154—'ea lege qua nunc Habitus accusatur quae tunc erat Sempronia, nunc est Cornelia.'

Indeed, if we press Cicero's quotations from the *Lex Cornelia*, it seems that this was the only section of the law which was retrospective in its operation—'qui eorum coit, coierit, convenit, convenerit quo quis . . .' as compared with the previous clause quoted—'quicumque fecerit, vendiderit, emerit, habuerit . . .'. But this may only show that Cicero was not quoting that clause in its full legal phraseology.

Difficulty has been found in interpreting the purpose of this law and its position in relation to the rest of Gaius' legislation, especially in view of the restriction of its provisions to senators. Some historians have ignored it completely;⁴ others have made the following four suggestions:

1. Mommsen⁵ identified it with Gracchus' renewal of the law *de provocations* forbidding the appointment of extraordinary judicial commissions with power to impose a capital sentence.
2. Greenidge⁶ thought that it might be directed against any future revival of special commissions with senatorial *iudices* or against the praetors in civil suits.
3. Last⁷ thought that it showed that there were two stages in the evolution of Gaius' attempt to deal with corruption in the *quaestio de repetundis*. This *lex* is one of the earlier measures when he did not yet contemplate the replacement of senatorial by equestrian *iudices*.
4. Sherwin-White⁸ suggests that the law may have been directed not against those who took bribes in the court but against those who gave them.

¹ I thank Mr. F. A. Lepper for his help in preparing this article for publication and Mr. A. N. Sherwin-White for criticism of an earlier draft. The remaining blemishes are my own.

² Cic. *Brutus* 48.

³ *Pro Cluentio* 148.

⁴ e.g. Carcopino, *Histoire Romaine*.

⁵ *History of Rome*, trans. Dickson, iii. 355

(Macmillan, 1908). So also Lange, *Römische Alterthümer*, iii. 30 (1871).

⁶ Greenidge, *A History of Rome 133–70 B.C.* i. 216 f. (1904).

⁷ Last, *C.A.H.* ix. 53 f. and 70 (criticizing Greenidge).

⁸ Sherwin-White in *J.R.S.*, 1952, p. 46 n. 23.

He does not argue the point, and appears to connect the law with the *quaestio de repetundis*.

I wish to show that Last's interpretation of the measure, which is accepted by the two latest writers on the subject¹ in spite of Sherwin-White's suggestion, is at least open to question and then put forward a modification of the older view.

What is the correct translation of the title of the *lex*? It seems reasonable to look to the use of *circumvenire* elsewhere in this speech. There *iudicio circumvenire* is used twice, both times with the meaning 'to procure corruptly the conviction of the defendant'.² This is also the crime in the clause of the law quoted by Cicero, 'coire quo quis condemnaretur'. This usage of *iudicio circumvenire* is not peculiar to this speech; it is also found in Cicero, *Tusculan*. i. 98: 'Palamedem . . . Aiace . . . alios iudicio iniquo circumventos'.³

However, the evidence which we have for the behaviour of the *iudices* in the *quaestio de repetundis* before the legislation of Gaius Gracchus does not suggest that such a law would be directed against a notorious evil. The senatorial *iudices*, as Gracchus reminded the people,⁴ had been more notable for acquitting the guilty than for pursuing vendettas against the innocent. Doubtless it was for this reason that Last assumed that there must be more clauses to Gaius' law than that quoted by Cicero who would only give what was relevant to this case. Presumably, though he does not say so, Last would translate the title of the *lex* as 'To ensure that no one fails to obtain justice in the courts' and would postulate another clause designed to protect and extend the rights of the plaintiffs against corruption. But there is no support for such a clause or clauses in the *Pro Cluentio* which is our only evidence for this law.

Yet can we make sense of the *Lex* on the assumption that the *Pro Cluentio* gives us the gist of the measure? I think we can if we approach the evidence without the presupposition that it must be related to the alleged corruption in the *quaestio de repetundis*.⁵ The first actions of Gaius after his election as tribune were to take revenge on those who had frustrated or suppressed his brother's attempt at reform. A law that forbade reappointment of magistrates deposed by the people was proposed, directed against Octavius; extraordinary *quaestiones* appointed without the sanction of the people were forbidden; Popilius Laenas and perhaps Rupilius, the consuls of 132, were driven into exile. These laws looked to the past; but they also served to protect Gaius against any reaction in the future. It is surely possible, as Mommsen saw, and more in accordance with what little we know of it, to connect the *lex ne quis circumveniretur* with this group of legislation rather than with the reform of the *quaestio de repetundis*. Gaius might find himself accused on some trumped up charge either

¹ Scullard's revised edition of Marsh, *History of the Roman World* 146-30, p. 409 (1954), and Badian, *A.J.P.*, 1954, pp. 376 ff.

² *Pro Cluentio* 146 referring to Cluentius' alleged bribery at the first trial; and 192 referring to Sassia's activities in the present one. *Circumvenire* is also used alone four times in the speech with the same meaning (secs. 9, 30, 79, 90).

³ Cicero is here translating from Plato's *Apology* 32: καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλος διὰ κρίσιν ἀδικῶν τέθνηκεν. *Iudicio circumvenire* need not only

refer to securing an unjust verdict by bribery. These are both cases of unjust verdicts where none was involved. Palamedes was condemned on forged evidence (Hyginus, *Fabulae* 105) and Ajax failed to obtain the arms of Achilles because of Odysseus' influence with the jury (Pindar, *Nem.* 8. 26). (I owe this point to Mr. Lepper.)

⁴ Appian, *Bellum Civile* 1. 22.

⁵ Note also that Cicero describes the law as *pro plebe* (148) and not *pro provincialibus*.

before a *iudicium populi* or before a special *quaestio* authorized by a packed assembly, and then pressure and bribery might be brought to bear on the citizens or *iudices* to condemn him. The only people with the motive and authority to do this were the senators and so the law was only directed against them. Perhaps he hoped to defeat such a move by this law. In the event, of course, all such legal defences were in vain against the forceful methods of Opimius. But the senate had proceeded before against the followers of Tiberius with quasi-legal forms and might be expected to do so again.

If the above interpretation is accepted, I cannot leave this subject without a brief consideration of Professor Last's theory that there were two stages in Gaius' judiciary legislation. This theory rested upon two main arguments: firstly, that the mutually supporting testimony of Plutarch and Livy could not be ignored even though it contradicted the rest of our ancient authorities, and secondly, that the *lex ne quis circumveniat* showed that at one time senators were expected to remain as *iudices* in the *quaestio de repetundis*.

If Plutarch were alone against the rest of the ancient evidence we might be bold enough to dismiss his far from lucid¹ account on the ground that he had mistakenly ascribed to Gaius the proposal of Drusus in 91 B.C. But Livy cannot be so easily ignored. The epitomator may be inaccurate elsewhere, but here he is emphatic in his assertions and arithmetic, and, as Last rightly says, 'surprise provokes attention'. Moreover, he cannot have been confused by some later proposal; Drusus proposed to import 300 *equites* into the senate, Sulla did so, but no one ever suggested that 600 should be incorporated at once. I question, however, the universal view that the proposal to enlarge the senate must have been directed towards the reform of the *quaestio de repetundis*. Livy makes no mention of such a connexion. It is at least possible that the law the epitomator quotes was rather intended as a threat² to swamp the senate with new creations if it attempted to interfere with his programme. This might explain the quiescence of the senate in 123 B.C. It can, of course, be objected that there is absolutely no warrant elsewhere than in the epitome of Livy for such a suggestion. But can we put much weight on the *argumentum ex silentio* in face of the paucity of evidence for this period?

This is highly speculative. The only certainty is that no ancient authority credits Gaius with the introduction of two judiciary laws. The theory that he did so is a modern expedient to avoid rejecting part of the ancient testimony. Each historian will decide for himself whether he prefers to excise or duplicate.

The last part of this paper has necessarily been more rash than the first. My main purpose has been to rehabilitate the view of Mommsen on the *lex ne quis circumveniat*.

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¹ It is not clear from Plutarch whether Gaius proposed to reform the *quaestio* by enrolling a new *album* of equestrian *iudices* from which juries would be drawn equally with the senatorial *album* (as Badian argues in *A.J.P.*, 1954, pp. 377 ff.); or whether he intended to augment the senate with 300 *equites* who would in consequence form part of the senatorial *album* (so Mommsen and Last).

² Last would totally disagree with this interpretation: 'It is difficult to suggest a method less offensive to senatorial susceptibilities than this' (*C.A.H.* ix. 70). Without referring to modern examples, the majority of the senate did not view with favour the proposal of Drusus in 91 B.C. even though it was designed for their benefit (Victor, *De Viris Illustribus* 66).

DIONYSUS LIKNITES

In the *Classical Quarterly*, xlix (July–October 1955), Mrs. A. D. Ure mentions a Corinthian pyxis which had been previously published by her in the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, lxix. 19 f. (Figs. 2a and 3). This vase, at first believed to be of Boeotian origin, appears to come from Corinth, as subsequently shown by Mrs. Ure in *J.H.S.* lxxii. 121. Its subject is quite well known, consisting of an unbearded figure dressed in a fawn-skin with two horns growing from its head, and sitting on what very probably is a heap of corn. In his right hand he is holding a staff thickened at the head, and in his left a stick terminating in fork-like prongs.¹ The figure is flanked on the right by a small animal (pig) and on the left by a basket of fruit. It is believed to be Dionysus who in this instance, if Mrs. Ure's interpretation of winnowing-fan and fork is correct, would be associated with the goddess Demeter. However, since Dionysus in cult is but rarely connected with Demeter, I would agree with Professor H. J. Rose who maintains (*J.H.S.* lxxii. 121) that this pyxis represents no cult scene, and that these two deities have mysteries in common in one instance only, at Lerna.

In her article in the *Classical Quarterly* Mrs. Ure contends that this figure, by reason of the two implements, portrays a Dionysus Liknites or Winnower, as distinct from the well-known and popular cult of the divine child in the winnowing basket. Her arguments are: (1) A papyrus containing fragments of what appear to be a *Thebaid*, published by Professor E. G. Turner, in which reference is made to a golden *thrinax*. Dionysus is not mentioned in this papyrus, but he is believed to be associated with the *thrinax* in this case, because the dithyramb and other relevant features are referred to in the papyrus. (2) The fact that the word *liknites* is more appropriate to one holding the *liknon* than to one within it. In support of this argument she quotes Stephanus of Byzantium who regards *λικνίτης* as bearing the same relation to *λίκνον* as *ὀπλίτης* to *ὄπλον*—*ὀπλίτης* 'a person wielding a weapon', *λικνίτης* 'a person holding a *liknon*'. To this group she adds *αἰχμητής* 'a man with a spear', and *κορυμήτης* 'a man with a club'.

The fragment in which the word *θρίναξ* occurs has been published as part of the *Hibeh Papyri*, and it appears on pp. 19–20.² Professor Turner (p. 17) says: 'Fragment I is in direct speech, and a mother(?) seems to be lamenting her son. The reference to a golden *thrinax* (l. 14) and to the dithyramb (l. 20) might suggest that he is Iacchos-Dionysos, and that the story relates the search for and piecing-together of the dismembered Iacchos before his rebirth.'³ It is uncertain what function the golden *thrinax* is meant to serve in this poem, because there is no evidence of it being employed for any but a utilitarian purpose.³ One conclusion, however, must be certain, that the word *thrinax* does rather tend to make an association with the figure of Dionysus Liknites unlikely. Probably neither the *thrinax* nor the *ptuon* ever assumed any religious

¹ Mrs. Ure describes the object in the right hand as an oar-like *ptuon*, and that in the left hand as a *thrinax*. Unfortunately the fork-like object or *thrinax* is hardly discernible from the reproduction in *J.H.S.* lxix.

² *Hibeh Papyri*, ii, no. 177, fr. i, l. 14

[θ]ρίνακι χρυσείῃ[ε].

³ Except once perhaps on an inscription, when the image of a *thrinax* was used as a signet, *Tabulae Heraclenses* i. 5 (Inscr. Graec. xiv. 645).

significance,¹ and in Greece they were always clearly distinct from the *liknon*. Finally, it seems doubtful whether the figure of Iacchus or Dionysus is the subject of the fragment under discussion. Indeed, the mention of the dithyramb offers no conclusive proof of such a theory, because it need not always have been connected with the god Dionysus.² The second argument is readily answered. It is perfectly true that *ἀνλντης* and *αλχνήτης* cannot be translated by 'a man in a weapon' or 'a man in a spear'; but these nouns certainly can signify 'a man concerned with a weapon' or 'a spear'. It follows that there are a number of these denominative nouns which cannot mean 'a person holding an object', but which merely denote that the person is concerned with it.³

I am not competent to remark on the date of representations in Greek art of cult scenes of Dionysus Liknites, the majority of which Mrs. Ure says date to the Hellenistic age and later, although she admits that we have examples that occur in the fifth century. One of these is a *χοῦς* of about the middle of the second half of the fifth century by the Eretria painter showing a mask of Dionysus within a *liknon* placed on a table.

There is ample evidence that the cult of the divine child Dionysus within the *liknon* is of old standing.⁴ Plutarch described one form of it in his address to Clea, the leader at the time of the Delphic Thyiades, as a trieteric *ἐγερσις*.⁵ The best evidence concerning its origin points to the Phrygians who may have brought the 'trieteric' Dionysus from their home in Thrace.⁶ Another form can be found in the mystic rite of *ἐγερσις* which takes place in spring and which is also performed by the Lydians.⁷ Orphic tradition relates that a Mother Earth goddess, Hipta, possibly of Hittite derivation,⁸ carries the *liknon* with a snake coiled round it and containing the child Dionysus on her head.⁹ Hipta was taken over by Orphism; to her, as the nurse of Bacchus, the 49th hymn is dedicated. We have two earlier inscriptions from the Maeonian district in Asia Minor dedicated to Meter Hipta and Zeus Sabazios. But the Phrygian god Sabazios is usually associated with Dionysus; and the later Orphic tradition seems to support this view, although in the Maeonian inscriptions no mention of a divine

¹ See J. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (New York, 1955), p. 530, for the *ptuon* which 'remained a simple agricultural tool'. See generally *ibid.*, pp. 526-30, where Miss Harrison gives a succinct account of the uses of the *ptuon* and *liknon*, together with the relevant literary sources.

² See A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, *Dithyramb Tragedy and Comedy* (Oxford, 1927), pp. 8 ff., 40-45 (Bacchylides).

³ See Goodwin, *Greek Grammar* (Macmillan, 1948), par. 841: 'a person concerned with anything may be denoted by the following suffixes: *ev*-masc.; sometimes *ev*-fem. *ta*-masc. (nom. *της*) *τιδ*-fem.' See also Ed. Schwyzler, *Griechische Grammatik* (München, 1939), ii. 1: 1, pp. 499 f.

⁴ Pauly-Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, xiii. 1, cols. 536 ff., 'Liknites' (Kruse).

⁵ Plutarch, *De Is. Os.*, p. 365 a: *καὶ θύουσιν οἱ Ὀσίοι θυσίαν ἀπόρρητον ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος, ὅταν οἱ Θυιάδες ἐγείρωσι τὸν Λικνί-*

την. Cf. p. 378 f.

⁶ M. P. Nilsson, *The Minoan-Mycenaean Religion and its Survival in Greek Religion* (Lund, 1950), p. 569, where see a full discussion of the subject and literature.

⁷ Himerios, iii. 6; Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* (München, 1955), i. 579 and n. 1. Compare the *ἐγερσις* which the Phrygians celebrate with Bacchic rites in summer (Plut. *De Is. Os.*, p. 378 f.).

⁸ Nilsson, *Gesch. d. griech. Rel.* i. 579 f., n. 8.

⁹ Nilsson, *Gesch. d. griech. Rel.* i. 579; *id. Min.-Mye. Rel.* pp. 568 f.; Proclus, *In Plat. Timaeum* i. 407 Diehl = Kern, *Orph. Fragm.*, no. 199. Nilsson, *The Dionysiac Mysteries of the Hellenistic and Roman Age*, Lund, 1957, p. 43, n. 23, lays emphasis on the fact that Proclus (*ibid.*) mentions only one snake. He suggests that this snake may be identical with the *οὐροπόρος ὄφης* which to Neoplatonists is often the symbol of the world which renews itself.

child is made. In Greece, the divine child which lies asleep in *cribro* until it is awakened to ensure a good crop of corn¹ and a fruitful growth of vegetation may not always be Dionysus, but indeed any vegetation deity such as Demeter herself, or Athene, or Hermes.²

Of great interest in this connexion is the part played by Dionysus Liknites in the trieteric orgia described by Plutarch, for there he need not be concerned with his old functions as a deity of vegetation. The chief argument against such a view lies in the fact that the orgiastic rite is biennial, so that it cannot be connected with the reawakening of Nature in spring. Nilsson in his latest work³ fully discusses this point. He says⁴ that on taking the relevant passage in Plutarch about Liknites as a whole, the reader receives the impression that the trieteric rite at Delphi does not concern the awakening of the god, but his ascent from the underworld. To support his theory, Nilsson⁵ adduces some evidence which is mostly drawn from the Orphic Hymns. There Dionysus is closely connected with Persephone and Eubuleus, two figures of the underworld.⁶ Now it has been said above that the trieteric orgia were introduced into Greece from Asia Minor. Asia Minor, too, in all likelihood was the birth-place of the Orphic Hymns.⁷ The nature of the eastern trieteric festival does not, however, suggest a vegetation cult, but—if Nilsson's thesis is correct—deals with the ascent of the god from the underworld. This raises the problem, how one can reconcile the Greek concept of the divine child in the winnowing-fan with the type of Liknites just described. The answer has already been suggested by Nilsson. He pointed out that the figure of this Liknites, whose awakening is celebrated every two years, assumed another significance in the new Dionysiac mysteries of the Hellenistic and Roman age.⁸ Then the *liknon* filled with fruit, and the phallus, served as the symbols of purification and

¹ See schol. Callimachus, *Hymn* i. 48; and schol. Aratus 268: ἐν τοῖς λικμητηρίοις γεννώμενα τὰ βρέφη ἐτίθεσαν εἰς σύμβολον εὐτροφίας. Δημήτριος γὰρ καρπῶν τὸ ἐργαλεῖον.

² Harpocration, τὸ λίκνον πρὸς πᾶσαν τέλην καὶ θυσίαν ἐπιτίθεινόν ἐστιν. Baby Hermes in the *liknon* surveying the cattle he has stolen from Apollo, on an Attic red-figure cup of the first quarter of the fifth century, *Class. Quart.* xlix. 228 n. 8. Compare also the birth of Plutus from the cornucopia represented on a 5th/4th century hydria from Rhodes in the Museum at Constantinople. This was first published and briefly discussed by S. Reinach, *Revue Arch.* (1900), xxxvi. 87. See also J. Svoronos, *Journ. d'Arch. et Numism.* (1901), p. 387, and L. R. Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States* (Oxford, 1907), iii. 256 f., and fig. xxib. The last discussion is in M. P. Nilsson, *Gesch. d. griech. Rel.* i. 317 f., with a few differences in interpretation which are unimportant to the present discussion.

³ *The Dionysiac Mysteries of the Hellenistic and Roman Age* (Lund, 1957), pp. 38–45, 'Dionysos Liknites', and see especially p. 40.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 39 f.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 41 ff. On p. 41 of this work Nilsson rejects his previous view, *Min.-*

Mycen. Rel., p. 566, that Dionysus Liknites was a figure of vegetation cult. This seems somewhat unnecessary, since he had at that time already, *Min.-Mycen. Rel.*, p. 567, distinguished between the trieteric orgia and the concept of the divine child that is born and dies annually. To illustrate the annual birth and death of Dionysus, Nilsson quotes, *Min.-Mycen. Rel.*, p. 567 n. 18, a fragment from a hymn to the epiphany of this god, which has been published in *Mitteilungen aus der Papyrussammlung der Nationalbibliothek in Wien*, n.s. i, 'Griechische literarische Papyri', i (1932), xxii. ii. 138: Διόνυσον ἀέσωμεν ἑρπῆς ἐν ἀμείραις δώδεκα μήνας ἀπόρτα κ.τ.λ.

⁶ See especially the end of the 46th Hymn to Liknites, where it is said that through Zeus' will Dionysus was brought to Persephone. See also the 30th Hymn, where Dionysus is called Eubuleus, and the 42nd Hymn to Misa in which Dionysus is the στέργμα Εὐβουλῆος. Compare the 52nd Hymn to Trieteticus.

⁷ See Nilsson, *Dion. Myst.*, p. 38. Compare his note in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, s.v. 'Orphic Literature'.

⁸ Nilsson, *Dion. Myst.*, p. 44.

fertility. The child Dionysus, in Orphic religion and to the Neoplatonists, became the future Master of the Universe by command of Zeus.¹ This late development explains the fact that this type of Liknites figures prominently in the Orphic Hymns, for their date probably also falls within the Roman age. Furthermore, Plutarch's treatise *On Isis and Osiris* was composed in the second century A.D., and it is full of syncretism as well as steeped in the mysteries of its age. It introduces the subject of the trieteric orgia in order to compare the Orphic tale of the dismemberment of Dionysus with the same fate suffered by Osiris;² but it gives no hint of the Greek concept of the divine child in the *liknon*. Therefore it becomes apparent that any connexion between the trieteric Liknites and the scene on the vase in question must be ruled out on obvious grounds, and on that of date—Mrs. Ure's date for the vase is the third quarter of the fifth century.

The *λίκνον* or *νέικλον*, *νίκλον* (Hesych.) is often represented as a woven basket with a rim disappearing on one side, or becoming thinner;³ it is shown sometimes with and sometimes without handles. A sieve-like implement, the *liknon* serves to separate the threshed corn from the chaff in preparation for the new season. In time the very motion of winnowing with the *liknon* came to be looked upon as having a purifying and beneficent effect on the seed corn, when the divine child is gently swung in it to ensure a successful harvest.⁴ The *πτύον* could obviously not be used for the same purpose. The *πτύον* is an oar-like⁵ shovel used for winnowing when a not too strong wind permitted and is in appearance not unlike the object held in the right hand of the figure on the Corinthian pyxis. The *θρίναξ* is a type of fork with three or five prongs.⁶ Hesychius calls it, *σκεῦος γεωργικόν, ὃ καὶ λέγεται λικμητήριον, ἐπειδὴ τριαννοεῖδής ἐστι οἷονεῖ τριόνυξ*.⁷

The common verb for winnowing with the *πτύον*, *thrinax*, or *liknon* was *λικμάω*. The fact that this verb is akin to *liknon* may have been responsible for an occasional confusion between *πτύον* and *λίκνον*. While this may be true for a description of the winnowing of threshed corn, it can hardly be claimed to have occurred in reference to the *deus in cribro*, in whose cult the employment of the basket is essential. Nor indeed is there anything to substantiate such a belief. And I see no reason to suppose the juxtaposition of a Dionysus Liknites, who wields a *ptyon* and assists Demeter in winnowing the corn, and the well-known Dionysus of the mysteries, until some evidence can be found to corroborate such a view.

The scene on the Reading pyxis is at best doubtful proof of this and is surely not supported by the evidence in Mrs. Ure's article 'Threshing Floor or Vineyard'.

Professor H. J. Rose in *J.H.S.* lxxii. 121 points out that this vase does not show a scene from a cult or rite, and that we know of none that would fit a more than poetic or artistic association between Demeter and Dionysus. It may be necessary to search farther afield for the significance of the scene. The

¹ Ibid., pp. 43 f.; cf. id. *Min.-Mycen. Rel.*, pp. 581 f.

² See Nilsson, *Dion. Myst.*, pp. 38, 40.

³ Amelung, *Vatican*, l. 520, pl. 54; *Brit. Sch. Ath.* x. 146.

⁴ See above, p. 246, n. 1; P.-W. xiii. 1, cols. 538 ff., 'Liknon' (Kroll).

⁵ Hom. *Od.* 11. 127 ff., and schol. B.H.V.

on *Od.* 11. 128. Cf. Hom. *Il.* 13. 588 ff., and schol. A.B.

⁶ Miss J. Harrison, *J.H.S.* xxiii (1903), 292 f.; xxiv (1904), 241 f., see *Class. Quart.* xlix. 228.

⁷ Hesychius, *θρίναξ*; and schol. Nic. Ther. 114. For a full discussion of these implements see P.-W. xiii. 1, cols. 539 f.

basket on the left of our figure may make an interesting contribution to any interpretation. Filled as it appears to be with fruit and corn, it calls to mind a 'panspermie' ceremony of the type that obtained at Eleusis. The plate of Ninnion from Eleusis shows women carrying so-called Eleusinian vessels on their heads which Nilsson identifies as examples of the *liknon* of Dionysus¹ used for this purpose, when it is frequently filled with fruit, and the phallus. However, the horns of the figure on the pyxis, if it is Dionysus, suggest an orgiastic rite. Mrs. Ure points out that they more closely resemble those of a goat than a bull. If this is true, it is tempting to believe that we have no Dionysus here at all, but rather some other figure associated with corn and perhaps a fruitful harvest who is depicted often as wearing the horns of a goat. I have in mind a type of fertility daimon who renders help for the growth of corn and sometimes of vegetation in general, possibly a satyr.² A black-figure vase in Paris shows a female head beaten by satyrs with mallet-like hammers as it rises from the ground. This scene depicts the anodos of Persephone, symbolic of the growing young corn when the ploughed earth is evened with wooden mallets, following the autumnal rains.³ The satyrs on this vase have human shapes and feet, yet in a similar scene on a vase at Dresden⁴ they still sport the hooves of goats. Scenes such as this show their frequent close connexion with Demeter, the goddess whose dearest office is to provide a good crop and a propitious sowing for the coming year.⁵

If the figure on the pyxis is seated on a heap of threshed corn—which seems to be supported by the fact that wisps of corn hang from the pig's mouth—then it may more readily be explained as a 'Fruchtbarkeits Daemon', such as a satyr, who in this instance does not necessarily have to recall one particular cult scene.⁶

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¹ Nilsson, *Gesch. d. griech. Rel.* i. 128, and E. Gjerstad, *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, xxvi (1928), 183, n. 11.


² Obviously the figure in question does not have the hooves of a goat, the common attribute of the satyr. Towards the end of the sixth century, however, these hooves tend to disappear in art, H. Jeanmaire, *Dionysos* (Paris, 1951), p. 280, and bibliogr. on pp. 495 f.

³ Nilsson, *Gesch. d. griech. Rel.* i. 472, and pl. 39, 2.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pl. 39, 1.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 472. See a full discussion of satyrs and silenés in Nilsson, *op. cit.*, pp. 232 ff., and similarly in connexion with Dionysus, Jeanmaire, *op. cit.*, pp. 278 ff.

⁶ If I am right, the object in the right hand of our figure may not be a *pteron* at all, but the mallet, a more appropriate instrument in the hands of such a personage. However, without examination of the original this must unfortunately remain a conjecture.



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